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Abstract 
Computer Science today has many examples of logics given by proof systems. 
Although one intuitively knows how to use these systems and recognise correct 
derivations, there is no definitive account which captures this intuition. It is 
therefore natural to seek a framework for representing logics, which unifies the 
structure common to all logical systems. We introduce such a framework, called 
ELF and based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework (ELF). The major advan-
tage of ELF is that it allows us to give precise definitions of representation. Such 
definitions are not possible with ELF since information is lost during encoding; 
the adequacy theorems of ELF representations are only applicable to particular 
encodings and cannot be generalised. We rectify this deficiency using the extra 
distinctions between terms provided by the universes of a pure type system which 
yields a simple presentation of the type theory of ELF. To do this, we extend 
these type systems to include signatures and /3ij-equivalence. 
Using the ideas underlying representation in ELF+,  we give a standard presen-
tation of the logics under consideration, based on Martin-Löf's notion of judge-
ments and Aczel's work on Frege structures. This presentation forms a reference 
point from which to investigate representations in ELF; it is not itself a frame-
work since we do not specify a logic using a finite amount of information. Logics 
which do not fit this pattern are particularly interesting as they are more difficult, 
if not impossible, to encode. 
The syntactic definitions of representations have an elegant algebraic formu-
lation which utilises the abstract view of logics as consequence relations. The 
properties of the ELF entailment relation determine the behaviour of the van-
ables and consequence relations of the logics under consideration. Encodings must 
preserve this common structure. This motivates the presentation of the logics and 
their corresponding type theories as strict indexed categories (or split fibrations) 
so that encodings give rise to indexed functors. The syntactic notions of represen-
tation now have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Gordon Plotkin, for many ideas and inspi-
rational discussions, and for his help when it was needed. I am also indebted to 
John Power for his guidance and moral support, and to Eugenio Moggi and Anne 
Salvesen for their help in the early stages of this thesis. 
My thanks also go to many friends and colleagues, associated with the Labo-
ratory for the Foundations of Computer Science, for their advice, suggestions and 
friendship: in particular, to Stuart Anderson, Julian Bradfield, George Cleland, 
Zhaohui Luo, James McKinna, Randy Pollack and Alistair Sinclair, and to Claire 
Jones for her advice about ]I4TEX. 
This work was supported by a SERC Research Studentship and, in the finishing 
stages, by the Laboratory for the Foundations of Computer Science. 




I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, and the work contained in it is 
my own except where otherwise stated. 
Philippa Gardner 
111 




Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	iv 
Introduction 	 1 
Pure Type Systems 	 11 
2.1 Introduction to pure type systems ..................11 
2.2 Pure type systems with signatures ..................23 
2.3 Pure type systems with 077-equivalence ................34 
Logical Systems 	 45 
3.1 	Syntax and judgements ........................46 
3.2 Proof systems and consequence relations ...............55 
The Framework ELF 	 64 
4.1 	Representation in ELF .........................65 
4.1.1 Representation of first-order logic in ELF 	......... 	66 
4.1.2 	Adequacy theorem .......................70 
4.1.3 	Problems with ELF ......................72 
4.2 	The type theory ELF 	..........................73 
4.2.1 	Definition of the type theory .................74 
4.2.2 	Representation in ELF 	....................76 
iv 
Table of Contents 
	
4.2.3 	Results 	.............................79 
4.2.4 	/3i-long normal forms .....................84 
Adequate and Natural Encodings 	 91 
5.1 Representation of consequence relations ...............92 
5.1.1 	Encodings ............................92 
5.1.2 	Adequate encodings ......................97 
5.1.3 	More examples .........................100 
5.2 Representation of proofs ........................109 
5.2.1 	Proof expressions ........................110 
5.2.2 	Natural encodings .......................113 
Encodings Expressed as Indexed Functors 	 119 
6.1 Indexing of categories .........................120 
6.2 Logics as indexed categories ......................121 
6.3 ELF as an indexed category ......................124 
6.4 Adequate encodings give indexed isomorphisms ...........127 
6.5 Natural encodings give indexed isomorphisms ............131 
Conclusions and Future Work 
	
135 






A wide variety of logical systems are used in Computer Science today. Although 
one intuitively knows how to use these systems and recognise correct derivations, 
there is no definitive account which captures this intuition. It is therefore natural 
to seek a framework for representing logics which unifies the structure common to 
all logical systems. The framework must explain the notions central to these logics 
such as binding, discharge of assumptions and context sensitive side-conditions. 
Moreover, it should be easy to translate a logic to this unified setting and to 
recognise when this translation results in a representation of the logic. As well as 
providing insights into the important theoretical question of what a logic is, these 
goals have an immediate application in the provision of computer-assisted tools 
for reasoning with various logics. 
Type theories have emerged as leading candidates for frameworks. In this 
thesis we introduce such a type theory for representing logics, called ELF+  and 
based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework (ELF). The major advantage of ELF 
is that it allows us to give precise definitions of representation. Such definitions 
are not possible with ELF since information is lost during encoding; the adequacy 
theorems of ELF representations are only applicable to particular encodings and 
cannot be generalised. 
1 
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Type theories and logics 
Type theories and minimal intuitionistic logics are connected by the well-known 
propositions- as- types principle, sometimes called the Curry—Howard correspon-
dence [CF58] [How80]. With this interpretation a proposition is viewed as a type 
whose inhabitants correspond to proofs of this proposition. The idea was devel-
oped further by de Bruijn [dB70] and Martin-Löf [Mar80], who associated the 
H-abstraction of dependent type theories with universal quantification. A corn-
prehensive account of these ideas can be found in [Bar90], which presents various 
intuitionistic minimal logics as pure type systems [Ber90] [Ter89]. 
A different interpretation of logics in type theory involves the judgements-
as-types principle, advocated in the work on the Edinburgh Logical framework 
(ELF) [HHP89]. It is inspired by Martin-Löf's emphasis of formal systems as cal-
culi for constructing derivations of basic judgements [Mar85]. These judgements 
are the formulae in first-order logic and the terms A set, A = B, a E A and 
a E A = B in Martin-Löf's type theory. Rules are expressed using two higher-
order forms. If J and K are basic judgements, then the hypothetical judgement 
J -* K expresses a form of consequence, that K is provable under the assumption 
J, and the general judgement -* J expresses the fact that J is provable uni-
formly in variable x. The judgements-as-types principle asserts that judgements 
are identified with types whose objects correspond to derivations in the logic, with 
the H-abstraction being used to represent the higher-order forms. Certain type 
theories are, thus, candidates for providing a general metatheory for various logics 
defined using proof systems. 
The Edinburgh Logical Framework 
We give a brief outline of representation in the Edinburgh Logical Framework to 
illustrate the problems which arise when using this framework. The Edinburgh 
Logical Framework (ELF) of Harper, Honsell and Plotkin [HHP89] is a type theory, 
closely related to several of the AUTOMATH languages [dB80]. It is based on a 
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A-calculus with first-order dependent types with three levels of terms: objects, 
types (which classify the objects) and kinds (which classify families of types). 
Terms are identified up to 377-equivalence; all matters relating to representations 
of logics are treated up to this equality. The specification of a logic is given by a 
signature, declaring a finite list of constants; ELF together with this signature 
forms the representing type theory of the logic. The method of finding such 
representations is informal and so each signature is accompanied by an adequacy 
theorem to show that we do indeed have a representation. 
The treatment of the syntax in ELF is inspired by Church [Chu40] and Martin-
Löf's theory of arities [NPS90]; binding operators are represented using the 
A-abstraction of ELF and higher-order operators. For example, the signature of 
first-order logic with arithmetic, denoted by EF0I, consists of two constant types 
t and o whose inhabitants correspond to the arithmetic expressions and formulae 
respectively. We have constants + : t -* (t -+ t) and V: (t -* o) -* o for addition 
and universal quantification respectively. For ELF terms t and u corresponding 
to arithmetic expressions, the term +(t)(u) represents their sum, and, for an ELF 
term 0 corresponding to a formula, the term V(Ax:t.qS) represents the universal 
quantification. 
As has already been mentioned, our representation of the rules of inference 
focuses on the notion of judgement stressed by Martin-Löf [Mar85]. Logics are 
represented in ELF by introducing the judgements-as-types principle mentioned 
earlier. The basic judgements of first-order logic are that propositions (expressed 
by formulae) are true, sometimes written as 0 true to distinguish the concept of 
a formula being well-formed from that of it being true. These are represented by 
types of the form true('), where the constant true inhabits the appropriate kind 
and the object q5' is in o. The inhabitants of true(q5') are identified with the proofs 
of the formula denoted by The structure of the ELF type system allows for the 
uniform treatment of higher-order judgements as H-abstractions so that rules can 
be represented by constants of the appropriate type. For example, the implication 
introduction rule of first-order logic is given by 
DI: 110,0 : o.(true(cb) -* true('')) - true(çb j 
Accompanying each ELF signature specifying a logic is an adequacy theorem 
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to provide some confirmation that the resulting type theory is a representation of 
the logic. It gives a correspondence, called an encoding, between the syntax and 
basic judgements (and, for a stronger result, the proofs) of the logic and certain 
ELF terms such that the consequence relation of the logic and the corresponding 
part of the ELF entailment relation coincide. For example, the adequacy theo-
rem accompanying the representation of first-order logic with arithmetic provides 
bijections EX and Sx  between the arithmetic expressions and formulae with free 
variables in X and the 07-equivalence classes of objects in t and o respectively 
such that, for formulae 01,
. . , m, and a set of variables X = 1x 1 ,. . . , x,}, we 
have 
01, • , m H x  0 if and only if 
x 1 t,. . . ,x, : t,Pi : tr'ue(6x(1)),... ,Pm : true(Sx(cbm)) iELF
EFOI 
p: true(6x(q)) 
where Pi, . . ,Pm are distinct ELF variables corresponding to proofs of assumptions 
çb, and the ELF term p in true(6x(cb)) denotes some proof of q'. 
Limitations with ELF 
ELF represents an important advance in the study of formal systems. However, 
there are problems with using this type theory as a framework, as is illustrated 
by the simple encoding of first-order logic outlined above. The adequacy theorem 
for first-order logic only applies to this particular representation, since it refers to 
specific constants t, o and true declared in EFOE. It cannot be stated generally as 
information is lost in the encoding owing to the types being used for many pur-
poses. The terms t, o and true(çb) for : o are all types, so we cannot distinguish 
which objects correspond to arithmetic expressions, formulae and proofs without 
appealing to the particular types they inhabit. The machinery of ELF also gives 
rise to types which are meaningless from a first-order logic perspective: for ex-
ample, the type llx:o.t. Extra types, having no general correspondence with the 
underlying logic, also arise from less direct encodings; in some cases, this results in 
logics with different consequence relations being specified by the same signature, 
which is clearly undesirable. In this thesis we introduce a new framework, which 
allows us to make such distinctions without reference to specific types and to give 
a precise definition of representations in the type theory. 
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The new framework ELF+ 
We define a new framework, called ELF+  and based on ELF, which retains the 
information lost in the ELF encodings, and so allows for a generalisation of the 
adequacy theorems of ELF to apply to all signatures specifying logics. This gener-
alisation yields equivalences between logics and their representing type theories. A 
problem with ELF is that there is not enough distinction between the ELF types 
to determine, in advance, the part of the entailment relation which corresponds to 
the consequence relation of the logic, without appealing to the particular encod-
ing under consideration. This distinction is achieved in the new framework ELF+ 
by splitting the ELF types into three: sorts, types and judgements. The method 
of representation in the new framework does not differ greatly from that of ELF. 
The difference becomes apparent in the analysis of the resulting type theories. The 
interpretation of the consequence relation of the logic in the entailment relation 
of the representing type theory is defined as a correspondence between the basic 
judgements and the ELF+  judgements, and between the terms of the logic and 
the inhabitants of ELF sorts, such that the entailment relation gives a sOund 
representation of the consequence relation; such a correspondence is called an en-
coding. An encoding is adequate when the correspondence provides an equivalence 
between the logic and the part of the entailment relation determined by the sorts 
and judgements. A natural encoding requires a stronger link between proofs and 
inhabitants of judgements. 
The syntactic definitions of representations have an elegant algebraic formu-
lation which utilises the abstract view of logics as consequence relations. The 
properties of the ELF entailment relation determine the behaviour of the van-
ables and consequence relations of the logics under consideration. Encodings must 
preserve this common structure. This motivates the presentation of the logics and 
their corresponding type theories as strict indexed categories (or split fibrations) 
so that encodings give rise to indexed functors. More specifically, a logic, with 
a consequence relation satisfying certain properties, provides an indexed category 
whose base presents the terms and whose fibres are defined by the consequence 
relation. This approach uses ideas from the area of categorical logic (initiated 
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by Lawvere [Law70]) applied in general to a wide class of logics, rather than to 
particular logics. Using ELF+,  we are also able to present the representing type 
theory as an indexed category with the sorts providing the base category and the 
judgements the fibres. Adequate encoding corresponds to indexed isomorphisms. 
By adapting both indexed categories to incorporate the extra information regard-
ing the proofs and the inhabitants of judgements, natural encodings also yield 
isomorphisms between indexed categories. As well as giving a simple algebraic 
formulation of encodings, this approach provides us with the beginnings of an 
algebraic framework for logics. 
Not all logics can be represented in ELF+  (or in ELF). There are various reasons 
for this: different behaviours of the logic variables, the consequence relation having 
properties incompatible with those of the entailment relation, rules with 'awkward' 
side-conditions. Using the ideas underlying representations in ELF, we give a 
standard presentation of logics defined using formal systems, based on Martin-
Löf's notion of judgements [Mar85] and Aczel's work on Frege structures [Acz80]. 
This presentation forms a reference point from which to investigate representations 
in ELF+;  it is not itself a framework since we do not specify a logic using a 
finite amount of information. Logics which do not fit this pattern are particularly 
interesting as they are more difficult, if not impossible, to encode. 
The distinction between terms required by the new framework exploits, and 
was partially inspired by, the techniques of Beradi and Terlouw in extending 
Barendregi's )¼-cube [Bar90] to pure type systems (PTSs) [Ber90] [Ter89]. Both 
ELF and ELF+  are presented as PTSs, adapted to allow for signatures and 
/37-equality, to emphasise the link between the two type theories and provide 
results for ELF via those for ELF. We use Salvesen's method [Sa189] of incorpo-
rating ij in ELF to extend the @-equivalence of PTSs. To prove the decidability of 
ELF, which is essential for the reduction of proof-checking to type-checking, the 
Church—Rosser property (CR) for 37-equiva1ence is required. This is not known 
for general PTSs and involves a lengthy and subtle proof for ELF [Sa189]. We 
prove CR for ELF from the corresponding results for ELF and the untyped 
A-calculus, thus avoiding the technical details required in Salvesen's proof [Sa189]. 
In recent unpublished work [Sa191], Salvesen extends her ideas to include a wide 
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class of PTSs'. Her results include the Church—Rosser property, subject reduction 
and imply the decidabiity of ELF. 
This thesis introduces and develops the new framework ELF+  in chapters 4, 5 
and 6, which form the main part of the thesis. An introduction to PTSs is found 
in chapter 2. There) the definition of a PTS is adapted to account for signatures 
and /3-equality on well-typed terms. The standard presentation of logics is given 
in chapter 3, with substitution results handled in this general setting to make the 
transfer to the algebraic presentation straightforward. In chapter 4, the new frame-
work is defined and motivated and the method of representation illustrated. An 
informal account of the encoding definitions is given, with the formal justification 
presented in chapter 5. Examples and counter-examples illustrate the definitions. 
The behaviour of the variables and the properties of the consequence relation of 
encoded logics, determined by the ELF entailment relation and emphasised in 
the logic chapter, motivates the presentation of the logics and their corresponding 
type theories as indexed categories (split fibrations), given in chapter 6. Adequate 
and natural encodings correspond to isomorphisms between the appropriate in-
dexed categories. We conclude by summarising our achievements and describing 
some possible future research resulting from our work. 
Related research 
The new framework is based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework (ELF) [HHP89], 
adapted using techniques from pure type systems (PTSs) [Bar9O]. The design of 
ELF was influenced by AUTOMATH [dB80] and by Martin-Löf's work on the 
foundations of intuitionistic logic [Mar80]. The seminal work on machine-assisted 
proof was initiated in the late 1960s by de Bruijn, whose goal was to develop a 
framework for expressing arbitrary mathematical arguments in a notation suitable 
for checking by a machine. His approach was based on representing mathematical 
texts as terms in a typed A-calculus, reducing proof checking to type checking. A 
variety of mathematical theories have been developed and checked, most notably 
1 Geuvers has recently proved CR for functional normaiising PTSs. 
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the formalisation of Landau's textbook on Mathematical Analysis [Jut 77]. This 
work has been important in the development of machine-assisted proof, especially 
the NuPRL system of Constable et al. [Con86} and the Calculus of Constructions 
of Coquand and Huet [Coq85]. However, this subsequent research differs in spirit 
from AUTO MATH in that the latter two are concerned only with the formalisation 
of constructive mathematics, whereas AUTOMATH sought to encompass classical 
mathematics as well. The ELF project can be viewed as a development of the 
AUTOMATH ideas that seeks to keep a clear distinction between the object- and 
meta-level. The ELF approach differs in that it aims to develop a general theory 
of representations of formal systems. 
The work of Martin-Löf [NPS90] influenced the design of ELF and hence ELF. 
In particular, his emphasis on the notion ofjudgement and on its uniform extension 
to higher-order forms was very important [Mar85]. The system of 'logical types' (as 
yet unpublished, but see [NPS90]), providing a basis for his intuitionistic set theory, 
is formally similar to the LF type theory, but the applications are substantially 
different. In particular, work on ELF is concerned with encoding formal proofs 
in arbitrary logical systems and is not concerned with specifically intuitionistic 
problems such as proof normalisation. In contrast, Martin-Löf uses the system 
of logical types as the foundation for his set theory and does not consider its 
application to general formal systems. Martin-Löf also separates expressions, by 
using judgements A set, A prop, A true for expressions A, in a similar fashion to 
the distinctions of ELFtterms with comparable, although not identical, uses. The 
framework All [ACN90] is based on Martin-Löf's ideas. 
The extension of Barendregt's A-cube [Bar90] to PTSs [Ber90] [Ter89] provides 
a greater range of type theories, one of which forms the basis of ELF+.  Baren-
dregt [Bar90] has popularised the notion of PTS and presents various intuitionistic 
minimal logics as type theories using the prop ositions- as-typ es paradigm [CF58] 
[How80]. This use of type systems to present logics contrasts with the ELF ap-
proach where the type system is used as a metatheory, rather than to present 
particular formal systems which happen to fit. The idea of adding signatures to 
PTSs appears in Beradi's thesis [Ber90]. Pollack [Po19-] is currently working on an 
implementation of PTSs which, therefore, provides an implementation of ELF, 
albeit without signatures and i. 
Introduction 
There has been much work associated with the ELF project. Our empha-
sis on consequence relations is motivated by Avron's research [Avr9l]. Salvesen 
[Sa189] proves the Church—Rosser property for the i-equivalence of ELF which 
is used in the corresponding result for ELF+.  In recent unpublished work, she 
extends her ideas to functional PTSs with 77 satisfying strong normalisation. Her 
work implies the decidability of ELF. Geuvers has very recently proved the 
Church—Rosser property for functional normalising PTSs [Geu91]; throughout 
this thesis we just refer to Salvesen's result as this was the one known to us 
when writing. Various examples of formal systems have been encoded in ELF. 
These include two different variations on Hoare logic [AHMP87] [kHM89], modal 
logics from K to S4 [AHMP87], various A-calculi, including A,, A t,, and linear 
A-calculus [AHMP87] [AHM89], various type theories, including the LF type sys-
tem itself, Martin-Löf's type theory, and the Damas-Milner type assignment sys-
tem [Har90]. Other results, which have not been used directly in this thesis but 
which are still significant to ELF, can be found in [Pym90], [E1190], [PW91] 
and [Pfe9l]. Work is currently under way to produce a 'linear' ELF [MPP92] 1  
incorporating ideas from Girard's linear logic [Gir87]. 
Paulson's Isabelle system uses ideas similar to ELF in the context of higher-
order logic [Pau87]. Nipkow has adapted the Isabelle system to allow for order-
sorted polymorphism [Nip9l]. Constable and Howe [CH90] demonstrated the use 
of NuPRL as a logical framework, emphasising the use of the richer type structure 
of the NuPRL type theory in an encoding. Felty has studied the representation 
of logics in A-Prolog, in particular the LF type theory itself [Fel89]. Mendler and 
Aczel [MA88] are developing the theory of MaThImP, as a system for doing inter-
active mathematics on a machine that is also based on a general theory of logical 
systems, albeit of a rather different flavour than that considered here. Feferman 
has proposed a theory of formal systems based on a general system of finitary 
inductive definitions [Fef89]. 
Our algebraic account of representations in ELF+ uses ideas from the area 
of categorical logic initiated by Lawvere [Law70], but applied to logics in general 
rather than to particular logics. There are various case studies of logics modelled as 
categories (see Seely's work on hyperdoctrines [See83] and the references therein, 
and also [Amb9l] for an example of a categorical presentation of a first-order 
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linear logic). There has been much work on presenting dependent type theories 
categorically: for example, contextual categories [Car78] [Str89], categories with 
fibrations [Pit89], comprehension categories [Jac9l]; see Jacobs [Jac9l] for a more 
complete list. General approaches to modelling logics include the work on institu-
tions [BG90] and model-theoretic logics [BF85]. Algebraic accounts of logics are 
investigated by Meseguer [Mes89], Aczel [Acz9lJ and Pym [Pym9l], and Mendler 
and Aczel [MA88] provide an algebraic notion of framework for, in particular, the 
Logical Theory of Constructions [ACM90]. 
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Pure Type Systems 
Pure type systems (PTSs) [Bar90], sometimes called generalised type systems, 
provide a concise notation for presenting many type systems in a unified way; 
they originate from the work of Beradi [Ber90] and Terlouw [Ter89] who gener-
alise Barendregt's 'cube of typed A-calculi' [Bar90]. We define ELF and the new 
framework, ELF+,  using this notation to provide simple presentations which em-
phasise the link between the two frameworks and provide results for ELF+  via 
those for ELF. In order to give a precise account of these frameworks, however, 
we must extend the PTS structure to include 37-equiva1ence and signatures. 
2.1 Introduction to pure type systems 
A PTS is specified by sets of universes, axioms and rules which determine the 
syntax and proof system of the type theory. The universes provide the starting 
point on which the type theory is based, with some universes inhabiting others as 
indicated by the axioms. For example, ELF has two universes Type and Kind, 
with the universe Type inhabiting Kind. The rules determine which families of 
terms are allowed; that is, they control the formation of terms of shape llx:A.B. 
11 
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2.1.1 DEFINITIoN A specification of a pure type system is a triple (U, A, R) where 
. U is a set, called the set of universes; 
• A C U x U is the set of axioms; 
. R. C U x U x U is the set of rules. 
Remark 
This definition is a very minor restriction of Barendregt's definition where U 
(called the set of sorts in [Bar90]) is a subset of a set of constants C and the 
axioms are elements of C x U. Barendregt only gives one example which uses 
this extra expressivity for the axioms and, in example 2.2.2, we argue that 
this example is misleading and propose an alternative presentation using 
signatures. 
A full understanding of the role of the rules is only achieved by studying 
the proof system derived from the specification (U, A, 7.) (definition 2.2.5). 
The intuition is that, for rule (u, v, w) E 7?, we can form the term llx:A.B 
inhabiting w if A inhabits u and if B inhabits v assuming x inhabits A. 
Notation The axiom (u, v) is written as u v and the rule (u, v, v) is usually 
abbreviated to (u, v). 
Let Var be a countably infinite set of variables. It is useful to divide Var into 
disjoint finite subsets Var'1 for each u E U; that is, Var = UUEU Var'1 . The 
members of Var are usually denoted by x, y, z; when the universe is important we 
write x'1 for u E U. 
Let (U, A, 7Z) be a specification of a pure type system C . The set of preterms 
T is defined by the abstract syntax 
T ::= x I u I Hx:T.T I )x:T.T I TY, 
where 'u E U and x E Var' for some v E U. We use the letters A, B, M, N to 
denote preterms. We say that preterm A is a A-abstraction or 11-abstraction if A is 
of the form Ax:A 1 .A 2 or llx:A 1 .A 2 respectively, and let A - B abbreviate Hx:A.B 
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when x fv(B). The notions of free variables, substitution and a-conversion are 
special cases of definitions 3.1.10, 3.1.15 and 3.1.13. 
2.1.2 DEFINITIoN For preterms M and N, M is a subterm of N if M E Sub(N) 
where Sub(N), the set of subterms of N, is defined by 
Sub(N) = {N} if N is a variable or universe; 
S'ab(N) = {N} U Su(P) U Sub(Q), 
if N has one of the shapes llx:P.Q, Ax:P.Q or PQ. 
The definitional equality on preterms is /3-equality, which is defined as one would 
expect from the usual one-step 3-reduction, denoted by _* 3  [Bar84]. We denote 
fl-reduction by , the reflexive and transitive closure of -, and let =,a denote 
the corresponding congruence relation of /3-conversion. An important property 
of 3-reduction is the Church—Rosser property [Bar84]; that is, if A 	B and 
A 	C then B >p D and C >p D for some preterm D. For (-preterms A 
and B, A : B is called a (-assertion; we refer to A as the first component of 
the (-assertion and often denote (-assertions by a. A (-precontext is a finite 
sequence, possibly empty, of (-assertions whose first components are all variables. 
For a (-precontext F = (x 1 : A 1 ,. . . , x, : A n ), n > 0, the domain of F, dom(F), is 
{x1,... , x,}. A precontext F extends precontext A if F is L, Li' for some precontexi 
Li'. A precontext F is contained in Li, denoted F ç Li, if every x : A in F is also 
in A. A (-sequent is of the form F 1-C A: B, where F is a (-precontext and A 
and B are (-preterms; the relation I- is the entailment relation of the type theory. 
We sometimes write F FC  A: B: C as a shorthand for F F-' A : B and F F-C B : C. 
The superscript (is omitted when the PTS is apparent. 
2.1.3 DEFINITION The type system for the PTS (with specification (U, A, R,) is 
defined by the following formal system: 
AXIOM 	QE- u:v 	 u:vEA 
FHA:u 
START 
F, x : A F- x : A 
	 u E U,x E Var',x Ødom(F) 
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FI- A:u 	FI -B:C 
F, x : A I- B : C 
	 uEU,xEVar',x 0 dom(F) 
H 
FI -A:u 	F,x:AF-B:v 
FI-llx:A.B:w 




F I- Ax:A.M : Hx:A.B 
APP 
CONy 
FI-M:llx:A.B 	FI- N:A 
F I- MN: B[N/x] 
FI -A:B 	FI- B':u 
F I- A: B' 
B = 16 B',u EU 
A C-precontext F is a C-context if F is empty or there exist (-preterms A and B 
such that F F- A: B. A (-preterm A is a (-term if F A: B for precontext F 
and preterm B. 
Barendregt uses the abstract symbols *, o and L to denote universes. When 
investigating a particular type theory, universes are often labelled more concretely 
as, for example, prop, set, type and kind, to convey some meaning relative to the 
type theory of interest. This becomes confusing when providing a unified theory 
since, for example, the universe type has different meanings in the Calculus of 
Constructions [Coq85] and ELF [HHP89]. We use Barendregt's notation in this 
chapter and revert to names when describing the new framework. 
2.1.4 EXAMPLE The Calculus of Constructions [Coq85] can be presented a4PTS 
with specification AC given by 
U= {*,D} 
A= {*:D} 
= {(*, *), (*, 0), (9, *), (0, D)} 
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The * corresponds to Prop and 0 corresponds to Type in [Bar90]. The subsystem 
with only the rule (*, *) isjsimpiy typed A-calculus with type variables giving the 
basic types. The rules (0, *), (*, 0) and (0, 0) add polymorphic types, dependent 
types and higher-order features respectively. The subsystem with the rules (*, *) 
and (*, 0) is the All-calculus on which ELF is based (in this case * corresponds 
to Type and 0 to Kind in [HHP89]). The system with the rules (*, *) and (0, *) 
is essentially Girard's system F [Gir72], and adding the rule (0, 0) to system 
F corresponds to Fw [Gir72]. In this way we obtain a collection of eight type 
systems all containing simply typed A-calculus and all contained in the Calculus 
of Constructions. This collection is known as the 'cube of A-calculi' [Bar90]. 
2.1.5 EXAMPLE PTSs are also used to present many-sorted minimal intuitionis-
tic logics. For example, Geuvers [Geu90] defines a higher-order logic based on 
Church's presentation [Chu40} as the PTS with specification 
AHo1 	U = {*, 0, } 
A  
7= {(*, *), (0, *), (0, D)} 
With this definition, objects of 0 correspond to the domains of higher-order logic; 
in particular, the domain *, which contains the formulae, is distinguished. The 
universe L is a starting universe declared so that domains other than * can be 
given. Functional and predicate domains and the objects therein are formed using 
the rule (0, 0). Rule (*, *) provides the logical implication and (0, *) provides the 
quantification, with the corresponding introduction and elimination rules given by 
the A- and APP rules of the PTS. 
2.1.6 EXAMPLE Not all PTSs are normalising; for example, the PTS specified by 
U= {*} 
4= 
is an inconsistent system in the sense that every type is inhabited [Bar90]. 
The following results, taken from [GN91] unless otherwise stated, give the 
elementary properties of the entailment relation of an arbitrary PTS specified by 
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(U, A, R.). They have important repercussions when using a PTS to represent a 
logic since the properties of the entailment relation and tU consequence relation 
must be compatible (as discussed in section 3.2). 
The first lemma, adapted from a result in [GN91], states that we can only use 
variables that we declare. 
2.1.7 LEMMA [Free variable lemma] Suppose F I- B: C for F = (x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , 
Then 
the x 1 ,. . . , x are distinct; 
fv(B),fv(C) C {x 1 ,. . ., x}; 
any derivation ofF F- B : C has as subderivation x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , ;_:A_ F- A : ui 
for some u2 E U and any i E {1,.. . , n}. 
Proof By induction on the derivation of F I- B: C. 	 0 
2.1.8 COROLLARY A precontext F = (x 1 :A 1 , . .. , x:A,) is a context if and only 
if x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x_ 1 :A 1 I- A : u i for some ui E U and for each i E {1,. . . , n}, and 
the x 1 ,. . . , x are distinct. 
The next few lemmas show that contexts behave as expected. 
2.1.9 LEMMA Let F be a (-context. Then 
FF-u:vforallu:VEA; 
FF-x:Awheneverx:AisinF. 
Proof By assumption F F- B: C for preterms B and C. The result follows by 
induction on the derivation of F F- B : C. 	 0 
2.1.10 LEMMA [Substitution] If F,x : A,F' F- B: C and F F- M: A then 
F, F'[M/x] F- B[M/x] : C[M/x]. 
Proof By induction on the derivation of F, x : A, F' F- B: C. We consider two 
cases; the others are trivial or similar. 
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Case 1. The last line is obtained from the START rule and the proof is split into 
two subcases. 
Subcase 1. If F' is F", y: C and B is y, and the last line in the derivation 
is 
F, x: A, F" I- C : u 
F,x: A,F",y: C F- y: C 
for u E U, y E Varu and y dom(F, x : A, F"). 
By induction, it follows that F, F"[M/x] I- C[M/x] : u and 
F, F"[M/x], y: C[M/x} F- y: C[M/x} using the START rule. Since 
y 0 x, we have F, F'[M/x] F- y[M/x] : C[M/x]. 
Subcase 2. If F' is the empty context, B is x, C is A and the last line in 
the derivation is 
FF- A:u 
F, x : A F- x : A 
	U EU,x E Var,x dom(F). 
By the free variable lemma, fv(A) c dom(F), so A[M/x] is A and 
F F- x[M/x] : A[M/x] by the premise. 
Case 2. The last line in the derivation is obtained from the APP rule where B is 
NN' and C is C'[N/y] and the line is 
F, x : A, F" F- N: lly:A'.C' 	F, x : A, F" F- N': A' 
F,x : A,F" F- NN': C'[N'/y] 
By renaming if necessary, we may assume x 0 y. Using the induction hy-
pothesis, we have F, F"[M/x] F- N[M/x] : lly:A'[M/x].C'[M/x] and 
F, F"[M/x} F- N'[M/x] : A'[M/x]. So, using the APP rule, it follows that 
F, F"[M/x] F- (NN')[M/x] : C' [Mix] [N' [M/x]/y] , and, using the substitu-
tion results (proposition 3.1.15), we obtain the entailment 
F, F"[M/x] F- (NN')[M/x] : (C'[N'/y])[M/x]. 	 0 
Next we generalise the substitution lemma to allow for simultaneous substitu-
tion, which will be used extensively in chapter 6. 
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2.1.11 LEMMA [Generalised substitution lemma] The entailments 
F, x:A 1 ,... , 	A F- a, for assertion a, and F F- t : A 2 [t1 ,. . . , t_ 141 ,. . . , 
for i E {1, ... ,n} imply r,[/] F- a[/]. 
Proof 	By many uses of the substitution lemma, we have 
F, [t1 /x 1] ... [t,/x,j F- a[t 1 /x 1] .. . [t,/x,]. Using the free variable lemma, we 
know that I v(t) 9 dom(F) for each i E {1,... , n} and the sets {x 1 ,. . . , 
and dom(F) are disjoint. Hence, by the substitution results in proposition 3.1.15, 
we have F,[i/] F- a[/]. 	 D 
2.1.12 LEMMA [Thinning] 1fF F- A: B and F c F' for context F', then F' F- A : B. 
Proof By induction on the derivation of F I- A : B (care must be taken in the 
11-rule to avoid variable clashes, since x V dom(F) does not guarantee x 0 dom(F')). 
0- 
Remark This lemma is sometimes called the weakening lemma, but we do not 
use this terminology to avoid confusion with the weakening rule. It shows that 
postulating more assumptions does not invalidate the provable results. This af-
fects the logics we are able to represent in a type theory; for example, we cannot 
represent systems for non-monotonic reasoning. 
2.1.13 LEMMA [Generation] Let F F- A : B. 
IfAisuEUthenu:vEAandB=vforsomevEU. 
IfAisvariablex IL  thenx:B I  is inFandFF- B :uandB= fl B forsome 
uEU. 
IfA is llx:A 1 .A 2 then F F-A 1 : u and F,x : A 1 F-A2 : v and B = w for some 
('u,v,w) E R. 
If A is A 1 A 2 then F F- A 1 : Hx:B1 .B2 and F F- A 2 : B1 and B = ,8 B2 [A 2 1x] 
for preterms B 1 and B2 . 
IfAisAx:A1 .A2 thenFF- Hx:Ai.B':uforuEUandF,x:A 1 F-A2 :B'and 
B = Hx:A 1 .B'. 
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Proof The proof involves inspecting the derivation of F F- A : B. Call the AXIOM, 
START, H-, A- and APP rules the formation rules. We can follow the branch of the 
derivation until we get to a formation rule; the only other rules are the WEAK and 
CONV rules, which do not affect A. In each case, the conclusion of the formation 
rule is F' F- A: B' where F is an extension of F' and B = B'. The result follows 
by inspection of the rule used, together with the thinning lemma (lemma 2.1.12). 
D 
A corollary of the generation lemma shows that, although there can be infinitely 
many levels of inhabitation (that is, A 1 : A 2 : A3. . .), we soon get to the universes 
with inhabitation given by the axioms. We distinguish the universes which do 
not inhabit terms; these provide the starting point with which to build the type 
theory. 
2.1.14 DEFINITION Let C be the PTS specified by (U,A,R..). An element u of U 
is a top universe if u is not the first component of an axiom. 
2.1.15 LEMMA Let u be a top universe. Then F 1/ u : A for any preterm A and 
context F. 
The following result is a more precise statement of the corresponding one in [Bar90], 
which does not give the notion of top universe. 
2.1.16 COROLLARY [to lemma 2.1.13] The entailment F F- A: B implies that 
there is a u E U such that B is u and u is a top universe, or F F- B : U. 
Proof Prove by induction on the derivation of F F- A : B. We look at two cases. 
The other cases are trivial or similar. 
Case 1. F F- A: B is F F- Hx:A';B' : w and the last rule in the derivation is 
F F- A':u 	F,x:A'F-B:v 
F F- Hx:A I .B I  :w 
(u ) v,w) E 7?. 
Either w is a top universe or w : w' E A for some w' E U. 
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Case 2. F H A: B is F F- MN : B'[N/x] and the last line in the derivation is 
FF-M:Hx:A'.B' 	FF- N:A' 
F F- MN: B'[N/x] 
By the induction hypothesis, F F- llx:A'.B' : w for w E U. Using the genera- 
tion lemma, we have (u, v, w) E 7?. such that F F- A' : u and F, x : A' F- B' : V. 
By the substitution lemma, F F- B'[N/x] : v. 	 0 
2.1.17 LEMMA [Permutation] If F,x : A,y: B,F' F- C: D and F F- B: u for some 
u EU, then F,y: B,x : A,F' F- C: D. 
Proof By induction on the derivation of F, x : A, y: B, F" F- C : D using the thin- 
fling lemma (lemma 2.1.12). 	 U 
2.1.18 DEFINITIoN Let F, F' be -precontexts of the form (x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x:A,) and 
(x 1 :B1 ,. . . , x,:B,) respectively. 	Then F - 	F' if A 	B2 , for some 
i E {1, . . . , n}, and A, is B3 , for all i 0 j with j E {1,.. . , n}. Also F r 	F' 
ifA2 >p Bi and F=F' if A=13 B,foralliE {1, ... ,n}. 
2.1.19 LEMMA [subject reduction] If F F- A : B and A >p A' then F I- A' : B. If 
FF- A: B and F 	F' then F' F- A: B. 
Proof It is enough to prove the results for the one-step /3-reduction: that is, 
FF-A:BandA_-*A'impliesFF-A':B; 	 (2.1) 
FF-A:BandF_* 1 F'imp1sF'F-A:B. 	 (2.2) 
These are proved simultaneously by induction on the derivation of F F- A: B. We 
consider two possibilities. The other cases are easy or similar. 
Case 1. The last applied rule is the 11-rule where A is llx:C.D and B is w and 
the last line in the derivation is 
FF- C:u 	F,x:CF-D:v 
FF-Hx:C.D:w 
(u ) v,w) El?.. 
Then 2.1 and 2.2 follow from the induction hypothesis (for 2.2). 
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Case 2. The last applied rule is the APP rule where A is MN and B is D[N/x] 
and the last line in the derivation is 
	
FF-M:Hx:C.D 	F F- N:C 
F I- MN: D[N/x] 
The second result follows directly from the induction hypothesis. The first 
is proved by looking at cases. If A' is ON where M - M' then by the 
induction hypothesis F I- M' : Hx:C.D and so F I- M'N: D[N/x]. If A' is 
MN' where N -* N' then by the induction hypothesis F F- N' : C and 
F F- MN': D[N'/x]. Since D[N/x] =, D[N'/x], we have F F- MN' : D[N/x] 
using the CONV rule. If M is of the form Ax:C'.M' and MN - M'[N/x] 
then, by the generation lemma, there exists a -preterm D' and (u, v, w) E 7Z 
suchthatFF- C':'u,F,x:C'F-M':D'andF,x:C'F-D':v. Weknow 
that Hx:C.D =
,6 Hx:C'.D' implies D = Y. By the substitution lemma 
F F- M'[N/x] : D'[N/x] and so F F-: M'[N/x] : D[N/x] since 
D[N/x] = D'[N/x]. 	 0 
The following result is proved by Jutting [Bar9l], extending Luo's proof for 
the Extended Calculus of Constructions [Luo90]. His proof for arbitrary PTSs is 
involved and so is not given here. It asserts that PTS judgements are, in Martin-
Löf's terms, 'analytic judgements', since the derived validity of a judgement F F- a 
depends only on the variables that actually occur in a [Mar85]. 
2.1.20 LEMMA [Strengthening] If F,x : A,F' F- B: C then F,F' F- B: C provided 
x 0 dom(F') U fv(B) U fv(C). 	 - 
2.1.21 DEFINITION A PTS with specification (U,A,7Z) is functional when the 
sets A and R. satisfy 
u : v,u : v' E A implies v = v'; 
(it )  v, w), (u, v, w') E 7?. implies w = w'. 
2.1.22 LEMMA [Unicity of types] Let ( be a functional PTS. If F F- A : B and 
FF- A: B' then B = B'. 
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Proof By induction on the structure of A. We look at two cases; the others are 
trivial or similar. If A is u E U then, by the generation lemma, B 	v o.-..ô. 
E cA - -. Since (is functional, we have v 
= v:. 
If Ais llx:A'.A" 
then, again by the generation lemma, there exists (u, v, w), (u , v , w) E 7?. such 
that the following hold: F I- A': u, F F- A': u', F,x: A' F- A": v, F,x : A' F- A": v', 
and B' sw'. By the induction hypothesis, u = u' and v = v' and so w = w' 
since (is functional. 	 D 
Remark This result obviously does not hold for arbitrary PTSs since, for exam-
ple, one can declare u: v and u : v' in A. 
2.1.23 COROLLARY Let (be a functional PTS. If F I- A: B and B > B' then 
F F-A: B'. 	 - 
Proof Using the corollary to the generation lemma (corollary 2.1.16), we know 
that B is u and u is a top universe, or F F- B: u. If B is u then B and B' are 
identical. If F F- B : u then F F- B' : u by the unicity of types lemma and, using 
the CONV rule, F F- A: B. 
2.1.1 PTS morphism 
A simple comparison of PTSs is given in terms of a map between specifications; 
that is, a map between the sets of universes which preserves the axioms and rules. 
In particular, we use this map to obtain results for ELF+  via those for ELF. 
2.1.24 DEFINITIoN Let (and (' be PTSs specified by (U,A,7Z) and (U',A',7?.') 
respectively. A PTS morphism from (to ('is a mapping f : U - U' which 
preserves the axioms and rules; that is, 
if u: v E A then f (u) : f (v) E A'; 
if (u, v, w) E 7?. then (1(u), f(v), 1(w)) E 7?.'. 
To extend a PTS morphism f : ( -* (', with (specified by (U, A, 7?.), to a map 
between preterms, choose injective maps from Var's to Var, for u E U, and 
then define by induction on the structure of preterms. Again, the map can be 
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extended to a map from precontexts of (to precontexts of C. The extensions of 
f to the preterms and precontexts of ( will also be called f. The following lemma 
shows that a PTS morphism f : (—* (' provides a sound interpretation of (in C. 
2.1.25 LEMMA If f is a PTS morphism from (to ('then 
1' 	A: B implies f(F) fC'  f(A) : 1(B). 
Proof By induction on the AcrCof derivation of F A: B. 	 U 
2.1.26 ExAM PLE There is a simple PTS morphism from the specification of All 
(example 2.1.4) to that for the Calculus of Constructions (example 2.1.4) given 
by the identity function on the universes, since the rules for All are contained in 
those for the Calculus of Constructions. 
2.1.27 EXAMPLE Consider the following two specifications: 
U = {*, *2,  D} 	 U' = {*, D} 
A={* 1 :D} 
7?. = {(*, * 1, *2), (*, *2, *2)} 	 7?.' = {(*, )} 
There is a PTS morphism from (U, A,??.) to (U', A', 7?.'), the speéification of simply 
typed A-calculus, given by the forgetful maps 0 - 0 and * i-* * for i E {1, 21. 
2.2 Pure type systems with signatures 
In ELF, the signatures, declaring constants, and the contexts, declaring variables, 
have very different uses: signatures specify logics; contexts, amongst other things, 
correspond to assumptions in the representing type theory. Beradi first proposed 
the idea of adding signatures to PTSs [Ber90]. In [Geu90] signatures are defined 
as special contexts, namely fixed contexts where variable discharge does not oc-
cur. However, in ELF signatures are not special contexts; the formation of the 
signature variables is stronger than that of the context variables. We give a simple 
notion of signature within a PTS which yields a precise presentation of ELF and 
the new framework ELF (up to /3-equality) using the PTS notation. We also give 
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an alternative presentation of simply typed A-calculus with a finite number of base 
types using a signature to declare those base types. This differs from Barendregt's 
presentation, where base types are treated as universes which results, rather con-
fusingly, in different PTSs for simply typed A-calculi with different base types. 
Finally, we propose a more general notion of signature, where the formation of 
the signature is separate from the main proof system, to allow greater flexibil-
ity between constant and variable declarations. For example, we obtain a more 
natural presentation of various many-sorted minimal intuitionistic logics with the 
'structural rules', providing the function and predicate symbols, separate from the 
'logical rules' for implication and universal quantification. 
2.2.1 EXAMPLE The presentation of AH as a PTS is specified by 
11= 
In [Geu90], ELF is defined using this PTS with the signatures given as fixed, 
initial contexts. However, ELF is a type theory in which signatures are not special 
contexts; a constant may be declared in Type, but not a variable. 
2.2.2 EXAMPLE The second example is simply typed A-calculus [Bar84], which 
illustrates our reasons for working with a slightly restricted definition of PTS and 
our misgivings about the original definition. This is given by a set of types, denoted 
by T, defined inductively as follows: 
• A 1 ,. . . , A E 7 (called the base types); 
• if o, r E 7 then (o -* T) e 7 (called the functional types). 
Given disjoint, countably infinite sets of variables Var° , for each 01 E 7, the set 
of typed A-terms is WET  A, where A, is defined by 
• x 0. E A0.; 
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M E A_ j and N E A,. imply MN E A; 
M E AT  and variable x E A imply Ax.M E A r . 
This system is presented in [Bar90] by the PTS 
U= {*,D} 
A = 
where * corresponds to T. In this PTS the types are given by variables in Var*, 
whereas simply typed A-calculus has a finite set of base types and no variable 




where, in his formulation, the axioms are defined as elements of C x U, for a 
set C containing U, rather than elements of U x U. A significant advantage of 
PTSs is that they unify the presentation of type theories in a compact notation 
which emphasises the structure of the type theories. This structure is obscured 
in the above example since two simply typed A-calculi with different base types 
are expressed as different PTSs. The base types have been over-emphasised by 
treating them as universes. Instead, an alternative presentation will be proposed 
using signatures to declare the base types, so that these two calculi with different 
base types are expressed in terms of one PTS, but with different signatures. 
2.2.3 EXAMPLE We are also not satisfied with the presentation of certain mm-
imal intuitionistic logics as PTSs. For example, many-sorted predicate logic is 
represented in [Bar90] by the PTS 
U = {* 8, *P , 	D8 D'} 
4= {*:D,*":EJ"} 
7?. = {(*, * 8,  *), (*, *), (*8 , DP), (*, *I'),  (*, *')} 
Elements of * correspond to basic sorts and those of * to the formulae. The 
U8 and D  are top universes which allow us to define such elements. Elements 
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of the universe 	can be interpreted as higher-order sorts whose inhabitants are 
the function symbols of the logic. The inhabitants of * are formed from the rules 
*) and (*8,  *), and the predicate domains, whose inhabitants are the pred-
icate symbols, are given by (* 8 , DP) The 'logical' rules (*, *") and (*1' , *1') form 
the implication and universal quantification with the accompanying introduction 
and elimination rules given by the A- and APP rules. This gives an unnatural 
presentation of minimal intuitionistic logic since the 'syntactic' rules and 'logical' 
rules are mixed, and again we require a finite set of base sorts, rather than variable 
sorts. 
First, we give a simple method for incorporating signatures into the PTS no-
tation which is enough to give a precise account of ELF and ELF+.  Later, we 
propose a more general formulation which allows for greater distinction between 
the formation of signatures and contexts. 
We specify a PTS with signatures using a quadruple of sets of universes, vari-
able universes, axioms and rules. As in the original PTS presentation [Bar90], 
we distinguish the universes which variables are declared; we may declare 
variables in term A if A inhabits a variable universe, whereas constants may be 
declared in terms inhabiting any universe. 
2.2.4 DEFINITIoN A specification of a PTS with signatures is a quadruple of the 
form (U, V, A, R), where 
. U is a set, called the set of universes; 
. V c U, called the set of variable universes; 
• A C U x U, called the set of axioms; 
• R C V x U x U , called the set of rules. 
The set of preterms, T, of a PTS with signatures, given by specification 
(U, V, A, R.) is defined using countably infinite sets of variables Var and constants 
Const using the abstract syntax 
T::= xIulaI llx:T.TIAX:T.TITT, 
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where u is a universe, x E Var and a E Const. Again it is useful to divide the 
sets Var and Const into disjoint infinite subsets Var' and Cortst for v e V 
and u E U. Arbitrary variables and constants are denoted by x, y, z and a, b, c 
respectively. The (-preterms, C-assertions and C-contexts are defined as before. A 
(-presignature is a finite sequence of C-assertions whose first components are all 
constants. A (-sequent is of the form F' l-C A: B for presignature E, precontext F 
and preterms A and B. We omit the superscript (when the PTS with signatures 
is apparent. 
The method of declaring constants is based on the standard approach used, 
for example, in the type theory defining ELF [HHP89]. 
2.2.5 DEFINITION The PTS with signatures, specified by (U,V,A,R.) is defined 
by the following proof system: 
AXIOM 
SIGNATURE 
QF E U : v 
QF- A: u 
HE,a:A a : A 
F - 
 
u EU,a e ConstL,a  dom() 
uEU,aE Const,a V dom(E) 
V C V,x E Varv,x dom(F) 
E A:u 	QI-E B:C 
OFE,a:A B: C 
F F- F A : v 
CONTEXT 
F, x : A I- s x : A 
FE-E A:v 	FF-E B:C 
F, x : A HE B: C 
v EV ,x EV arv ,x  V dom(F) 
H -RULE 
FI-E A:u 	F,x:AHEB:v 
F' F- E Hx:A.B: w 
(u,v ) w) E 1?. 
A -RULE 
	FH E 11X:A.B:u 	F,x:AI-E M:B 	
uEU 
F HE Ax:A.M: Hx:A.B 
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APP 
	FI-E M:Hx:A.B 	FI-E N:A 
1' HE MN: B[N/x] 
FHE A:B 	rl-E B':u 
CONy 	 B=B',uEU 
B' 
A c-signature is a C-presignaturesuch that 1' 	A: B for some precontext F and 
preterms A and B. A c-context over signature E is a -precontext LSuch  that 
F 1-4 A : B for preterms A and B. A PTS with signature E , denoted by (, E), is a 
PTS with signatures, denoted by C, such that E is a c-signature and the sequents 
of interest are of the form F 1-4 A: B for some precontext F and preterms A and 
B. 
Remark An alternative system is to replace the signature rules by the rules 
I' H A : u 
F HEa:A  a: A 
	 u EU,a E Const',a dom(E) 
and 
FI- E A:u 	FI-E B:C 
Fl- B:C E,a:A 
	 u EU,a E Const',a d  dorn(E). 
This allows the signature to be extended at arbitrary points in a derivation rather 
than considering it, once formed, as fixed. We do not use this approach as both 
logics and ELF have fixed signatures, although it may be more appropriate to 
have flexible signatures when using type theories as theorem provers. 
One can obtain a simple connection between PTSs with and without signatures 
by viewing signatures as initial contexts, as in Geuvers' paper [Geu90]. This link 
gives us easy access to results for PTSs with signatures via those for PTSs. 
2.2.6 DEFINITION Let C be a PTS with signatures specified by (U,V,A,R). The 
fundamental PTS for C, denoted by Cf , is the PTS with specification (U, A, R.). 
To obtain the connection between the PTS with signatures and the fundamental 
	
PTS, choose a bijection f : VarC U Const" 	Varcf satisfying 
f(x) E Var" for x E Var' and v E V; 
1(c) E Var's for c E Const and u E U. 
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This is easily extended to preterms, precontexts and presignatures to obtain the 
following result. 
2.2.7 LEMMA Let C be a PTS with signatures and ( f its fundamental PTS. Then 
1' i-4 A : B if and only if 1(E), f(1') F-cf 1(A) : 1(B). 
Proof Easy induction on derivations. 	 0 
As a consequence of this lemma, all the results given in section 2.1 hold for PTSs 
with signatures. 
2.2.8 EXAMPLE The framework ELF with j3-equality is presented as the PTS 
with signatures specified by 
CLF 	.u= {*,o} 
V= {*} 
A= {*:D} 
= {(*, *), (*, o)} 
This is equivalent to the original presentation given in appendix A. 
2.2.9 EXAMPLE Simply typed A-calculus is given by the PTS with signatures, 




Simply typed A-calculus with one base type 0 is CA—  with signature {0 *} for 
0 E Const° , and simply typed A-calculus with two base types 0 and 0' is 
with signature {0 : *, 0 : *} for 0, 0 E Const . We may also define constants 
in the base types; for example, the signature {0 : *, a 0} for 0 e Const ° and 
a E Const* declares a base sort 0 inhabited by base constant a. There is no 
restriction on the constants we are able to declare, although thisLcan  be L -: by 
having no connection between U and V and defining the sets of axioms and rules 
as A c (U U V) x (U U V) and 1?. c V x (U U V) x (U U V) respectively. 
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2.2.10 EXAMPLE The PTS with signature presentation of many-sorted minimal 






with only variables corresponding to terms and proofs of formulae permitted. 
First-order logic with arithmetic, given in chapter 3, is presented as )tPRED 
with signature E = {i : *, 0 : i, succ : i -i i, + : i -* i -# i, =: i -* i 
where i, 0 7  succ, +, =E Const. Notice that there is a natural separation into the 
'syntactic' rules, (* 8 )  *8, *) (* *) and (*, Jr), used in the formation of the func-
tion and predicate symbols, and the 'logical' rules, (*, *') and (*', *1'), which give 
the formation, introduction and elimination rules for implication and universal 
quantification. This motivates an alternative approach of adding signatures. 
We discuss a possible alternative method for adding signatures, where the 
formation of signatures is separate from the main proof system. This method 
incorporates ideas mentioned in Beradi's thesis [Ber90} and is based on discussions 
with Geuvers and Pollack. The motivation for this approach is illustrated by the 
above example of the presentation of many-sorted predicate logic, where the rules 
fall naturally into 'syntactic' and 'logical' rules. We would also like to present, 
for example, first-order logic with Peano arithmetic, which includes the induction 
schema 
0( 0 ) and Vx.(q(x) D cb(succ(x))) implies Vx.(x). 
The alternative definition of PTS with signatures has a similar specification to the 
previous definition except that we separate the rules into two classes: constant 
and variable rules. The idea is that a signature is a context from a PTS defined 
using the constant rules; once the signature is formed, the constant rules are 
recLundant. This clarifies the intuition that constants are special variables which 
cannot be discharged. The specification of a PTS with signatures is now a quintuple 
(U, V, A, R, 7Z.4, where 
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• U is a set, called the set of universes; 
• V C U , called the set of variable universes; 
• A C U x U, called the set of axioms; 
• Ru ç U x U x U, called the set of constant rules; 
• Rv C V x U x U, called the set of variable rules. 
The intuition is that a signature is a context from the PTS specified by (U, A, 7Z) 
and the main proof system is essentially defined using V, A and RV . The PTS 
with signature E, given by specification (U, V, A, 7, R.), is defined by a context 
E from the PTS (E specified by (U, A, 1?), and the proof system given as follows: 
AXIOM 	QF4u:v 	 'a:vEA 
SIG 	 QF-4a:A 
	
E 	a: A,a E dom(E) 
START 
I', x : A 	x : A 
	 v E V,x E Var',x dom(F) 
FI-4A:v 	FF-4B:C 
WEAK 
F,x: A 	B: C 
H 	 E 
FHC 	
E 
A :u 	F, x: AFC B:v 
r F- llx:A.B : 
V EV ,x EV arV ,x  0 dom(I') 
(u ) v,w) E 'R.v  
A 	 E 
[FCHx:A.B :u 	F,x:AF- E M:B 
F i-4 Ax:A.M: Hx:A.B 
FI-M:Hx:A.B 	FHN:A 
APP 
F I- MN: B{N/x] 
'uEU 
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CONy 
FI- A:B 	FI-B':'a 
F I- A: B' 
B = B',u EU 
Remark The side-condition, E H a : A, a E dom(E), for the SIG rule results in 
QF4a:Awhenevera:A'EE,EE-A':uforueUandA=A';thiswould 
not hold for the more restrictive condition a: A E E. 
Remark The results for this system are left for future work since, in this thesis, 
the simple notion in definition 2.2.5 is enough for our purposes. For the moment, 
just notice that the corresponding result to corollary 2.1.16, namely, 
F HE  A: B implies B is a top universe or F 	B : u for universe u, 
does not hold. For example, let 
( 
be a PTS with signature E specified by 
(U,V,A,'R,7?..) and assume a : Hx:A.B E E, where the formation of the 
11-abstraction involves a rule in R u which is not in lZv . We have 
() 
I- a: Hx:A.B, 
but not 
() 
F- E 11x:A.B : u for some universe u. Therefore, we cannot use the 
method of corollary 2.1.23 to prove F HE  A : B and B >P C implies F 1E  A: C. 
2.2.11 EXAMPLE We return to the presentation of minimal intuitionistic first-
order logic which is now given by 
CtPRED 	U 
= {*8, *', 	08 , 0P} 
V = {*, *} 
A= {*3:D8,*1):D1)} 
= {(*8, 	*), (*, *), (* 8 , oP)} 
= 
First-order logic with arithmetic, given in chapter 3, is presented as
.\PRED with 
signature E = {i : *8,0 : i,succ : i -* i,+ : i -+ i -+ i,=: i -+ i -~ *}, where 
i, 0 1  succ, +, = are in Comst. 
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2.2.12 EXAMPLE The constant rules in the above example are extended to give 
a presentation of first-order logic with Peano arithmetic in this setting: 
(\PRED+PA U = {*, *", 1 , D, 0P} 
V = {*, *} 
A = {* 8 : 08, *": EIPJ 
= {(*, 	*), (*, *), (*,D"), (*8, *), (*, *), (OP , 	 , D)} 
= {(*8, *) (*, *)} 
The signature for first-order logic with Peano arithmetic would include 
it : *, 0 : t, succ: t - t, md: H:t -* *1) .(q5(0) - (Hx:t4(x) -* q5(succ(x)))) 
llx:t.q5(x)}. 
Remark This method of presenting the induction schema for Peano arithmetic 
is used in Beradi's thesis. An alternative approach is to add the induction schema 
to the proof system, rather than the signature. 
2.2.13 EXAMPLE In [HHP89], it is stated that the ELF type system has the proof-
theoretic strength of simply typed A-calculus. This is illustrated by viewing ELF 




Ru = {(*, *), (*, o)} 
R 
which is motivated by a result of Geuvers for ELF [Geu90] which implies that, 
once the signature has been formed, the (*, 0) rule is redundant. 
We do not continue investigating this view of signatures since incorporating the 
rules of signature formation within the proof system of the PTS with signatures 
is perfectly satisfactory for our purposes. 
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2.3 Pure type systems with /3ij-equivalence 
The framework ELF is a type theory with 377-equivalence: all matters relating 
to encodings of logics are treated up to this equality. We must therefore extend 
the definition of a PTS to include 77-conversion. This is not straightforward. The 
Church—Rosser property for PTSs with 3 holds for the usual notion of 0-reduction 
on the preterms. This property is lost for arbitrary preterms when the ij-reduction, 
)x:A.(Bx)— B if x V fv(B), 
is added. For example, the term )tx:A.(Ax:B.M)x reduces viaq to Ax:B.M and 
by /3 to )x:A.M, which has a common reduct if and only if A and B do. Let 
denote the one-step reduction, defined by -* together with the above reduction, 
whose reflexive and transitive closure is 	Salvesen [Sa189] adds /377-equality 
to the ELF type system using equality judgements, independent of the notion of 
reduction, which restricts the equality to ELF terms. She shows that the Church-
Rosser property holds for terms by a very technical and delicate argument. We 
follow her approach and add q to the proof systems of PTSs using the equal-
ity judgements. The results, corresponding to those for the standard definition, 
are not known in general. In recent unpublished work [5a191], Salvesen proves 
these results for functional PTSs with 77 satisfying strong normalisation, which, in 
particular, implies the decidability of the new framework ELF. 
The set of preterms of a PTS is extended to include preterms of the form A = B 
for preterms A and B. The proof system for PTSs with i is obtained by removing 
the CONV rule in the standard proof system for PTSs (definition 2.1.3), replacing 
it by a conversion rule containing an equality judgement of the form M = N : A 
and adding rules for inferring the equality judgement. 
2.3.1 DEFINITION Let (U,A,7Z) be a specification of a PTS (definition 2.1.1). 
The PTS with 77, specified by (U, A,.'R), is defined by the proof system given in 
table 2.1 and table 2.2. 
The notions of (-context and (-term are similar to those for standard PTSs. 
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AXIOM 	QF- u:v 	 u:vEA 
FI- A:u 
START 	
F, x : A I- x : A 	
U E U, x E Var, x V dom(F) 
FI- A:u 	FI- B:C 
WEAK 	
B : C F, x : A I- 	
U E U, x E Var, x 0 dom(F) 
FF -A:u 	F,x:AF-B:v 
H 	 (u,v,w)ER. 
FI-IIx:A.B:w 
F I- Hx:A.B:u 	F, x : A I- M: B 
uEU 
F I- Ax:A.M : llx:A.B 
FF-M:Hx:A.B 	Fl- N:A 
APP 
F I- MN: B[N/x] 





Table 2.1: The proof system for a pure type system with 77 specified by (U, A, 7Z). 
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FI -A:B 
REFL 









F I- llx:A.B = llx:A .B' : w 
FI-Hx:A.B:u FI-A=A':v 	F,x:AI-M=M':B 
A —EQ 
F I- Ax:A.M = Ax:A'.M' : flx:A.B 
for u, v E U 
FI-M=M':Hx:A.B FHN=N':A 
APP—EQ 
F I- MN = M'N': B[N/x] 
FF-A=A':B 	FF - B=C:u 
CON V—EQ uEU 
FHA=A':C 
BETA 
	 FF- C:A 	FI-11x:A.D:u 	F,x:Al-B:D 	
uEU 
F I- (Ax:A.B)C = B[C/x] : D[C/x] 
FI-B:Hx:A.0 
FT A 
F I- )tx:A.(Bx) = B: 11x:A.0 
	 loy xfv(B) 
Table 2.2: The proof system for a pure type system with i  specified by (U, A, R) 
(continued). 
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The following basic results give a few elementary properties of the entailment 
relation of an arbitrary PTS with 77 specified by (U, A, R). These are proved by 
trivial adaptation of the proofs of the corresponding results for the standard PTS 
with 3-conversion and so are not given here. Throughout we use the notation 
FF-atodenoteFl-A:BorFI-A=B:CforpretermsA,Band C. 
2.3.2 LEMMA [Free variable lemma] Suppose F I- B: C for r = ( x 1 :A 1 ,. . . ) 
Then 
the x 1 ,. . . , x are distinct; 
fv(B),fv(C) C 1x 1 ,. .. 
a derivation F I- B: C has subderivation x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x_:A_ 1 I- A : u j for 
ui E U and each i E {1,... , n}. 
2.3.3 LEMMA [Start Lemma] Let F be a context. Then 
FI- u:vforu:vE.4; 
FI-x:Aforallx:AF. 
2.3.4 LEMMA [Substitution] 
If F, x : A, F' I- a and F I- M : A then F, F'[M/x] F- a[M/x]. 
2.3.5 LEMMA [Generalised substitution] If F, x 1 :A 1 ,.. . , 	I- a and, for 
i E {1, .. . ,n}, FI- t : A[t 1 ,.. . , t_ 1 /x 1 ,.. . , x_ 1 ] then F,[/] I- a[1/]. 
2.3.6 LEMMA [Thinning] If F F- a and F C F' for context F' then F' F- a. 
2.3.7 LEMMA [Permutation] If F, x : A, y: B, F' F- a and F F- B : u for some u E U 
then F,y: B,x : A,F' F- a. 
2.3.8 LEMMA [Weak Generation] Let F F- A : B. 
IfAisuthen u:v E A for some u E U. 
IfAisxthenx:CEFI0rFF-C:uanduEU. 
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If Ais Hx:A 1 .A 2 then 1' I- A 1 : u and F,x : A 1 I- A 2 : v and (u,v,w) e 7Z for 
some w E U. 
If A is Ax:A 1 .A 2 then F, x : A 1 I- A 2 : C for some term C and F F- Hx:A 1 .C: u 
for u E U. 
If A is A 1 A 2 then F I- A 1 : Hx:C1 .C2 and F F- A 2 : C1 for some terms C 1 and 
C2 . 
Remark The generation lemma for pure type systems with /3-equality is stronger 
as it also gives information regarding B using the transitivity rule for /3-equality. 
The analogous result cannot be proved for 37-equality using the same technique, 
as is illustrated by the following segment of a proof tree: 
FF-A:B FF-B=B1 :u 
FF-A:B1 FHB1 =B2 :v 
F I- A : B2 
Here, F I- B 1 = B2 : u does not follow using the transitivity rule as u and v need 
not be the same universe. 
2.3.9 LEMMA Let u be a top universe. Then F 1/ u : A for any preterm A and 
context F. 
Remark An obvious question to ask is whether the system with 3-reduction 
given on the preterms of the PTS and the system with the equality judgement 
giving 3 are equivalent. Coquand [HP91] points out that this is a non-trivial 
question and proves they are equivalent concepts for a type system containing 
ELF. 
Remark In recent unpublished work [Sal9l], Salvesen shows that functional 
PTSs with ij and strong normalisation satisfy the Church-Rosser property and 
subject reduction. From this, unicity of types, generation and strengthening hold. 
In section 4.2.3, we give an alternative proof of the Church-Rosser property for 
ELF+ which avoids the technicalities required in Salvesen's proof. 
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The sets of preterms for PTSs with and without 77 are identical since the 
differences occur in the proof systems, not the specifications. Also, the definition 
of PTS morphism between PTSs with 77 is, therefore, similar to the one for standard 
PTSs (definition 2.1.24). The following result, stating that the translation gives 
a sound interpretation of the domain PTS in the image PTS, is used to derive 
results for ELF from those of ELF. 
2.3.10 LEMMA Let f be a PTS morphism from (1 to (2,  where (1 and (2  are two 
PTSs with i. Then 
F F-c' A: B implies f(F) 16 1(A) : 1(B); 
F F- A = B : C implies f(F) HC2 1(A) = f(B) : f(C). 
Proof This is proved by simultaneous induction on the derivation of F F- 6 a for 
a of the form A: B or A = B: C. 	 U 
We obtain strong normalisation for ELF+  via the corresponding result for ELF 
using the next lemma, and so we are able to apply Salvesen's results to the new 
framework. 
2.3.11 LEMMA Let f be a PTS morphism from (1 to (2,  where (1 and (2  are PTSs 
with 17. If (2 is strongly normalising then so is (. 
Proof This follows from the fact that f is a map preserving /3- and i-redexes. 0 
The next result is unsurprising, but is stated here as it will be used later in our 
proof of the Church-Rosser property for ELF. 
2.3.12 LEMMA Let f be a PTS morphism from (1 to (2,  where (1 and (2  are PTSs 
with i, and let A and B be two preterms. Then 1(A) = 1(B) implies that either 
A and B are identical or the sets of subterms of A and B (definition 2.1.2) contain 
universes. 
The PTS presentation of a type theory is defined using a set of preterms de-
termined by the specification. Jutting [Bar9l] shows that each preterm of a PTS 
in Barendregt's A-cube can be assigned a unique level such that F I- A: B im-
plies that the level of B is one more than the level of A. The intuition for this 
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is illustrated by two presentations of ELF, one based on the pure type system 
All (example 2.2.8) and the other on the original presentation with three sorts 
of syntax—objects, families and kinds (appendix A). The AH-preterms of level 0 
correspond to objects in the original presentation, preterms of level 1 to the fami-
lies, those of level 2 to the kinds, and the preterm of level 3 to a universe in which 
the kinds live. We extend this notion of levels to a certain class of PTSs with 
ij by reversing the ordering on levels so that arbitrarily many universes can be 
accommodated. 
2.3.13 DEFINITIoN Let P denote the set of preterms of a PTS with 77  specified 
by (U, A, R.), and let T denote the set of preterms. The level relation # C T x 
is defined inductively as follows: 
if u is a top universe (definition 2.1.14) then #(u, 0); 
if u: v E A and #(v,n) then #(u,n+ 1); 
#(u, n) and x e Varu for u E U imply #(x, n + 2); 
#(B,n) implies #(Ax:A.B,n) and #(Hx:A.B,n) and #(BA,n). 
Notation We say the preterm A has level n if #(A, n). 
It is not always the case that PTSs have top universes: for example, the PTS 
specified in example 2.1.6 has one universe * and axiom * : *. The level relation 
can, therefore, be empty. We restrict our attention to the PTSs whose universes all 
have levels. We also impose the restriction that the universes have unique levels. 
2.3.14 LEMMA Let C be a PTS with ij whose universes all have unique levels. 
Then, 
the preterms all have unique levels; 
pce 
if variable x and Lterm  B have the same level then A and A[B/x] have the 
same level. 
xc 	 O.k. 	 O rerr#.s. 
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Remark The uniqueness is required as the following example shows. Let 
U = {u,v,w} and A = {v : u , w : u,v : w}. Then we have #(u, 0), #(v, 1), 
#(w, 1) and #(v, 2), which imply #(xv,  3), #(x")  4) and 	3), but not 
We show, for a certain class of PTSs, that I' I- A: B and #(A, n + 1) im-
ply #(B, n) for some n > 0. This is achieved, using the technique due to Jut-
ting [Bar9 1], by proving a stronger result whose formulation requires the following 
definition. 
2.3.15 DEFINITIoN Let A, B and C be preterms of a PTS with 77 whose universes 
all have unique levels. Then 
A: B is okif #(A,n+ 1) and #(B,n) for some n > 0; 
A = B: C is okif #(A,n+ 1) and #(B,n+1) and #(C,n) for some n > 0; 
for a of the form A: B or A = B: C, a is hereditarily okif a is ok and all 
substatements y: P (occurring just after a symbol 'A' or 'H') in a are ok; 
F is hereditarily ok if F is x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x:A, and x2 : A i is hereditarily ok for 
eachiE{1,...,n}. 
More restrictions on PTSs are required if we are to show that F I- A : B implies 
A : B is ok. By definition, the preterm llx:A.B has the same level as B. It is 
therefore necessary to impose the restriction that, for every rule (u, v, w) in the 
specification of a PTS, the universes v and w have the same level. We call such 
PTSs even. 
2.3.16 LEMMA Let C be an even PTS with ij specified by (U, A, R,). Then F F- a 
implies that a and F are hereditarily ok, where a is of the form A: B or A = B : C 
for preterms A, B and C. 
Proof An easy induction on the derivation of F I- a. Lemma 2.3.14 is used for 
the cases where the last line in the derivation is an instance of the APP or APP-EQ 
rules. The extra condition on the rules in the specification of (is required for the 
P1 and P1-EQ rules. 
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Remark Jutting's proof of this result for the type systems in Barendregt's A-cube 
uses lemmas specific to the A-cube for the case where the last line in the derivation 
is the CONV rule. It is not clear how to generalise his method for PTSs with 
/3-equality defined on the preterms. These lemmas are not required for 37-equality 
given by incorporating equality judgements into the proof system. 
2.3.17 COROLLARY [to lemma 2.3.16] Let (be an even PTS with i specified by 
(U,A,R). Then: 
FI-'A: B implies #(A,n+l) and #(B,n) for some n> 0; 
F F-' A = B: C implies #(A,n + 1) and #(B,n + 1) and #(C,n) for some 
n>0. 
The adaptation of PTSs with ij to include signatures follows similar lines to 
the one for PTSs given in section 2.2. The specification of a PTS with signatures 
and ij is the same as the one in definition 2.2.4. The proof system is obtained by 
amalgamating definitions 2.1.3 and 2.2 in the obvious way. For completeness, we 
present the full proof system for a PTS with signatures and q in tables 2.3 and 2.4, 
since we use this presentation to define the new framework ELF+.  The results for 
PTSs with ij lift to PTSs with signatures and i. 
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AXIOM 	QF-E u:v 
SIGNATURE 	
O 
( ) H,a: a: A 
()F- E A:u 	.QF- E B:C 
()HE ,a:A B: C 
U Fr A : v 
CONTEXT 
F, x : A HE x : A 
FHE A:v 	PI-E B:C 
F,x : A HE B : C 
'u:vEA 
U EU,a C Const',a dom(E) 
uEU,aEConstL,a V dom(>) * 
V C V,x E Var',x V dom(F) 
v C V,x C Var",x dom(F) 
FF-E A:u 	F,x:AHEB:v 
H-RULE 	 (u,v ) w)R. 
F F- E Hx:A.B: w 
FHE HX.A.B.'u 	F,x:AHEM:B 
s-RULE 	 uCU 
P HE .\x:A.M: llx:A.B 
PHE M:Hx:A.B 	FI-E N:A 
APP 
I- MN : B[N/x] 
FI-E A:B 	PH B=B':u 
CONy 	 uCU 
Table 2.3: The proof system for a PTS with signatures and ij specified by 
(U,V,A,7Z). 
43 
Pure Type Systems 
REFL 
	
'E A: B 
PF- E A=A:B 
SYM M FH
E A=A:B 
P A' =A: B 
PI-E A=A':B PH E A'=A":B 
TRANS 
P H A = A" : B 
U - 11E 	
PHE A=A':u 	P,x:AF- E B=B':v Ii 	it '\ 	V 
-- ---s y-',,  
F H Hx:A.B = Hx:A'.B' : w 
A-EQ 
P1- E  Hx:A.B:u 	PH E  A=A':v 	P,x:AH E  M=M':B 
P 1-E  Ax:A.M = Ax:A'.M' : llx:A.B 
for u E U and v E V 
P1- M=M':Hx:A.B Fl- N=N':A 
APP-EQ 	E 	 E 
P HE  MN = M'N': B[N/x] 
PH A=A':B Fl- 	= 
CONy-EQ 	E 	 E 
 B C:u 	
u E U 
P A = A' : C 
BETA 
	FI- E C:A 	PH E IIX:A.D:u 	F,x:AHE B:D 	
U E U 
P l-E  (Ax:A.B)C = B[C/x] : D[C/x] 
B 
P HE  Ax:A.(Bx) = B : llx:A.0 	
x f v( )
Table 2.4: The proof system for a PTS with signatures and ij specified by 
(U, V, A, R) (continued). 
ETA 




The purpose of this thesis is to provide a new framework, ELF+,  for representing 
a wide variety of logical systems: that is, logics described using proof systems. 
This framework necessarily takes a particular approach to syntax and rules, which 
may differ from the approach in the original presentation of such systems. Before 
we introduce ELF+,  we therefore give a standard presentation of the logics under 
consideration, using ideas underlying representations in ELF and ELF. This 
presentation does not constitute a framework since we do not specify a logic using 
a finite amount of information; as we shall see, the syntax and rules of a logic have 
a finitary specification in ELF+.  Instead, it forms a reference point from which 
to describe representations in ELF+.  Logics whose presentations do not fit this 
pattern are particularly interesting as they are more difficult, if not inipossible, to 
represent. 
In this thesis, logics consist of syntax, judgements and a proof system acting 
on the judgements. The syntax of a logic is a set of expressions, partitioned by a 
set of syntactic classes. For example, the expressions of first-order logic fall into 
two syntactic classes, namely terms and formulae. This partitioning of expressions 
is also natural in the presentation of, for example, elements of the datatypes int, 
list and boo 1. The formation of expressions is based on Aczel's work on Frege 
structures [Acz80], inspired by Martin-Löf's theory of arities [NPS90]. With rep-
resentations in ELF+,  certain variables of the framework correspond to variables 
of the underlying logic so that substitution in the metatheory dictates the be-
haviour of variables in the logic. We define substitution for logics presented in this 
standard form. This allows for a smooth translation to an algebraic presentation 
of these logics as described in chapter 6. 
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Proof systems are viewed as calculi for constructing derivations of certain corn-
binations of expressions, identified by the judgements. In first-order logic, the 
formulae are the judgements, sometimes written Otrue for formula 0 to distin-
guish the concept of a formula being true from that of it being well-formed. The 
judgements of Martin-Löf's type theory [Mar85] are A set, a E A, A = B and 
a E A = B, where A, B, a and b are expressions of the type theory. A for-
mal description of the proof systems under consideration is given, from which 
the derivations and consequence relation are defined. This description includes 
an account of the assumptions and free variables in derivations since these must 
be declared explicitly in ELF; in particular, we account for the discharge of as-
sumptions and variables local to derivations. This last point may be unfamiliar 
since a full account of the behaviour of variables is rarely given. It is illustrated 
by first-order logic where the truth of Vx.0 does not depend on the variable x, 
since we treat Vx.cj and Vy.[y/x] as syntactically equivalent, where y is not free 
in 0. Not all logics can be represented in ELF+  since their consequence relations 
may have properties incompatible with the ELF entailment relation; examples 
include systems for non-monotonic reasoning. These restrictions are highlighted 
in our presentation. 
As is to be expected in research of this generality, many of the ideas discussed 
here can be found in the literature. The novelty of our approach lies in the 
combination of ideas which give a better understanding of representations in ELF+ 
and indicate the potential difficulty with finding such representations. 
3.1 Syntax and judgements 
We describe a collection of logics whose expressions and judgements are formed 
by a signature, which is a quadruple of sets of function symbols: 
• a set of class symbols C; 
• a subset. C' C C, which distinguishes the syntactic classes containing vari-
ables; 
• a set of expression symbols E; 
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a set of judgement symbols J. 
The set of class symbols is a finite set of function symbols with arities given by 
the natural numbers. For example, the set of class symbols for first-order logic 
is {t ° , f°}, consisting of two nullary function symbols which denote the classes of 
terms and formulae respectively; for higher-order logic it is {t°, o,  21 where t 
and o are nuflary function symbols and = is a binary symbol. The class symbols 
which form the syntactic classes containing variables are distinguished; in first-
order logic, the syntactic class of terms contains variables, whereas the class of 
formulae does not. 
The formation of the expressions is governed by arities formed from the syn-
tactic classes. 
3.1.1 DEFINITIoN Let (C, C' ) E, J) be the signature of a logic. The set of syntac-
tic classes for this logic is defined inductively as follows: 
the nullary class symbols are syntactic classes; 
given an n-ary class symbol f, with n > 1, and syntactic classes c1 ,... , 
then f(c 1 ,.. . , c) is a syntactic class. 
The syntactic classes containing variables are those syntactic classes formed solely 
from elements of C'. 
The arities accompanying expression symbols can be viewed as simple types; 
this view is inspired by Martin-Löf's theory of arities [NPS90] and follows Aczel's 
work on Frege structures [Acz80], modified to retain the partitioning of expres-
sions via syntactic classes. Each arity has the form (a 1 ,. . . , a) -f c for n > 01  
where a r ,... , an are arities (called the domain arities) and c is a syntactic class. 
Associated with each arity is a level; for n = 0 the level is 0 and, for n > 0, the 
level is 1 + 1, where 1 is the maximum level of a 1 ,. .. , a. The set of expression 
symbols is a countable set of function symbols, with each symbol accompanied 
by an arity indicating the application and binding power of that function symbol. 
For example, the set of expression symbols for first-order arithmetic can be given 
as 
10 
 t t-4t succ , +(t,tt, (t,t)-f 3 (t_+f)_f } 
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The fact that V and 2 are binding operators is indicated by the domain arity of 
level 1. For our purposes, the arities can be limited to those of level not exceeding 
2, since we require only variables of the logic to occur bound. The set of expression 
symbols need not be finite. For example, the set for higher-order logic is 
(a=.a=,o) j(o=o=o) V(=0)=0 3(a=0)=0} 
	
aj 	 a 	a 
aj3 
where a and /3 are syntactic classes. 
The judgements are defined using a countable set of function symbols, this time 
called judgement symbols, with accompanying arities of the form (c, . . . ) a,) for 
n > 1, where each a2 is a syntactic class. The set of judgement symbols for 
first-order logic is {true}, while that for Martin-Löf's type theory is 
{
(ezp) set (ezp , E 
,ezp) Equals' equats e ( PezPeP)} , 
where exp is the syntactic class of expressions. We do not insist that the set of 
judgement symbols be finite since we can envisage judgements indexed by syntactic 
classes (for, example, equality judgements). 
The formal definitions of the sets of expressions and judgements are straight-
forward. The expressions are generated from countably infinite sets of variables, 
one, denoted by Varc,  for each syntactic class c containing variables. 
3.1.2 DEFINITION Let (C, C', E, J) be the signature of a logic. The set of expres-
sions for this logic is defined inductively as follows: 
I. if x is a variable in Varc  for syntactic class c formed from C', then x is an 
expression with arity C; 
if f E E with arity (a 1 ,.. . , a) -f c of level < 2, and e 1 ,.. . , e are expres-
sions of arity a 1 ,. . . , an respectively, then f(e 1 ,.. . , e) is an expression with 
arity c; 
if e is an expression with arity c of level 0, and x 1 ,. . . , x are distinct variables 
with arities a 1 ,. . . , a, each of level 0, then (x 1 , ... , x)e is an 'expression 
with arity (a 1 ,... , a) - c. 
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The logic expressions are those expressions with arity of level 0, and the term ex-
pressions are those logic expressions inhabiting syntactic, classes containing vari-
ables. 
Remark In the last clause x 1 , . . . , x, bind any free occurrences in expression e. 
We do not distinguish of-equivalent expressions, by which we mean expressions 
equivalent up to renaming of bound variables. We delay the formal definitions of 
these notions until after the judgements have been defined. 
Notation Let e be an expression with arity c of level 0. We say that e inhabits 
c. We employ infix and other notational devices as appropriate. For example, we 
write q$  A b rather than A(q, b) and 3x.0 rather than 2((x)q5). For convenience, 
we sometimes call the variables of the logic the logic variables. 
Notice that the expression symbols with arities of level > 0 are not expressions of 
the logic. For example, in first-order logic with arithmetic, the symbols succ, D 
and V are not expressions. Essentially, we have constructed the 3?-1ong normal 
forms of terms of second-order A-calculus, since (x1,... , x,)e conveys the fact 
that the x 1 ,... , x are bound in e, as does Ax 1 . . . Ax.e. This analogy is slightly 
misleading, however, as our notation does not assume any particular behaviour of 
the variables except binding and of-conversion: there is no notion of 3-equivalence, 
as we cannot form /3-redexes, and 7-equiva1ence is superfluous as we only abstract 
expressions which, by definition, have been fully applied; for example, we have 
V((x)x = y), but not V(= y). 
We have given a general description of the expressions of a logic. From this, 
the judgements identify the combinations of logic expressions which are actually 
used in the proof system. 
3.1.3 DEFINITION Let (C, C', E, J) be the signature of a logic. The set of judge-
ments for this logic is 
{j(e 1 , . . . , e) : j1 	e J for syntactic classes a1,... , an and 
logic expressions e 1 ,. . . , e, inhabiting a 1 . . . , a respectively}. 
Remark These judgements are sometimes referred to as basic judgements, to 
distinguish them from Martin-Löf's higher-order judgements mentioned above and 
discussed in the next section. 
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3.1.4 EXAMPLE We have already seen that the terms and formulae of first-order 
arithmetic are generated by 
C {t ° , f° }; 
C' {t ° }; 
E {0t  succt-t , 	 (t,t)-f 	 t—f_+f}. 
J {true"}. 
3.1.5 EXAMPLE Simply typed A-calculus is sometimes presented informally as 
ci ::= i; 1 o Icr => ci; 
M I' l l 
with judgements of the form M: ci. Our presentation uses the quadruple 
C {type ° , term° }; 
C' {term ° }; 
E {tYPe 0tpe 	(type,type)-type app(t m,term)-term  A(type,term-.-*te?m)--*term }; 
j { COlOfl (tmtYPe)} . 
3.1.6 EXAMPLE Another presentation of the syntax of Church's simply typed 
A-calculus involves one syntactic class of expressions with no distinction between 
the types and terms. This is precisely the view taken by Barendregt et al. [Bar90] 
in their uniform presentation of Church's type theories as pure type systems 
(PTSs). The expressions (or preterms) and judgements of the PTS with speci-
fication (U, A, R) (see chapter 2) are determined by the quadruple 
C {exp 0 }; 
I 	 0 C {exp }; 
E {exP 11(exp,exp-+ep)--*ezp A(P,)zP app'' : u 
J { col on 
zp,ezp) I. 
Remark An alternative set of judgement symbols for PTSs is {inhab}, where 
the inhabitation of an expression is significant: that is, expression B is inhabited if 
F F- A: B for arbitrary expression A and context F. This emphasis on inhabitation 
is used in the analysis of representations of consequence relations in ELF+ . 
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3.1.7 EXAMPLE The syntax and judgements of higher-order logic, whose expres-
sions are the well-typed terms of simply typed A-calculus, are given by 
C {t° o° =. 2 } 
C' {t ° , o° ,= 2 }; 
E 	 A(a_/3)-(a=.I3) =c=.c.o D000 v(a=o)=o (cx=o)zo} 
where a and 3 range over the syntactic classes; 
J { true'°}. 
(In Church's formulation of higher-order logic [Chu40], one A-abstraction is used, 
rather than infinitely many indexed by the syntactic classes.) 
3.1.8 EXAMPLE In the previous example, the set of expression symbols is defined 
by indexing over the syntactic classes. A more complicated indexing occurs when 
we present the syntax of primitive recursive functions over some domain exp: 
C {exp 0  }; 
I 	 0 C {exp }; 
E {zero, SUCCeXPeZP} U fpik 	: i, k E Co., 0 < i < Ic}D U Ct*cr 
- 	 -- 	 ---- 
where expk denotes (exp,. . . , 	for k > 0 and 
C on st k  denotes an infinite set of function symbols of arity eXPk - xp; 
j 	{(ePexP)} - 	 - 	- 	- 	-- 
3.1.9 EXAMPLE Inevitably there are logics whose usual syntactic presentation 
does not coincide with the above format. Part of the work of encoding a logic in 
ELF+ involves providing a presentation which matches the one given, although 
this is not necessarily possible in all cases. For example, in the A 1-calculus [Bar84] 
and the linear lambda calculus (A L-calculus) [AHM89] are examples where the 
application of function symbols is restricted, a mechanism which is not allowed in 
the above presentation. The A-abstraction for the A 1-calculus is 
Ax.M is an expression if M is an expression and x E I 
and that for the AL-calculus is 
Ax.M is an expression if M is an expression and variable x occurs free once in M. 
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We now formalise the behaviour of variables in the expressions and judgements 
of a logic. It seems acceptable to have common notions of free and bound variables 
and a-conversion. A common behaviour of variables of the logic is not so apparent. 
For example, in first-order logic the free variables may be regarded as place holders 
for term expressions of the same syntactic class. In the ir-calculus [MPW89], 
variables are just names which are substituted for other names, while in Hoare 
logic [Apt8l] variables play two roles: a variable denotes both a location and the 
value within that location. Also, certain logics used in situation theory [Acz90] 
have a component-wise substitution; that is, for expression f(a 1 , .. . , a,), each 
expression a, is replaced by expression b 2 to obtain f(b 1 ,. . . , b,j. 
When representing logics in ELF, the logic variables are identified with certain 
variables of the type theory. This determines a particular behaviour of the logic 
variables which we now formalise. It is given at this general level to facilitate the 
translation from the syntactic presentation of logics described here to the algebraic 
presentation described in chapter 6. 
Remark In the concluding chapter on future research (chapter 7), we propose 
a new notion of framework which does not rely on a common behaviour of the 
logic variables; the aim is capture binding and a-conversion at the logic level and 
substitution at the schematic (or metatheoretic) level. 
The free variables are defined as usual, with (x 1 ,.. . , x,,)e denoting the fact 
that the x 1 , . . . , x are bound variables in e. 
3.1.10 DEFINITION The set of free variables of an expression or judgement, a, of 
a logic, denoted by fv(a), is defined inductively as follows: 
if a is a variable then fv(a) = {a}; 
if a is f(e 1 ,. . . , e,,), where f is an expression orjudgement symbol and n > 0, 
then fv(a) = U 1  fv(e); 
if a is the expression (x1,... , x)e with n> 0 then fv(a) = fv(e)—{x 1 ,. . . , x}. 
We now give the definition of simultaneous substitution for expressions and judge-
ments as it is used extensively in chapter 6. The substitution of one expression for 
a variable is an instance of this general definition. For more details see [Sto88]. 
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3.1.11 DEFINITION [Simultaneous substitution] Let t 1 ,. . . , t, be expressions of a 
logic and let x 1 ,. . . , x, be distinct variables, with n > 0, such that, for each 
i E 11,. . . , n}, the x2 and tj belong to the same syntactic class. Also, let a denote 
either an expression or a judgement. Define a[t1 ,. . . , t/x 1 ,.. . ,x,], written more 
concisely as a[i/], by induction on the structure of a as follows: 
if a is the variable x i then x[/J = 
if a is the variable y, for y {x 1 ,.. . , x}, then y[1/] = 
if a is f(e 1 , . . . , em ), where f is either an expression or judgement symbol 
and m > 0, then f(e 1 ,. . . , em)[1/] = f(e1 [t7],. . . , e[t7]); 
if a is the expression (y r ,. . . , ym)e, with m > 0, then 
((yi,...,ym)e)[ 1/].= ((zi,...,zm)e[zi,...,zm/ii,...,ym][I/]), where the 
Z1. . . Zm are distinct variables such that, for all j E 11,. . . , m}, variable z 
is not contained in {x1,... , x,} U U fv(t) U fv(e). 
In 4, the z1 ,. . . , Zm are chosen to be the first variables from the appropriate syn-
tactic classes satisfying z1 {x 1 ,. . . , x}UU 1  fv(t)Ufv(e)U{z 1 ,. . . , z_ 1 } using 
some standard enumeration of the variables of the logic. 
Notation We assume that the notation a[ /] implies that I and Y denote finite 
sequences of expressions and distinct variables of the same length ii, for n > 0, 
such that, for each i E 11,. . . , n}, the t2 and ; belong to the same syntactic class. 
We say that [t7] is a substitution. It is a renaming substitution if I is a finite 
sequence of distinct variables. 
3.1.12 DEFINITION M is a subexpression of N if M E Sub(N), where Sub(N), 
the set of subexpressions of N, is defined inductively by 
S'ub(x) = {x}; 
Sub(f(e 1 ,. . . , e,j) = {f(e 1 ,. . . , e,3} U U 1  Sub(e); 




A change of bound variables in M is the replacement of the subexpression 
(x1,.
.. 
) x,)N by (yr ,. . . , y)N[i/J, where n > 0 and the yi are distinct 
variables which do not occur in N. 
M is a-congruent to N, denoted by M = N, if N results from M by a 
sequence of changes of bound variables. 
The following proposition is trivial to prove by structural induction on expres-
sions and judgements. 
3.1.14 PROPOSITION Let a be a judgement of a logic or an expression with arity 
a. Then a[ /] is also a judgement or an expression with the same arity a. 
A more detailed analysis of simultaneous substitution can be found in [Sto88]. 
Here, we just list those results that will be required later in this thesis. 
3.1.15 PROPOSITION Let a be an expression or judgement of a logic. Then, for 
n > 0, 
a[/] =c  a; 
%"C 
a[/] = a if x 2 V fv(a)/ where T denotes the variables x 1 ,. . . , 
eCC 
a[/}[/] =a  a[/] if yj V fv(a)t where V denotes the variables y,. . . , 
a [ t7}  [/Y] = a [/] [i[/]  /J if x 2 V fv(), where T denotes the variables 
x 1 ,. . 
a[/][/] = a[[/]/] provided y2 E fv(a) implies y2 E {x 1 ,. . . , 
where y denotes the variables yr,. . . , y,, and i E 11,. . . , n}; 
a[t1 /x 1]... [t/x} = a[/] provided the; are distinct and 	U 1  fv(t) 
foralljE{1,...,n}. 
Remark Part 5 is used extensively in chapter 6 for the categorical presentation 
of logics and their representing type theories. 
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3.2 Proof systems and consequence relations 
In this section, we give a formal account of proof systems, from which we define the 
derivations and consequence relation of a logic, and which highlights the restric-
tions imposed by requiring consequence relations to be compatible with the ELF 
entailment relation; in particular, we concentrate on natural deduction systems. 
We account for assumptions and free variables in a derivation since these con-
cepts must be explicitly declared in ELF; this involves explaining the notions of 
discharge of assumptions and variables local to derivations. The last point is illus-
trated by first-order logic: the truth of a formula Vx.4 does not rely on x since Vx4 
and Vy.q[y/x}, for y not free in 0, are syntactically equivalent. We also link these 
ideas to Martin-Löf's notion of higher-order judgements (also called hypothetico-
general judgements in [Mar85]), written in the form J1,. , J to indi-
cate that basic judgement J is provable, generally in x 1 ,.. . , x i,,, from assumptions 
• , J; proof systems are represented in ELF+  by regarding rules as tuples of 
basic and higher-order judgements. Throughout this section, we assume that a 
logic is based on some arbitrary signature which defines sets of syntactic classes, 
logic expressions and basic judgements. 
Assumptions and free variables are declared explicitly in ELF+  and so must 
be taken into account here; derivations in a proof system are therefore based on 
the notion of sequent. 
3.2.1 DEFINITIoN A sequent of a logic has the form F = J, where F is a finite 
set of judgements, J is a judgement and X is a finite set of logic variables such 
that fv(F) U fv(J) 9 X, where fv(F) is Uj,€r  fv(J). 
Notation For a sequent F 	J, the set of judgements F is the set of as- 
sumptions for the sequent. We often use the notation F, J1 ,. . . , J 	 J 
to denote a sequent with the set of assumptions F U {J1 ,. . . , J} and set of free 
variables X U 1x 1 ,. . . ,  XWJ- 
Remark We have restricted ourselves to sets of assumptions. This is a necessary 
property if we are to represent logics in ELF+,  although it excludes, for example, 
various linear logics [Gir87] where assumptions can only be used once. Regarding 
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derivations as trees, it is perhaps more natural to regard the collection of assump-
tions as a 'multiset': that is, a collection of judgements in which the number of 
times each element occurs is significant, but the order of elements is not. We 
cannot represent a multiset of assumptions using a context in a type theory since 
we have unrestricted use of declared variables in this context. An alternative ap-
proach is to concentrate on ordered sets, that is, collections of distinct judgements 
where the order is important. However, this complicates matters and the need 
for it seems to be rare. The permutation lemma (lemma 2.1.17) for PTSs ensures 
that we do not encounter problems with representing sets of assumptions using 
contexts. 
3.2.2 DEFINITIoN A rule is a set of (n + 1)-tuples of sequents where n > 0. 
Rules are typically written in the form 
seq1 . . . seq 
seq 
where schematic variables and side-conditions may be employed. We call such a 
presentation the schematic form of the rule, seq1 . . . seq, are the premises and seq 
the conclusion. 
3.2.3 DEFINITION An instance of a rule is an element of that rule. 
3.2.4 EXAMPLE The D I-rule of natural deduction-style first-order logic [Pra65] 
can be written as 
F,çbtrue =tx  i,btrue 
F 	(0 D çb)true 
This notation indicates that, for particular instantiations çb' and i ' of the schematic 
	
I 	I. 	 . 	 . 	 I. 	I. variables q5  and , the formula, D 1', is true using assumptions F if '1' is true 
using assumptions F' U {' true}. The discharge of assumptions is reflected by 
insisting that qV true occurs in the assumptions of the premise; q5' true need not 
occur in the assumptions of the conclusion. 
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3.2.5 EXAMPLE The VI-rule 
VI 	
F 	çbtrue 
f X  Vx.çb true 
denotes that Vx.' is true using assumptions P and free variables in X if ' is true 
using the same assumptions and free variables in X U {x}. Variable x is local to 
the proof of çb' true from F' since it has no importance in the quantification Vx.': 
the formulae Vx.0' and Vx.'{y/x], for y not free in q5', are syntactically equivalent 
by a-conversion. 
These two examples illustrate our treatment of the discharge of assumptions and 
the binding of variables in derivations. An alternative view of rules, and one that 
underpins representations in ELF+,  is to emphasise these concepts of discharge 
and variable binding using Martin-Löf's higher-order judgements. In this view, 
rules are (n + 1)-tuples of basic and higher-order judgements. The higher-order 
judgements are of the form , 1m J for n,m > 0, where J1,. , m , 
are basic judgements. (When n and m are 0 we omit the arrow). They indicate 
that basic judgement J is provable, generally in x 1 ,. . . , x, from assumptions 
containing J1 , ..., 'm Two particular kinds of higher-order judgements are often 
highlighted: the hypothetical, J -* K, and the general, - J. 
Remark To contrast the two concepts of rule, observe that in definition 3.2.2, 
the assumptions and free variables are explicitly given whereas, using Martin-Löf's 
higher-order judgements, just the information regarding discharge and variable 
binding is present. We use the first approach to provide the formal definitions of 
derivation and consequence relation, since we concentrate in this thesis on repre-
senting standard consequence relations, defined from basic judgements, in ELF+ . 
The second approach is used to describe the representation of rules in ELF+;  in the 
chapter on future research (chapter 7), we propose investigating a higher-order con-
sequence relation, defined from Martin-Löf's basic and higher-order judgements, 
to help analyse the representations of derivations in ELF+ . 
3.2.6 DEFINITION A formal system is a finite set of rules. 
Remark We define proof systems as formal systems satisfying the cut condition, 
which states that derivations can be combined: given derivations of F =' J and 
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J x  K, we obtain a derivation of F, L =x K. A precise definition will be 
given once derivations have been defined. 
We view derivations as trees of sequents whose formation is governed by the 
rules. An alternative view is that derivations are sequences of sequents, where each 
sequent is obtained from its predecessors by the application of a rule. The first 
approach gives more information regarding the assumptions used at each stage 
and so is more appropriate here. 
3.2.7 DEFINITION Let P be a formal system. A derivation in P of sequent F = J 
is defined inductively as follows: 
(F ~ x J)ifJeF; 
if TIj is a derivation of F2 =. J, for i E {1,. . . , n} and 
(F1 X1 j1, 	, 	 J,, F = 	J) is an instance of a rule in P, then 
(11 1 ,. . . , H I F =>X  J) is a derivation. 
Notation When n = 0, the vertical bar is omitted. We often write 
(ll,.. . , 
11
ni F ==>x J) in the form 
F=J 
omitting the horizontal line when n is 0. 
3.2.8 DEFINITIoN Let P be a formal system and let F = J have derivation H. 
The set of free variables of H is X. 
3.2.9 EXAMPLE The set of free variables in a derivation of F 	J does not 
depend solely on the free variables in the assumptions F and conclusion J, as 
the following derivation illustrates. Let ç  be a formula in first-order logic with 
fv(çb) = {x}. The derivation 
{Vx.qS} {z} Vx.0 
{Vx.q5} 	{z} b[z/x] 
{Vx.0} 	{z} z.q[z/x] 
requires the free variable z for the second line. 
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3.2.10 EXAMPLE The distinction between free variables is important. For exam-
pie, consider the derivation 
F, 0 , Vx.q5 X,z 
F, 0,  Vx. 	X,z çb[z/x] 
F, o , Vx.q5 X,z  2z.[z/x] 
F x  ax.çb F, 	X,z Vx.çb D 3z.[z/x] 
3E 
F =x  Vx.0 D 3z.o[zlxj 
When z 0 x then z must be in X, but when z = x this is not necessary. 
3.2.11 DEFINITIoN Let P be a formal system. The consequence relation of P, 
written Il J for a set of judgements F, judgement J and set of logic variables 
X, is defined by 
F kX  J if and only if a derivation of F =' J exists in P. 
Remark We concentrate here on analysing the representation of this standard 
consequence relation in ELF+.  Later, in section 5.2, we investigate a consequence 
relation with explicit reference to proofs and extend the analysis of representations 
accordingly. This gives an indication of the feasibility of mimicking derivations 
in a logic using its ELF representation. An alternative approach to studying 
the representations of derivations is to explore a higher-order consequence rela-
tion, based on Martin-Löf's basic and higher-order judgements. The concluding 
chapter on future research explains this further, together with a schematic no-
tion of consequence relation. Our approach differs from Avron's abstract view of 
consequence relations [Avr9l], which need not be defined from proof systems. 
As has already been mentioned, we view the cut condition as a fundamental 
property of the proof system of a logic. 
3.2.12 DEFINITION A proof system is a formal system whose consequence relation 




Remark The 'analogous property of the ELF entailment relation is given by 
the substitution lemma (lemma 2.1.10). 
We have already imposed some restriction on the proof systems we consider, mo-
tivatéd by the properties of the entailment relation of PTSs. Further restrictions 
are required by the properties stated in the thinning lemma (lemma 2.1.12) and 
the generalised substitution lemma (lemma 2.1.11). 
3.2.13 DEFINITIoN A consequence relation is intuitionistic if it satisfies 
(weakening) F 	J implies i. 	J for F ç ; 
(substitution) F F-a.  J implies F[l/] Fx/{.}ufV()  J[l/], where if It 1 ,.. . , t 
then fv(l) is u1 fv('t). 
Remark Observe that F 	J implies F H 1, J for X C Y, by condition 2. 
Finally, we distinguish a particular style of proof system, called a natural deduc-
tion system, based on rules expressed using the schematic form mentioned earlier. 
All proof systems with intuitionistic consequence relations have equivalent formu-
lations (in the sense that their consequence relations coincide) as systems using 
this style; it is with respect to these formulations that ELF representations are 
given. 
A natural deduction rule is a rule constructed from the schematic form 
seq1 . . . seq,,, 	
side-condition 
seq 
where seq is F = 	J and each seq, for i E {1,... , n}, has the shape 
F, J1 , . . . , J, , J for fl, m > 0. A natural deduction system is a 




F, A =4',' 
F=J 	L,JzK 
CUT 





F[/] 	X/{}Ufv()  J[/] 
Remark Natural deduction systems do not necessarily lead to intuitionistic con-
sequence relations. Weakening, cut and closure under substitution may not hold 
due to 'awkward' side-conditions limiting the assumptions. For example, the 
presentation of call-by-value A-calculus in [Plo74] consists of the usual untyped 
A-terms and rules including the restricted 3-ru1e 
(Ax.A)B = A[B/xJ 	 if B is a value, 
where a value is an expression which is not an application. As Plotkin points out 
in [P1o74], the free variables should range over values and not arbitrary terms. 
Otherwise, for M = ( Ax.Ax.x)(x), N = Ax.x and L = (Ax.x)(Ax.x), we have 
M = N, by the 18-equality, but not M[L/x] = N[L/x], since N[L/x] is in normal 
form and M[L/x] cannot be reduced. In [AHM89], the calculus is represented in 
ELF by limiting substitution to values. 
3.2.14 EXAMPLE A fragment of the natural deduction system for first-order logic 
is 
F,çbtrue =tx  0 true 
F 	(0 D b)true 
DE 	
F='.x (çb'çb)true F=qtrue 
F 	btrue 
VI 	
11 X,z çbtrue 
F 	Vx.q5 true 
VE 	
F 	Vx.çb true 
F 	çb[t/x] true 
21 	
F 	cb[t/xJ true 
F 	2x.0true 




There is a direct encoding of first-order logic in ELF (example 5.2.4) which 
preserves the structure of derivations. Natural deduction systems with no side-
conditions are easy to encode in ELF+,  once the syntax has been represented. 
3.2.15 EXAMPLE The natural deduction system of S 4 [Pra65] includes the neces-
sitation rule 
NEC 
	 r = qtrue 	
F consists of modalities, 
F 	Dçb true 
where a modality is a formula beginning with 0. This logic is represented in 
ELF by an indirect encoding which is adequate (definition 5.1.4), but not nat-
ural (definition 5.2.3). It is usually the case that natural deduction rules with 
side-conditions which limit the assumptions in the premises are more difficult to 
represent. 
3.2.16 EXAMPLE It is standard practice to concentrate on theoremhood when 
using Hilbert systems. We follow Avron's approach [Avr9l] for incorporating 
assumptions into these systems and describe Hilbert systems as special cases of 
natural deduction systems with the natural deduction rules restricted to those of 
the form 
FXJi ... F X Jfl 	
side-condition 
that is, no discharge of assumptions or binding of variables occur in these systems. 
Remark As Avron cautions, regarding Hubert systems as special natural deduc-
tion systems makes the frequent problem of finding a natural deduction system for 
a consequence relation defined from a Hilbert system redundant. A deeper anal-
ysis of the rules and connectives is required to highlight the differences between 
these types of systems. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The Hubert system of propositional logic [Ham80] can be formulated as the 
following natural deduction system: 
A 1 	F4 x (çbJ(bDçb))true 




	 F =x (5D 0) true 	F =x  çbtr'ae 
1' ='x  'btrue 
where, in this case, X denotes a set of propositional variables. This system has 
a direct representation in ELF+  using a fragment of the signature given in exam-
ple 5.1.9 to represent Hilbert-style S4 . This natural deduction system is extended 
to give a proof system for Hilbert-style S4 [Che80] by incorporating the rules 
A 3 	F 	(D 3 q)true 
A 4 	F = 	(11(5 j ) j (5 3 D1'))true 
A 5 	IF =x (00 3 000) true 
and either the rule 
F = th 
NEC 
	
0 is a theorem, 
l x DØ 
which results in a natural deduction system with an undecidable side-condition, 




which is not a natural deduction rule. In examples 5.1.9 and 5.2.7, we indicate 
that the representation of this presentation of Hilbert-style 84 in ELF is not a 
direct encoding, as the behaviour of the assumptions would suggest. 
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The Framework ELF 
We propose a new framework, ELF+,  as a type theory for representing logics. 
It is based on ELF [HHP89] and follows the same pattern of representation in 
that a logic is specified by an ELF signature which gives rise to a correspon-
dence between the logic and the resulting type theory. With ELF, it is possible 
to give a general definition of this correspondence with representations providing 
equivalences between logics and their representing type theories. This extends 
the adequacy theorems [HHP89] for ELF encodings which are only applicable to 
particular representations and cannot be generalised. The main point is that the 
terms in the ELF universe Type have many uses: they represent the basic judge-
ments and syntactic classes, they are extra terms given by the machinery of ELF 
and they are extra terms required in an encoding. This means that information 
is lost during representation and so it is impossible to identify, from the repre-
senting type theory, the part of the entailment relation which corresponds to the 
consequence relation of the underlying logic. ELF+  has three universes in place 
of Type, which allows for more distinction between terms and enables us to give 
general definitions of the equivalences we seek. 
Before we introduce the new framework, we discuss the representation of first-
order logic in ELF given in [HHP89].• This simple encoding illustrates the problems 
with ELF, and also serves as an introduction to representations in ELF+  since 
many of the ideas apply. Readers familiar with ELF may skip to section 4.1.3, 
which motivates the need for a new framework. In section 4.2, we introduce the 
type theory ELF presented as a pure type system with signatures and ij. Recent 
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unpublished results of Salvesen [Sa191], 1 which extend her work on incorporating i 
in ELF to functional PTSs satisfying strong normalisation, imply that the system 
is decidable. We give an alternative proof of the Church-Rosser property for ELF, 
a key result for showing decidability, which avoids the technicalities in [Sa189]. Sec-
tion 4.2.2 shows that our new framework ELF+  overcomes the problems identified 
in section 4.1.3. In the following chapter, we provide the formal justification for 
the new framework. 
4.1 Representation in ELF 
In both frameworks, denoted indiscriminately by 	a logic is specified by 
a signature. The logic expressions, judgements and proofs of the logic are all 
represented by terms with the type checking rules enforcing the well-formedness 
conditions; in particular, proof checking is reduced to type checking. The variables 
of the logic are identified with certain variables of the type theory and the binding 
operators are represented using A-abstraction, inspired by Church [Chu40] and 
Martin-Löf's system of arities [NPS90]. The advantage of this approach is that 
in many cases it enables the machinery associated with handling binding opera-
tors (such as of-conversion and capt ure- avoiding substitution) to be shifted to the 
metatheory, rather than be repeated for each presentation. Of course, only binding 
operators that behave similarly to A-abstraction can be represented in this way. 
Systems with non-standard variable binding have not been fully investigated; the 
representation of Hoare logic in ELF [Apt8l] involves a complicated specification 
and it is not clear whether the it-calculus [MPW89] can be represented in 
Our representation of the rules and proofs focuses on the notion of judgements 
stressed by Martin-Löf [NPS90] and described in chapter 3. Proof systems are 
viewed as calculi for constructing derivations of basic judgements and rules are 
given by schemata formed using Martin-Löf's higher-order judgements. Basic 
judgements are represented by terms inhabiting a universe (Type in the case of 
'In very recent work {Geu91], Herman has proved the Church-Rosser property for 
functional, uorma.lising PTSs 
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ELF using the 'judgements-as-types' principle) whose inhabitants correspond to 
proofs. The structure of the type system of the two frameworks allows for a 
uniform treatment of the higher-order judgements as H-abstractions so that rules 
can be represented as constants of the appropriate type. 
We present ELF as a PTS with signatures and ij (also given in section 2.3). 
The advantage of the PTS notation is that it provides a simple description of 
the framework which is easy to understand (contrast this presentation with the 
original presentation in appendix A) and which emphasises the differences and 
similarities between ELF and the new framework ELF+ . 
4.1.1 DEFINITIoN The framework ELF is the PTS with signatures and (exam-
ple 2.2.8) given by the specification 
U = {Type, Kind} 
V = {Type} 
A = {Type: Kind} 
= {(Type, Type), (Type, Kind)} 
We now proceed to describe the encoding of first-order logic in ELF, specified 
by EFoh  assuming the language of expressions is that of arithmetic (examples 3.1.4 
and 3.2.14). It will be clear that the method applies to any first-order signature. 
Many of the ideas discussed here also apply to the new framework, as representa-
tion inELF is similar to that in ELF. 
4.1.1 Representation of first-order logic in ELF 
The representation of the syntax of first-order arithmetic is straightforward. The 
syntactic classes of the first-order terms and formulae are represented in ELF by 
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whose inhabitants correspond to individuals and formulae. These inhabitants are 




= : 	-+—*o 
o—*o--o 
V : (t—+o)--o 
In >Fol, there is no declaration of terms to denote variables; variables of first-
order logic are identified with certain ELF variables. Thus, for example, the ELF 
term +(succ(x'))(0) in a context declaring x' : t represents the open expression 
succ(x) + 0. This means that we can use the A-abstraction of ELF to give the 
binding operators so that, for example, the universal quantifier is handled by a 
constant whose domain is of function type (t -* o); the formula Vx.x = x is 
represented by the term V(Ax:t. = (x)(x)). This allows us to avoid explicitly 
formalising the machinery associated with binding operators in each individual 
case. 
As emphasised in chapter 3, we view proof systems as calculi for generating 
derivations of basic judgements. The ELF approach for representing these judge-
ments is based on the 'judgement-as-types' principle where the basic and higher-
order judgements (discussed in chapter 3) correspond to objects of the universe 
Type; the inhabitants of these objects correspond to proofs. In EF01, the basic 
judgements are given by the constant 
true : o - Type 
so that, for term ' in o corresponding to formula q,  the judgement true(cb') 
corresponds to Otrue. 
The method for representing proofs as ELF terms inhabiting judgements relies 
on the uniform representation of the higher-order judgements. Recall that, if J 
and K are basic judgements, then the hypothetical judgement J - K expresses a 
form of consequence, that K is provable under the assumption J, and the general 
judgement - J expresses the fact that J is provable generally in x for variable 
x from syntactic class o. The hypothetical judgement is represented in ELF by 
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J' —* K' for terms J' and K' corresponding to the basic judgements J and K, and 
the general judgement by Hx':cr'.J' for terms J, o' and x' corresponding to the 
basic judgement J, the syntactic class o and the variable x. More generally, we 
represent the hypothetico-general judgement J1 ,• , J __* .ai amTfor n, m > 0 
by a term of the form 1Ix 1 :A 1 . . . llxm :Am .J; — —  X. 
For the purpose of encoding, we regard rules 	in their schematic form. 
With direct encodings, one constant is declared for each rule in the proof sys-
tem; this is the case for first-order logic and higher-order logic, but is not so for 
Hilbert-style S 4 (see examples 5.1.7 and 5.1.9). For the moment, we concentrate 
on representing the rules for first-order logic, given in example 3.2.14, which are 
given by the schematic form: 
R 
J 
for schematic judgements J1 ,. . . , J and J. This schematic form is represented by 
a constant R' inhabiting a type 
where the J,. . . , J,, J are terms corresponding to the schematic judgements 
and the yi,... , y close the term: that is, fv(J') U U fv(J') = {yi,... Ym}. 
An instance of the above rule corresponds to a term R'(a1 ) . . . ( am ) inhabiting 
(J — ... —* J, —* J')[a1/y] ... [am/ym] for a2 inhabiting , in the appropriate 
context. 
We give a detailed account of the representation of the natural deduction 
system for first-order logic. The rule for implication elimination has two basic 
schematic judgements for its premises with two schematic variables denoting for-
mulae. Its constant in EFOI is 
DE 	: 	H,:o.true((cb)(')) —+ true(q5) —* true('çb) 
The term D E(')(')(p)(q), where çb' and i,b' correspond to formulae t' and and 
p and q to proofs of 0 D 0 true and 0 true respectively, inhabits the judgement 
true(') and represents a proof of 1' true. The introduction rule for implication 
is similarly schematic in two formulae; this time its premise is viewed as a hypo-
thetical judgement. Its corresponding constant is 
llcb,:o.(true(cb) —* true(i/')) — true(qf D 0) 
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using infix notation for constant D. A term of the form I(q5')('i/)')(Ap:true(q5').q) 
inhabiting true(çb' D /) corresponds to a proof of qS  D i/'true, where the 
A-abstraction provides a 'proof' of the hypothetical judgement 0 true -f b true: 
that is, a function which takes a proof of 0 true and gives a proof of true. 
We have seen that binding operators are represented using the A-abstraction 
with, for example, the formulae Vx.0 given by V(Ax:t.'). In the representation 
of the rules for universal and existential quantification, the schematic formula is 
given by the term F : i -f o, so that substitution in the logic is transferred to 
/3-reduction in the type theory. The constant for the VE-rule is 
VE : HF:L -+ o.11t:t.true(V(F)) - true(Ft) 
If F is Ax:t.' and p inhabits true(V(Ax:t.')) then VE(Ax:t.')(0)(p) inhabits 
true((Ax:t.')(0)), which 3-reduces to true(ç/i[O/x]) 
The declaration of the constant corresponding to the universal introduction 
rule relies on the uniform treatment of general judgements in ELF 
VI : IIF:t -p o.(Hx:t.true(Fx)) -4 true(V(Ax:t.Fx)) 
For term p : true((b') in context F, x : t, we have VI(Ax:t.çb')(q) inhabiting 
true(V(Ax:t.çb') in context F where q is Ax:t.p in llx:t.true((Ax:t.')(x)); here q 
corresponds to a 'proof' of the general judgement - çb true: that is, a function 
which, given any term, provides a proof of [t/x] true. 
The specification of the I-ru1e follows from the ideas already mentioned: 
31 	HF:t - o.11t:t.rue(Ft) -+ true(F)) 
The existential elimination rule has both discharge and variable-occurrence con-
ditions: 
3E 	: 	IIF:t - o.Hi,b:o.true(F) -* (Hx:t.true(Fx) - true('çb)) -* true() 
The side-condition for the SE-rule is a matter of scoping: since 0 is bound outside 
the scope of x, no instance of ' can have x free, as required. 
Remark Not all specifications of the rules are so straightforward since the ap-
plication of the rules may depend on 'awkward' side-conditions. For example, the 
encoding of Hilbert-style S 4 (example 5.1.9) requires extra constants to represent 
the consequence relation of the logic. This is discussed further in the next chapter. 
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4.1.2 Adequacy theorem 
Accompanying each specification of a logic in ELF is an adequacy theorem which 
identifies the part of the entailment relation which corresponds to the consequence 
relation. All matters relating to representations of logics in ELF are treated up to 
/37-equivalence; in particular, we use the 077-long normal forms (section 4.2.4) as 
representations of these equivalence classes. 
Notation Let A be an ELF term. We write A to denote the set 
{t: 1' F- t : A and t is in 1377-long normal form with respect to (E; F)}. 
For each sequence of variables X, let T(X) and F(X) denote the sets of terms 
and formulae with free variables in X. 
The adequacy theorem for EF0I uses the evident correspondence between the 
arithmetic expressions of first-order logic and inhabitants of t and between for-
mulae and terms in o. It is given by the functions : T(X) -*t and rx 
F(X) -* o, where if X is ( X m ,... Xterm) then r is (x : t,.. . , x : 
for bijection ()' : Var09 	VarType  These functions are defined inductively on 
the structure of the logic expressions as follows: 
=X 	 xEX 
= 	0 
e(succ(t)) = 	succ(x(t)) 
x(t+s) = 	+(e(t))(e()) 




4.1.2 THEOREM [Adequacy theorem for first-order logic] For each sequence of 
variables X = ( X m , ... Xtm) the functions 	and 6, are bijections satisfying: 
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x  and JX are compositional:. that is, for term expressions t E T(Y) and 
s i ,. . . , s e T(X) and formula 0 E F(Y), 
= y (t)[ x (s)/ y (x)J 
= öy(c5)[x(s)/y(xI1. 
for sequences of logic variables (x 1 , . . . , x,1 ) and formulae  
q5l true,. .. , t/ true HZ}  çbtrue if and only if 
true(Sx((i1)),. . ., Pm : true(Sx((i,m )) HE: true(8x(q)), 
where _: true(6(q)) denotes the inhabitation of true(6x(c5)). 
Proof In [HHP89] and also implicit in the proof of theorem 5.1.3. 	 E 
Remark In [HHP89], Harper, Honsell and Plotkin give a stronger result for 
their adequacy theorem for first-order logic which gives a correspondence between 
the structure of proofs in the logic and the structure of their representing terms 
in ELF. Ideally, we aim to mimic derivations in a logic using its representation 
in ELF. This stronger result gives some measure of the feasibility of this goal. 
For the moment, we concentrate on the standard consequence relation for natural 
deduction systems 3.2.13. In section 5.2, we define interpretations in ELF which 
allow for these stronger correspondences. To distinguish the two standards of 
representation, we call a representation adequate when the representation of the 
standard consequence relation is analysed, and natural when information regarding 
the structure of proofs is also required. 
Remark Condition 2 is given for arbitrary ELF terms inhabiting true(8x(1O)) 1  
rather than specific terms, since, for the moment, we focus on representing the 
standard consequence relation for first-order logic. 
4.1.3 EXAMPLE To illustrate the interpretation of first-order logic in (ELF, EFOI), 
consider the derivation 
{(i, , 0 = q5 
{} = O 3 
0 	q5 3 ( 3  ) 
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This corresponds to the ELF term 
D15( )(4),5( )( Jç5)(Ap:true(ö( ()). DI (  )(45(  >()(Aq:true(8( ) (i/)).p)), 
where, for legibility, we write the terms representing formulae as subscripts. It is 
easy to verify that this term inhabits true(ö( 	(0 D 0))) in the empty context. 
4.1.4 EXAMPLE The entailments of ELF account for free ELF variables in the 
same way that sequents keep track of logic variables. The ELF term corresponding 
to the derivation for first-order logic in example 3.2.9 is 
(I))()), 
which inhabits true(6x (2z.q5[z/x])) in context z' : t,p : true(6x(Vx4)). Notice 
that the ELF variable z' occurs free in the term, just as logic variable z is free in 
the derivation. 
4.1.3 Problems with ELF 
The adequacy theorem (theorem 4.1.2) for the ELF representation of first-order 
logic only applies to this particular representation since it identifies the part of the 
entailment relation, which corresponds to the consequence relation, by appealing 
to specific constants in EF0I. We seek a general identification which results in 
equivalences between logics and their representing type theories. Such a defini-
tion is not possible in ELF since information is lost during representation as the 
universe Type serves many purposes. 
Both the basic judgements of a logic and the syntactic classes are represented 
in ELF by inhabitants of Type. For example, in (ELF, E 01 ) we have t, o 
and true(q5) for 4 : o in Type. We identify terms of the form true(q) with the 
basic judgements and variables of type t with the variables of the logic, but 
this information cannot be given, except by appealing to specific constants 
in EFo1. 
It is not unusual for extra constants to be required in the representation of a 
logic. The encoding of first-order logic is a simple representation which does 
not illustrate this. The encoding of higher-order logic [HHP89] [AHM89] 
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uses extra constants to represent the syntax, and the encoding of Hubert-
style S 4 [AHM89] uses extra constants to represent the consequence relation. 
We do not go into details here. The representations of these two logics are 
given for ELF in examples 5.1.7 and 5.1.9. The second example illustrates 
an instance of representation in ELF where two different logics (that is, 
logics having different consequence relations) have the same specification; 
the distinction is made apparent in the adequacy theorem. In ELF, logics 
with different consequence relations have difference specifications. 
3. There are other inhabitants of Type, arising from the machinery of ELF, 
which have no meaning in the encoded logic. For example, in (ELF, EFOZ) 
the term llx:o.t has no correspondence in the logic. 
Remark Some H-abstractions using the rule (Type, Type, Type) do have an in-
terpretation in the underlying logic. The term t -* t contains terms representing 
unary expression symbols: for example, succ: t -* i corresponding to the expres-
sion symbol succ. It also contains the term +(t'), which has no direct link as we 
only consider complete expressions: that is, t + s rather than t + -. We concentrate 
on the basic terms inhabiting Type, the terms which are not H-abstractions, since 
these are used to interpret the consequence relation of the logic. 
These points show that the framework ELF does not distinguish the terms 
representing the basic judgements, the ELF variables corresponding to the logic 
variables and the extra terms, resulting from the encoding or machinery of ELF, 
without specific reference to the representation under consideration. We propose 
a new framework which retains these distinctions. 
4.2 The type theory ELF 
In this section we introduce the PTS with signatures and ij which defines ELF. 
The decidability of the framework follows from recent unpublished work by Salvesen 
[5a191] which generalises her results for ELF [5a189] to functional PTSs with ij 
satisfying strong normalisation. We give an alternative proof of the Church-
Rosser property, a key result in proving decidability, which avoids the techni- 
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calities in Salvesen's work and utilises the similarities and differences between the 
two frameworks. It involves two translations: one to ELF, which preserves the 
structure but which loses the universe distinction, and the other to the untyped 
A-calculus [Bar84}, which retains the universe information but loses the typing in 
the A-abstractions. Together they provide CR for ELF from the corresponding 
results for ELF and the untyped A-calculus. All matters relating to representations 
in ELF+  are treated up to 377-equivalence. We therefore define the /377-long normal 
forms, extending a definition found in [Hue75] for the simply typed A-calculus, to 
provide the natural witnessing terms for our purposes. 
4.2.1 Definition of the type theory 
We have illustrated, using the simple encoding of first-order logic, that informa-
tion is lost during representation in ELF. This is due to the lack of distinction 
between the terms corresponding to the basic judgements, those corresponding to 
the syntactic classes and the extra terms given by the encoding or machinery of 
the type theory. The new framework ELF+  gives more distinction between the 
terms using three universes, called Sort, Type and Judge, in place of the one ELF 
universe Type. The connection between a logic and its representing type theory 
is as follows: 
basic judgements correspond to inhabitantsof Judge; 
. syntactic classes[are represented by inhabitants of Sorts; 
• variables of the logic are identified with sort variables (variables in V arS0t) . 
The universe Type consists of terms which have no particular link with the logic. 
The part of the entailment relation determined by the inhabitants of Sort and 
Judge should, therefore, correspond to the consequence relation of the underlying 
logic. 
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4.2.1 DEFINITION The framework ELF is defined by the PTS with signatures 
and ij, specified by (U,V,A,R.): 
U = {Sort, Type, Judge, Kind} 
V = {Sort, Type, Judge} 
A = {Sort: Kind, Type: Kind, Judge : Kind} 
= {(Sort, Kind), (Type, Kind)} U {(s, s 2 , Type) : S1, S2 e V} 
Notation An ELF term A is a kind if I' 	A: Kind for some context F 
and signature E. Similarly, a term A is a sort, type or judgement if it inhabits the 
appropriate universe with respect to some context and signature. 
The idea of splitting the universe Type of ELF into three motivates the choice 
of U, V and A. Some explanation of the rules of ELF+  is necessary. The rules 
(Sort, Kind) and (Type, Kind) allow us to represent judgements dependent on 
syntactic classes. Just as the ELF rule (Type, Kind) is used to declare the constant 
true in o - Type in the ELF representation of first-order logic, we use these ELF+ 
rules to declare the constants which provide the basic judgements of the logic. It 
will be shown that the ELF+  terms representing syntactic classes can inhabit Sort 
or Type, but not Judge, since the intention is for the inhabitants of Judge to 
correspond to the basic judgements of the represented logic. We therefore see no 
reason to include the rule (Judge, Kind). 
The H-abstractions of sorts, types and judgements, given by the rules of the 
form (s i
, S 2, 
 Type) for s 1 , s2 E V, all inhabit Type. The motivation for this is 
that we view 11-abstraction as part of the machinery of the metatheory, rather 
than as having a direct correspondence in the object logic. This differs from 
Barendregt's method of representing certain minimal intuitionistic logics as pure 
type systems [Bar90], in which propositions are treated as types and H-abstraction 
represents the universal quantification. 
Remark A result of the above choice of rules is that the basic judgements cor-
respond to terms inhabiting Judge, whereas the higher-order judgements are rep-
resented by H-abstractions (just as in the ELF case) which inhabit Type. This is 
because we define the consequence relation of a logic from basic judgements. An 
alternative approach is to view a higher-order consequence relation as fundamen-
tal (see [Avr89]), in which case the higher-order judgements are important and 
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must be distinguished from the other ELF terms inhabiting Type. One possibil-
ity is to replace the rule (v, Judge, Type) by (v, Judge, Judge), or perhaps even 
(vL..e, New) for some new universe New, for v E V. In this case the basic judge-
ments are distinguished as those terms in Judge which are not H-abstractions, and 
the higher-order judgements by the [I-abstractions Hx:A.J and Hp:J.K for J and 
K in Judge and A in Sort. However, there are terms of this universe which have no 
meaning in the underlying logic and so this approach needs to be explored further. 
For the moment we work with the more standard definition of the consequence 
relation. 
Remark It is not clear whether (Judge, Sort, Type) and (Judge, Type, Type) 
should be included. The rule (Judge, Sort, Type) allows for syntax to be depen-
dent on judgements. This is not allowed in the logics described in chapter 3, 
although a natural example of a logic where this might occur is intuitionistic first-
order logic extended by the choice operator. The idea is that, given a proof p of 
ax.çb(x)true, we obtain a term t, dependent on the proof of 2x.çb(x)true, such 
that the judgement 0(t) true holds. Also, there are examples of logics represented 
in ELF (see example 5.1.12), whose specifications have been adapted from ELF 
encodings, which, although their syntax does not depend on proofs of judgements, 
still require these rules for their representation. 
4.2.2 Representation in ELF 
Representations of logics in ELF+  are similar to those in ELF; the main con-
tribution of ELF is in the analysis of representation rather than the method 
of specification. The difference lies in the choice of kind that a constant inhab-
its which depends on the intended use of that constant. We give two examples 
to illustrate the differences. The first represents first-order logic and shows that 
the problems highlighted in section 4.1.3 with the ELF representation have been 
solved. The second encodes higher-order logic and illustrates the method for deal-
ing with extra constants required by an encoding. These examples illustrate that 
we can recognise the ELF+  terms corresponding to the term expressions and basic 
judgements of the represented logic without appealing to that logic. The formal 
analysis is deferred until the next chapter where we also discuss more examples. 
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4.2.2 EXAMPLE In the specification of first-order logic in ELF, also denoted by 
Fol, the two constants corresponding to the syntactic classes are 
Sort 
o : Type 
The different universes they inhabit indicate the varying roles that t and o play. 
The ELF+  terms in sort t correspond to the term expressions of the logic; the ELF+ 
terms in type o to well-formed formulae which are of no real interest in themselves, 
but which are necessary to form the basic judgements. This is mirrored in the 
encoding since the basic judgements are formed by the constant 
true : o - Judge 
The typing indicates that ELF+  terms in sort t correspond to term expressions and 
ELF judgements of the form true(cb) for 0 in o to basic judgements. Of course, in 
this particular case there is a link between the inhabitants of o and the formulae, 
but this is not a general concept, whereas a link between the ELF+  judgements 
and the basic judgements is. 
Remark Notice the similarity between our approach of separating the ELF 
terms corresponding to the term expressions, formulae and basic judgements and 
Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory [Mar85] with the judgements A set, A prop 
and A true. A full comparison of ELF and Martin-Löf's type theory is left for 
future research. 
As before, arithmetic expressions are represented by declaring a constant for 
each expression symbol: 
o :t : 	 Sort 
succ : : 	Type 
+ : : 	Type 
= 	: t—*t—o : 	Type 
D 	: o —*o --*o : 	Type 
V 	: (i -* o) - o : 	Type 
The constant 0 inhabits a sort, since it corresponds to a term expression, whereas 
other constants, corresponding to higher-order expression symbols, all inhabit 
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Type. Just as the higher-order expression symbols are constructs for the logic 
expressions, these constants form the inhabitants of t and o. The ELF+  terms + 
and +(t) for t : i both inhabit types, whereas +(t)(s) for s : t is in sort t and so 
corresponds to a term expression. 
The rules for first-order logic are represented in a similar way to the ELF 
encoding; we just give one constant corresponding to the D I-rule 
Hçb,'çb:o.(true(b) - true(b)) - true(çb 	: Type 
We distinguish between rules and proofs; rules correspond to terms inhabiting 
Type and proofsto terms inhabiting Judge. 
The problems illustrated by the ELF representation of first-order logic in sec-
tion 4.1.3 have been solved. We can now give a general identification of the ELF 
terms, which correspond to the basic judgements of the logic since they inhabit 
Judge. We can also identify the ELF+  terms which represent the term expres-
sions since they inhabit sorts; in particular, the sort variables correspond to the 
variables of the logic. The next example shows the method for coping with extra 
constants required in an encoding. 
4.2.3 EXAMPLE The representation of first-order logic is simple and direct. Not 
all encodings in ELF (or ELF for that matter) are so easy. This is illustrated 
by the representation Of the syntax of higher-order logic which is based on simply 
typed A-calculus: 
	
domains 	a ::=toIa 4 a; 
terms 	a (Axa.t)a= I 
The domains, viewed as syntactic classes, cannot be represented directly as there 
are infinitely many of them. In EHoI, the signature specifying higher-order logic 
in ELF+,  we have the constants 
dom : Type 
dom 
0 : dom 
dom -* dom —p dom 
S 
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where each class symbol corresponds to a constant to give an obvious link between 
the domains and the terms in dom. We associate to each inhabitant of dom a term, 
identified with the objects of that domain, given by the constant 
obj : dom - Sort 
For each a : dom, it is the term obj(a) which represents a domain of higher-order 
logic, rather than a itself, since inhabitants of obj(a) correspond to the expressions 
of the logic. Thus, obj(a) is a sort and term a in dom is considered an extra 
constant required in the encoding as the universes suggest. This demonstrates 
the standard technique of using the Type universe to represent extra constants. 
The representation of Hilbert-style S 4 in example 5.1.9 requires extra constants 
to represent the consequence relation of the logic and also uses this method. The 
complete signature EH01 is given in example 5.1.7. 
Remark Notice that, in the representations of first-order logic and higher-order 
logic in ELF, the term corresponding to the syntactic class of formulae is the 
type o in the first and sort obj(o) in the second. The former distinguishes between 
the first-order terms and formulae, whereas the latter treats a formula as any other 
term expression. This mirrors precisely the behaviour of formulae in first-order 
and higher-order logic. 
4.2.3 Results 
The decidability of ELF follows from very recent work of Salvesen [Sa191] which 
extends her results for incorporating 77 in ELF [Sa189] to functional PTSs satisfying 
strong normalisation. We give an alternative proof of the Church—Rosser property 
(CR) which avoids the technicalities in [Sa189] and utilises the similarities and 
differences between the two frameworks. This involves two translations; one is to 
ELF, which loses the distinction between universes, and the other is to the untyped 
A-calculus [Bar84], losing the type information in the A-abstraction. Together, they 
give CR for ELF from the corresponding properties for ELF and the untyped 
A-calculus. 
Detailed proofs of the following lemmas are given for ELF in [Sa189]. 
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4.2.4 LEMMA Let (U, V, A, 1?) be the specification of either ELF or ELF in def-
inition 4.1.1 or 4.2.1. 
FHA=B:CimpliesFE-A:CandFF-B:C. 
FHE A:BimpliesBisKindorFl - E B:uforuEU. 
F,x:AE-Ea  and  FFEA=A'  :v forv E Vimplies F,x:A' I-Ea,  where a 
denotes an ELF assertion. 
[instance of the substitution of equalities lemma (lemma 4.2.6)] Let F 	A: v, 
forvEV,andFH E N=N':A. Then 
F,x: A HE  B = B': v for v E V implies F HE  B[N/x] = B'[N'/x] : 
F, x : A HE  B : Kind implies F HE  B[N/x] = B[N'/x] : Kind. 
Proof (sketch) The result is proved simultaneously by induction on the derivation 
of F a for ELF assertion a. Part 4 is required to prove part 1 when the last 
line in the derivation uses the APP-EQ rule. It has an unsatisfactory proof which 
relies on the properties of the set of rules R. Part 4a is proved from observing 
that F HE  (Ax:A;B)N = (Ax:A.B)N' : u and F H (Ax:A.B)N = B[N/x] : u and 
F HE  x:A.B)N = B[N /x] : u where the formation of the )¼-abstractlons relies 
on R. Part 4b is proved by noting that B has the form 11x 1 :B1 . . . Hx:B.w for 
w E V. Then, by induction on n > 0, one shows that 
F,x 1 : B1 [N/x], . .. ,Xk : Bk[N/x] 'E Bk+i[N/x] = Bk+i[N'/x] : Vk 
for k E {1,. . . ,n} and Vk E V. The rest of the proof is easy and is left to the 
reader. 	 D 
4.2.5 LEMMA [substitution of equalities] Let (U, V, A, 1?.) be the specification of 
either ELF or ELF found in definition 4.1.1 or 4.2.1. Then 
F,x:A,F'HE B=B':CandFHE N — N':A implies 
F, F'[N/x] H E  B[N/x] = B'[N'/x] : C[N/x]. 
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Proof The proof follows from lemma 4.2.4. 	 0 
A technical lemma is now given which identifies some constraints on the asser-
tions which hold in The results for ELF are used in our proof of CR for 
ELF. 
4.2.6 LEMMA Let (U,V,A,R.) be the specification of either ELF or ELF in def-
inition 4.1.1 or 4.2.1. 
F V. Ax:A.B: Kind; 
1' V. AB : Kind; 
F F- A : B and #(A, 2) or #(A, 3) implies A does not contain a universe. 
Proof Part 1 is proved by assuming that F HE  Ax:A.B: Kind and proving con-
tradiction. The preterm Kind is certainly not a 11-abstraction and so, by in-
specting the possible derivation trees, it follows that A H C = Kind: v for some 
context A c F, some preterm C and v E U. By lemma 4.2.4 Kind: v which 
contradicts lemma 2.3.9. 
Result 2 is also proved by showing that 1' 	AB: Kind gives a contradic- 
tion. Again by looking at the possible derivation trees, we must either prove that 
C = Kind: v for some term C, context L c F and v E U, which using the 
above argument gives a contradiction, or that the last line in the derivation is 
an instance of the APP rule. In this case F A: Hx:C.Kind for some term C. 
By lemma 4.2.4, F I- 11x:A.Kind : v and so, using the weak generation lemma 
(lemma 2.3.8), F, x: C HE  Kind: v for v E U which contradicts lemma 2.3.9. 
Result 3 is proved by structural induction on A. We consider two cases; the oth-
ers are similar or trivial. When A is of the form Hx:A 1 .A 2 then, by the weak gener-
ation lemma (lemma 2.3.8), F HE A 1 : u and F,x : A 1  HE A 2 : v and (u,v,w) E R. 
So #(u, 1), by inspecting A and 7, and, by corollary 2.3.17, #(A 1 , 2). By def-
inition of the level relation , we have #(Hx:A i .A 2 , n) implies #(A2, n). Using 
the induction hypothesis A 1 and A 2 contain no universes. If A is A 1 A 2 then, by 
the weak generation lemma, F HE A 1 : 11x:B1 .B2 and F HE A 2 : B1 for preterms 
B 1 and B2 . We have #(A i ,n) when #(A 1 A 2 ,n) and so, by the induction hy-
pothesis, A 1 does not contain a universe. By lemma 4.2.4, F HE  11x:B1 .B2 : w for 
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w E U. Using the weak generation lemma, F HE B1 : u' and F, x: B 1  HE B2 : v' for 
(u v w') E R. So #(u', 1) and #(B1, 2) using corollary 2.3.17. Hence, #(A2, 3) 
and so A 2 does not contain a universe, by the induction hypothesis. 	0 
Remark It is also the case that 1 and 2 hold for any universe u e U, not just 
the top universe Kind. The proof of this, however, involves the Church—Rosser 
property. 
We now give the two translations, used in the proof of CR for ELF+;  one is 
from ELF to ELF and the other is from ELF to the untyped A-calculus [Bar84]. 
The PTS morphism f from ELF to ELF is given by 
Sort 	i-* 	Type 
Type '-p Type 
Judge i-* Type 
Kind '-* Kind 
and extended to the preterms, precontexts and presignatures, as described in sec-
tion 2.1.1. This provides a sound interpretation of ELF in ELF by lemma 2.3.12: 
that is, 
	
ELF 	\ F 1ELF  a implies f(1') H f(E) f(, 
where a is an ELF+  assertion. 
The translation from the preterms of a PTS to the untyped A-terms, extended 
with the constants U U {ll} U Comst, where U is the set of universes for the PTS, 
H is the constant used to translate the H-abstraction and C oust is the set of 
constants for ELF+,  is defined inductively on the structure of the preterms: 
C0 = C, 	 c E U 
= x, 	 for variable x 
a° = a, 	 for constant a 
(Hx:A.B)° = H(A°)(Ax.B°) 
(Ax:A.B) ° = .Xx.B ° 
(AB) ° = A ° B° 
It is easy to show that this translation preserves the equality between terms. 
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4.2.7 LEMMA Let C be a PTS with signatures and i. Then F A = B : C im- 
plies A °  =p B° , where =,a, 7 denotes the /3ij-equality of the untyped A-terms [Bar84J. 
The next lemma is important for our proof of the Church—Rosser property for 
ELF. The PTS morphism f from ELF to ELF loses the information about 
the universes. Therefore, ELF+  terms, whose images using f are equal, may not 
necessarily be identical; for example, f(Type) = f(Sort). However, terms, whose 
images using f and ()° are equal, must be identical. 
4.2.8 LEMMA Let E be a signature of ELF. For ELF preterms D and E, 
if 1(D) = 1(E) and F I_ EIF 1(D) : A, for some preterm A and context F, and 
Do =3  E then D and E are identical. 
Proof The proof follows by induction on the structure of D and E (which is 
the same since 1(D) = 1(E)). If D and E are universes then D°  = 677 E° im-
plies D° and E° are identical, using the Church—Rosser property for the untyped 
A-calculus. Since ()° preserves the universes, we know that D and E are iden-
tical. The cases when D and E are constants or variables are similar. For the 
A-abstraction and application cases, we use the equality 1(D) = 1(E). We know 
that 1(D) = 1(E), and so to show that D and E are identical it is enough, by 
lemma 2.3.12, to show that D and E do not contain universes. By lemma 4.2.6, 
F Vf(E) 1(D) : Kind so we have #(D,2) or #(D,3) using corollary 2.3.17. Us-
ing lemma 4.2.6, this means that 1(D) does not contain a universe. Therefore, 
D and E do not contain universes. When D and E are H-abstractions, of the 
form llx:D 1 .D2 and llx:E1 .E2 respectively, we require all the premises. We have 
F F-EIF  Hx 1 : f(D 1 ).f(D 2 ) u for u E {Type, Kind} and, by the weak genera-
tion lemma (lemma 2.3.8), F F- f(D) : Type. Hence, #(1(D1),2)  and, by 
lemma 4.2.6, f(D) does not contain a universe. By lemma 2.3.12, D 1 and E1 are 
identical. We now turn to the equality H(D)(Ax.D) = H(E)(Ax.E). Using 
CR for the untyped A-calculus and observing that, since fl is a constant, that re-
ductions preserve the outermost application structure, we have Ax.D = )tx.E. 
Again by CR, we know that Ax.D and Ax..Ehave a common reduct. By de-
laying i'-reduction using the outermost A-abstraction (if it is used) to last, it 
follows that D2° = E° . We also have 1(D2) = 1(E2 ), by definition of 1, and 
F 	 ELF 	 i , x : 1(D1) H f ( E ) 1(D2) u by the generation lemma. Using the nduction hy- 
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pothesis, it follows that D2 and E2 , and therefore HxD 1 .D2 and llx : E1 .E2 , are 
identical. 	 D 
We are now in a position to prove Church—Rosser for ELF+ . 
4.2.9 THEOREM [Church—Rosser for ELF] F ~_ELF+ A: B and A > A' and 
I  AA implies A 	III andA 	A Ill  forpretermsA F ,AII  andAIII  
Proof The PTS morphism f from ELF to ELF, sending Sort -* Type, Type i-* 
Type, Judge -* Type and Kind i-p Kind, preserves the 3- and ij-redexes and 
so results in f(F) F- 1(A) : f(B), f(A) > f(A') and 1(A) > 1(A"). Using 
Church—Rosser and subject reduction for ELF [Sa189], we have f(A') > C and 
f (A") > C for some ELF term C. Since f preserves 3- and i-redexes, we can 
use the same reduction paths to obtain A' > D and A" i' E for ELF+  terms D 
and E, such that f(D) = 1(E) = C. The map (..)° from the ELF preterms 
to the untyped A-terms also preserves 3- and ij-redexes so that A ° D° and 
017 
A: 	E° , where 	denotes /3-reduction in the untyped A-calculus, and so
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D o = E using the Church—Rosser property for the untyped A-calculus. By 
lemma 4.2.7, D and E are identical. 	 D 
Recall that strong normalisation holds for ELF by lemma 2.3.11 since ELF is 
strongly normalising [HHP89]. We appeal to Salvesen's results [Sa191] for subject 
reduction, unicity of types, generation and strengthening for ELF. 
4.2.4 3-1ong normal forms 
Throughout this section we assume that we are dealing with a functional PTS 
with signatures and 7 7 satisfying strong normalisation and rely on Salvesen's re-
sults [Sa191]; in particular, we assume CR and subject reduction. We investigate 
the equivalence classes of terms with respect to contexts and signatures given by 
the equality judgement: that is, if 1' A = B: C then A and B are in the same 
equivalence class with respect to (E; F). There are two standard ways of choosing 
witnesses for these equivalence classes. One approach selects the /37-normal form 
which is the unique term containing no 077-redexes. The other approach identifies 
the 377-long normal forrn and is of more relevance to us. The intuition is that 
the terms in /37-long normal form with respect to some signature and context 
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are fully-applied. For example, in the ELF+representation  of first-order logic, we 
associate the formula Vx.y = x with the ELFterm V(Ax:t. = (y)(x)) in context 
y: t, rather than the term V(= (y)). The constant =: t -* t -* o in EF0Z is fully-
applied in the first term, but not in the second. The /377-long normal forms are 
presented in [Hue75] for the simply typed A-calculus. In [HHP89], Harper, Honsell 
and Plotkin give a description of the so called canonical forms, which correspond 
to our /377-long normal forms. It is impossible for them to show that each well-
formed term is equal to a unique canonical term since they only have 0-equality. 
Felty [Fe189] and Augustsson, Coquand and Nordstrom [ACN90] provide systems 
which generate just these canonical forms. 
4.2.10 DEFINITIoN Let C be a functional PTS with signatures and ij satisfying 
strong normalisation and let A be a preterm. Then, 
A is in 077-normal form if it has no subterm of the form (Ax:B 1 .B2 )(C) 
(called a 3-redex) or Ax:B.Cx for x fv(C) (called an -redex); 
A has a /3'q-normal form with respect to (E; 1') if F 1-4 A = B: C and B is 
in /377-normal form. 
The /377-normal forms provide witnesses to the equivalence classes defined by the 
equality relation. They are found using the decidable reduction relation -. 
4.2.11 LEMMA Let C be a functional PTS with signatures and ij satisfying strong 
normalisation and let F 	A: B. Then, 
A has an unique 6i-normal form with respect to (E; F). 
if 	A: C then the 3i-normal forms of A with respect to (E; F) and 
(; z) are the same. 
Proof By strong normalisation, the Church—Rosser property and subject reduc- 
tion. 	 o 
Remark This lemma shows that a term A has unique 677-normal form irrespec-
tive of the term it inha1its with respect to a particular context and signature. 
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Remark In [HHP891, the canonical forms are defined using the 3-normal forms. 
We use the 817-normal forms since they are unique; the 3-normal forms are not 
unique using our stronger equality. 
The analysis of the shape of the 017-normal forms is required in order to con-
struct the /317-long normal forms. First, a technical lemma is given which extends 
lemma 4.2.6. This uses the Church—Rosser property and so was not proved earlier. 
4.2.12 LEMMA Let (be a functional PTS with signatures and 77  satisfying strong 
normalisation. Then F vc Ax:A.B : u for all u E U. 
Proof Assume the contrary. Using the generation lemma, it follows that 
F 	u = Hx:C.D v, for v E U and preterms C and D, which is impossible using 
strong normalisation and the Church—Rosser property. 	 0 
4.2.13 LEMMA Let A be in /317-normal form. The subterms of A (definition 2.1.2) 
are also in /3ij-normal form. 
Proof By definition. 
4.2.14 LEMMA Let (be a functional PTS with signatures and ij satisfying strong 
normalisation. 
1. A term A in 017-normal form has shape 
Ax:Al....Ax fl :A fl .11yl:Bl....Hy m :Bm .@Ml ... Mk for n,m,k > 0, where © 
is a variable, constant or universe and the As, Bs and Ms are in 317-normal 
form, and where 
A 1 is not a A-abstraction for each i E {1,. . . 
B2 is not a A-abstraction for each j E {1,... , m}. 
2. Let E = (a1 :A 1 ,. .. , a:A) and F = (x 1 : A+1). .. , Xm : An+m ) for n, m > 0. 
The /317-normal form of Ak with respect to (E; F), for k E {1,... , n + m}, is 
not a A-abstraction. 
Proof Part 1 is proved by induction on the structure of A. The non-trivial cases 
are when A is a H-abstraction or an application. If A is Hx:C1 .C2 it is enough, 
M. 
The Framework ELY' 
since C2 is in 317-normal form, to show that C2 is not a A-abstraction. Using the 
weak generation lemma (lemma 2.3.8), we have F, x : C1 F-c C2 : u for universe u 
and context F and so, for this case, the result holds by lemma 4.2.12. For A 
of the form C1 C2 , we show that C1 is not a A- or H- abstraction. The former 
is immediate since C1 C2 cannot be a @-redex. By the generation lemma, we 
know that F I- C1 : 11x:D1 .D2 for preterms D1 and D2 . If C1 is a H-abstraction, 
then, by the generation lemma, we have F' HE U = Hx : D1 .D2 : v for universes u 
and v. By CR and strong normalisation, since the H-structure is preserved by 
/377-reduction, it follows that u must be a 11-abstraction, whichUs (o'r kA^e c.c.e. 
For part la, we know that F,x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x_ 1 :A_ 1 F- A : u, for ui E U and 
i E {1,.. . , n}, using the weak generation lemma. From lemma 4.2.12, A i is not a 
A-abstraction. Parts lb and 2 are proved in a similar way. D 
The /3i-norma1 forms of terms distinguish elements from the equivalence classes 
of terms given by the equality judgements. Another way of choosing witnesses to 
these classes is to use the 3'q-long normal forms, defined using the 1377-normal 
forms. This involves the concept of a constant or variable being fully-applied: for 
example, in the ELF encoding of first-order logic the term x : t 	 +(x) : t 
is not fully-applied, whereas x : t E-'' +(x)(x) : t is. 
4.2.15 DEFINITIoN 	Let F HE  A : B and A be in 377-normal form. Then, 
the arity of a universe in A with respect to (; F) is 0; 
the arity of free variable x or constant a in A with respect to (; F) is the 
number of Hs in the prefix of C', where x : C E F or a: C e E and C' is the 
1877-normal form of C with respect to (E; F); 
the arity of bound variable y in A with respect to (E; F) is the number of 
[Is in the prefix of D, the term attached to its binding occurrence. 
Remark The definition is proper since D is in /3ij-normal form (lemma 4.2.13), 
we have the entailments F HE  x: C or F HE  a: C by the free variable lemma 
(lemma 2.3.2) and D and C' are not A-abstractions (lemma 4.2.12). 
4.2.16 DEFINITIoN Let F HE  A: B. 
EYi 
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The term A is in 37-long normal form with respect to (; F) if it has shape 
Ax 1 :A 1 . . . Ax:A.11y 1 :B1 • . Hym:Bm.©Mi,. . . , Mk 
for n, m, lc > 0, where the arity of © is k with respect to 
(E; F, x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , 	y 1 :B1 ,. . . , y:B,), each A, for i E {1, .. . , n}, is in 
/3i-long normal form with respect to (E; F, x 1 :A 1 ,. . . ,x 2 _ 1 :A_ 1 ), each B1 , 
for j E {1,. . . ,m}, is in 3-long normal form with respect to 
(E; I', x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x:A, y 1 :B1 , . . . , y1 _ 1 :B1 _ 1 ) 
and the M1 for 1 E {1,... , k} are in ,13i-long normal form with respect to 
(; F, x 1 :A,. . . , XnAn, y 1 :B1 , . . . , ym :B). 
The term A has a /3i-long normal form with respect to (E; F) if, for preterm 
C, F HE  A = C : B and C is in 37-1ong normal form with respect to (E; F) 
Remark Notice that the definition of terms in -1ong normal form depends on 
the context and signature since, for example, with x: A HE  x : A, the variable x 
is in 377-long normal form with respect to the appropriate signature and context, 
whereas this is not the case for x in x : A -* A HE  x : A -* A. 
Just as in [HHP89], we use the thj-1ong normal forms, rather than equivalences, 
of ELF+  terms in our analysis of ELF+  representations. Given F HE  A : B, we state 
an algorithm for constructing the 0-1ong normal form of A with respect to (E; F); 
the results, which show that the 377-long normal forms are witnessing terms for 
the equivalences given by the equality relation, are left for future research, since 
they are not essential to our research. 
4.2.17 DEFINITIoN Let F HE  A : B. The pseudo-long form of A with respect to 
(E; F) is constructed as follows: 
find the 37-normal form of A with respect to (E; F), which has shape 
Ax 1 : A 1 . . . Ax : A.Hy 1 : B 1 . . . 11Ym :. B m .©Mi ... Mk for n, m, k > 0, 
where © is a universe, constant or variable; 
if © is a universe go to 5; 
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if © is a free variable or constant then replace ©M1 . . . M, by 
.\wk + 1.Dk + 1. . . \w,:D,.©M1 ... 
for p ~! k, where D1 is C1 [M1 /w 1 ] . . . [M,/w,] for 1 E {k + 1,. . . ,p}, the 
Wk+1 . . . w, are distinct variables which do not occur in u fv(M) U {©}, 
© : C is declared in F or E and the /3ij-normal form of C with respect to 
(E; F) is Hx 1 :C1 . .. Hx:C.EN1 . . . N; now go to 5; 
if © is a bound variable then replace ©M1 . . . M, by 
	
)(wk+1:Dk+1 . . . .\w:D,.©Mi . . . 	 • 
for p ~! k, where D1 is C1 [M1 /w 1 ] ... [M,/w j ] for 1 E {k + 1 1 . . . ,p}, the 
wk+1 . . . are distinct variables which do not occur in u 1  fv(M) U {©} 
and © : Hx 1 :C1 . . . Hx:C.sN1 . . . Nq is one of the x : A i or yj : B for 
iE {1,.. . ,n} and j E {1,... ,m}; now go to 5; 
if n, m, k and p are 0 then stop; 
otherwise, for each i E {1, . . . , n}, replace A, by its pseudo-long form with 
respect to (E; F, x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x_ 1 :A_ 1 ); similarly for each j E {1,. .. , m}, 
1 E {1,.. . , k} and r E {1,. . . ,p}, replace the B, M1 and Dr  by their pseudo-
long forms with respect to (E; F, x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , y 1 :B1 ,. . . , 
(E;F,x1 :A 1 ,. . . ,x:A,y 1 :B1 ,. . . ,y:B) and 
(; F, 	. . , 	y 1 :B1 , ... , Y m Bm , Wk+1 	Dk+l,. . . 	 : D_1) re- 
spectively. 
Remark The hypothesis is that the pseudo-long forms are unique and coincide 
with the 3j-long normal forms. It is not obvious, however, that the above algo-
rithm terminates since, for each 1 E {k + 1,. . . ,p}, the term D1 in parts 3 and 4 
may contain 3-redexes. One possibility for providing termination (suggested by 
Plotkin) is to use an equivalent algorithm, with the same resulting term as the 
one given, which first produces terms that are fully-applied (for example given 
F F- ©M1 . . . Mk, the term ©M1 . .. Mk is fully-applied with respect to (; F) if 
the arity of © is k) and then 3-reduce; intuitively, the fully-applied condition is 
preserved by /3-reduction. This conjecture is left for future work. Dowek [Dow9l] 
has a very different proof of termination for essentially the same algorithm for the 
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Calculus of Constructions [Coq85] and its subtheories. For the remainder of this 
thesis, we assume the uniqueness of 67-long normal forms. 
ME 
Chapter 5 
Adequate and Natural Encodings 
The formal justification of the new framework ELF is presented in this chapter. 
We show that ELF permits general definitions of representation; the syntactic 
versions of these definitions are given here, and in the following chapter the simple 
algebraic formulations are presented. 
Initially, we focus our attention on the consequence relations of formal systems. 
In the first section, we define the notion of an adequate encoding of an arbitrary 
logic represented in ELF+,  which characterises representations of consequence rela-
tions in the entailment relation of the representing type theories. We give examples 
of adequate encodings and show that the encoding of A 1-calculus [Bar84] in ELF, 
adapted from the ELF signature in [AHM89], is not adequate. 
The adequacy theorem accompanying the ELF representation of first-order 
logic [HHP89] also links the structure of derivations in the logic with the structure 
of certain ELF terms corresponding to the derivations. This gives some indication 
that the proof system of the logic can be mimicked by the representation in ELF. 
We provide a general definition of this correspondence, called a natural encoding. 
Using the same method as in [HHP89], this involves extending the syntax of the 
logic to incorporate expressions for proofs and adapting the proof system accord-
ingly. This results in a consequence relation with an explicit account of the proof 
expressions. It is not clear how to perform this extension in general. We illustrate 
the method using first-order logic which provides a natural encoding in ELF. We 
also point out that the encoding of Hilbert-style S 4 in ELF, although adequate, is 
not natural. 
II 
Adequate and Natural Encodings 
5.1 Representation of consequence relations 
We characterise representations of intuitionistic consequence relations of logics 
(definition 3.2.13) in ELF. This characterisation takes two parts; we first define 
an encoding, which gives a sound interpretation of the consequence relation in the 
entailment relation, and then an adequate encoding which states when this results 
in an equivalence. With representations in ELF it is not possible to define the basic 
notion of an encoding since, in some cases (example 5.1.12), a single signature is 
used to specify logics with different consequence relations. 
5.1.1 Encodings 
The definition of an encoding is given for an arbitrary logic specified by an ELF 
signature. It provides a correspondence between the syntax and judgements of 
the logic and the ELF terms in 077-long normal form (justified and defined in 
section 4.2.4). This correspondence identifies variables of the represented logic 
with sort variables, preserves substitution and gives a sound interpretation of the 
consequence relation in the entailment relation. Some care must be taken with 
identifying variables of the logic with sort variables. Each variable of the logic 
inhabits a unique syntactic class, whereas the corresponding information in the 
type theory is determined by the context, and so varies. We therefore define 
encodings using functions indexed by sequences of variables of the logic. The 
following notation is used throughout. 
Notation Let LOG be an arbitrary logic represented in ELF by EL 09 . We 
distinguish the following sets of ELF terms: 
termr = It for some preterm A, I' Log t : A); 
sort 	= {c: 1'
Log 
C: Sort); 
texpr = is : for some c Esortr , F F- EL0g  s : c}; 
judger = {j : F I- ELog  j: Judge). 
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The correspondence between the encoded logic and its representing type theory is 
given using the /3ij-long normal forms and so we distinguish the set 
term' = It : t E termr and t is in 37-long normal form w.r.t. (EL 09 ; F)} 
and, similarly, the sets sort, texp" and judg4". We also require, for each 
preterm A, 
= {t: F I- 	t : A and t is in 377-long normal form w.r.t (E LO9 ; F)}. ELog 
Recall that T denotes the set of preterms of (ELF+, EL) and VarSo?i  and 
Var Judge  denote the sets of sort variables and judgement variables respectively: 
that is, if F ELF+  x : A: Sort then x is a sort variable, and similarly for the Log 
judgements. 
The set of syntactic classes containing term expressions, the set of term ex-
pressions and the set of judgements of a logic LOG are denoted by SLOG, TLOG 
and JLOG  respectively. For X a finite sequence of distinct logic variables, TLOG(X) 
and JLOG(X) denote the subsets whose members contain free variables in X. We 
omit the subscripts when the particular logic is apparent. 
5.1.1 DEFINITIoN Let LOG be an arbitrary logic with an intuitionistic conse-
quence relation (definition 3.2.13) specified in ELF by EL 09 . An encoding of 
LOG in (ELF, EL O9 ) is a triple (ii, 6, 6) where ij: S — T is an injective function 
satisfying, for all c E 5, 
0 	i(c) : Sort,Log 
where ij(c) is in 13, j-long normal form with respect to (EL09; ( )). 
Both 	and 6 are families of injective functions 	: T(X) —* T and 
J(X) —* T, for finite sequences of logic variables X = (x',. . . , x) and 
for which there are distinguished bijections 1C : Vare Var S0Tt  for each c E 5, 
such that: 
x(r) 
= fC() for xC  in X; 
for each term expression t from syntactic class cr and judgement j, both with 
free variables in the sequence X = (x',.. . , x), we have 
F)cF•ELog 	(t) : 
FF E Sx (j): Judge, 
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where rX is ((Xi) : ij(o 1 ),.. . , x (x,) : ij(o)) and x(t) and S(j) are in 
/37-long normal form with respect to (EL Og ; rx ); 
the x  and 8, are compositional: that is, for term expressions t e T(Y) and 
• . , Sn E T(X) and judgement j E J(Y), 
= ey ( t)[ x (s)/ y (x)} 
= Sy(j)[x(s)/y(x)]; 
the interpretation is sound: that is, for sequences X = (x',. . . , x) and 
j) of variables and judgements of the logic respectively, 
{jl ... ,jm}H{x1x}jimplies 
8x(ji),. ,Pm : 6(jm ) H E . 
where I'x  is (SX(Xi) : 	. . , 	: ?](oj), the Pi, • . ,Pm are distinct 
variables in Var9e  and ..: &K(j) denotes the inhabitation of ELF term 
5(j). 
Remark The encoding definition depends on certain properties of the logics 
under consideration. The definition of syntactic classes (definition 3.1.1) does not 
depend on the variables of the logic so the image of ij is contained in sort. We also 
assume that the term expressions and the judgements (definitions 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) 
do not contain information regarding proof; this is mirrored in the encoding since, 
for each sequence of variables X, the images of 	and 6X are contained in term,677  rx 
and judg4" for context of sorts i' s . 
Remark An alternative approach is to define encodings without the indexing of 
variables and transfer the bookkeeping of variables to the definition of adequacy, 
where it is essential. Our method gives simpler definitions. 
Remark In general, the /377-long normal forms are not preserved by substitution: 
for example, if y: A, x : A — A llz : B.xM: u and y: A HE  (Ay:A.y) : A —+ A 
then y : A HE llz: B[(Ay:A.y)/x].(Ay:A.y)M[(Ay:A.y)/x] : u which contains a 
/13-redex. The compositional definition is well-defined in part 3 since A-abstractions 
are not substituted, as substitutions are restricted to inhabitants of sorts. 
94 
Adequate and Natural Encodings 
Remark In the above correspondence we do not link derivations in the logic 
and inhabitants of ELF+  judgements since the standard consequence relation of 
the logic contains no information about the derivations. The proof information is 
therefore disregarded in the entailment relation: that is, we are interested in the 
inhabitation of ELF judgements, rather than particular ELF terms. 
Notation Let (77, , 8) be an encoding of a logic in ELF. For each sequence 
X = (x', . . . , x) of variables of the logic, we let F denote the contexts of 
sorts (X(Xi) : 77(0'1),. . . ,(x) : ii(j). We write x : T(X) -+ texp 	and 
6x :' J(X) -* judg4 to denote the functions extensionally equal to 	and 
6x but with the more precise ranges. These are well-defined by condition 2 in 
definition 5.1.1. We also write 77 : S - sort. These functions play a central role 
in the definition of an adequate encoding (definition 5.1.4). 
5.1.2 PRoposiTioN Let (77,e,8)  be an encoding of a logic in ELF using EL 09 
and let X and Y be sequences of variables of the logic. If t € T(X) and t e T(Y) 
then ex(t) = e(t). Similarly, if j E J(X) and j E J(Y) then 6(j) = 6y (j).j 
Proof Follows from the compositional property (part 3 of definition 5.1.1). El 
Ideally, the correspondence between a logic and its representation in a frame-
work should be immediately apparent, although it is not clear that this goal is 
compatible with the aim of representing a wide variety of logics. With ELF, 
the link between the logic and the representing type theory is usually obvious, 
although some work must be done to show that it satisfies the conditions required 
in definition 5.1.1. We give an encoding of first-order logic in ELF specified by 
EFOI (section 4.2.2); other examples of encodings can be found in 5.1.7 and 5.1.9. 
In the case of EFoI, the proof that we indeed have an encoding is similar to part of 
the proof of the adequacy theorem accompanying the representations of first-order 
logic in ELF [HHP89]; this is to be expected as our definitions make the intuition 
behind the adequacy theorems precise. 
5.1.3 THEOREM The ELF+  signature EFOI gives an encoding of first-order logic 
in ELF. 
Proof The two syntactic classes of first-order logic, denoted by term and form, 
are represented in ELF+  by the terms t and o respectively, which gives the function 
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i: S -* sort as follows: 
i(term) = 
For each sequence X = (x1 ,. . . , x) of variables of first-order logic (we omit the 
superscripts as there is only one syntactic class), the function 	: T(X) - texr4 
is defined inductively on the structure of t E T(X) as follows: 
	
ex(x) =X , 	 xEX 
= 0 
&(succ(t)) = succ(x(t)) 
x(t + s) =+(Ex(t))(x(s)) 
where ()/ denotes a bijection from VarLog  to Var Sort  and rx is (x /  1 : t,... ) x / : 
The function 	is evidently well-defined, total and injective. Compositionality 
for 	is shown to hold by a straightforward structural induction on first-order 
term expressions. 
Similarly, for each sequence of variables X = (x 1 ,. . . , x,j, the function 
J(X) - judg4' is given by 5x(c5 true) = true('yx(q5)) for formula q,  where 
F(X) -* 4, with F(X) denoting the set of formulae with free variables in 
X, is defined inductively as follows: 
7x(t = s) = = 
= 
7xNXM = 
'yx(x.0) = 	(Ax' : 
where X, x denotes X U {x}. It is easily shown that y, is well-defined. Hence, 
6X  is a well-defined, total, injective function satisfying part 2 of definition 5.1.1. 
The compositional property for 6X  is shown by proving the equivalent property 
for yx , which proceeds by straightforward structural induction on the formulae of 
first-order logic. 
All that remains to do is show that the above correspondence provides a 
sound interpretation of the consequence relation of the logic in the entailment 
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relation of (ELF+, EFO!); in this case, for finite sequences X = (x1)... , x,j and 
(i true,.. . , On true) of variables and basic judgements of the logic respectively, 
we must show 
{ 01 true,. . . 0, true} '{x 1 ,. . . , X} qtrue implies 
6( true),... ,p : 6x(0m true) I- _: Sx(cbtrue), 
where rX is (x : t,. . . , 	: t) and - : Sx(q5 true) denotes the inhabitation of 
8x(ctrue). The proof follows by induction on the derivation of 
{ ci true,. , m true} 	{X1,.. . , x} 0 true. 
5.1.2 Adequate encodings 
An adequate encoding defines an exact correspondence between a consequence 
relation of a logic and its representation in ELF. This is important since it not 
only states that we get a sound and complete interpretation of the consequence 
relation in the entailment relation, but also that we can recover the logic from the 
representing type theory since no information has been lost during encoding. 
5.1.4 DEFINITIoN An encoding (7,8) is adequate when 
ij: S —* sort 97 is a bijection; 
for each finite sequence X = (Xal . . , x) of variables, the functions 
T(X) — texp' and S :5(X) —* judg4" are 	bijections;r1X 
the interpretation is complete; that is, for sequences X = (xv, . . . , x) and 
(j 1 ,. . , jm) of variables and judgements of the logic respectively, 
6x(ji),. . ,Pm 5(jm) 
F'Log 	6x(j) implies 
where the Pi . ,Pm are distinct variables in Var 
Judge  and _: 8(j) denotes 
the inhabitation of ELF term 6(j). 
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Remark A weaker notion results if we require only the completeness condition 
(part 3); we call such an encoding weakly adequate. For example, the representation 
of first-order logic (section 4.2.2) provides a weakly adequate representation of 
propositional logic. We do not concentrate on this definition since it is important 
to be able to discern from the type theory that part of the entailment relation 
which corresponds to the consequence relation of the underlying logic. This is 
very important when one wishes to investigate, for example, proof search and 
general tactics for representations in ELF+,  topics which are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but which are studied in [PW91], [Schm83] and elsewhere. 
Remark Weaker notions of encoding require investigation. In chapter 3, we 
emphasise that ELF has a certain approach to syntax, which need not be the 
same as the approach in the original presentation of the represented logic. We 
therefore gave a standard presentation which can be viewed as a transitional stage 
between logics and their representations in ELF+.  For example, the representation 
of Hubert-style S4 (example 5.1.9) uses the transitional logic £new. One possible 
avenue to explore is an encoding consisting of two naps; one from the transitional 
logic-to the original logic and the other from the to the representation 
in ELF. 
Notation Let (, , 8) be an adequate encoding. For each context of sorts 
Fs = (x:A,. . . , x,:A,) in /377-long normal form, let Xr, denote the sequence 
of variables 
/ ,i (Aj)1 	j'° (A) 	 (A,)1 	\?7(A)\ ,g 	 ,,, 
cr a 
where gC : VarS0t 4  Varc is the inverse of the function IC : Varc —* VarS0t given 
by the encoding. We write 	: texj4 —* T(X rs ) and 6. : judg4" _* J(Xrs) 
for the inverse of functions 	and 6X  respectively.rs 
5.1.5 PROPOSITION Let (i,,8) be an adequate encoding. 	The functions 
EI 	 / 	. rs : texp'r _+ T(Xr s ) and 8r : 3udge —* J(Xrs ) are compositional: thatrs 
is, for t E sortAs  and j E judgeAs  and term expressions si,. .. ,s E sortrs  where 
As = (x1 :A 1 , . . . , x:A) and rs F- EL09  s : A[s1, ... , s_ 1 1x 1 ,.. . , we have 
"'s t[I 	LS )['  rs (s) 
	
( SX]) - - - ' (t__/e (x)]; 
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5.1.6 THEOREM The encoding of first-order logic in (ELF, EF0I) defined in the 
proof of theorem 5.1.3 is adequate. 
Proof The function i : S —+ sort is obviously a bijection. For each context of 
sorts F5 in 1877-long normal form, we define 	: sort' — T(Xr s ) by inductionrs  
on the structure of the terms in sort 017  (in this case, terms inhabiting t) as follows: rs 
	
Er  (x) 	g(x) = 	 x E doin(F) 
e' (0) = 0 rs 
Er (succ(t)) 	= succ(e,(t)) 
= E(t) + E (s) rs 
Log 	term 	
— 	S 
I 	 Log ort where g : Var —* Var is inverse to ( ) : Var * Var 	given in the 
proof of theorem 5.1.3. The injective function 6X : T(X) —* sort, for each rX 
sequence of variables X, is a bijection since-'rx  is its right inverse. 
Similarly we have, for each context of sorts F5 in ,877-long normal form, the 
function S : judge —* J(X). This is given by 6,(true(çb)) = '4(cb)true, 
where : o —* F(Xrs ) is the inverse of yj,, : F(Xrs) —* o defined in thers 
proof of theorem 5.1.3. 
Finally we show, for J1 ,.. J,,, J E judg4" with F5 a context of sorts in 
?ij-long normal form, that 
F5 ,p1 :J1 ,... ,pm:J HELF+ H: J implies 	. ,( Jm)} HEi(r) 8rs()' m EFOI 	 rs rs 
where H is in 377-long normal form with respect to (Epoi ; F5 ,p1 :J1 ,. 
. . ,Pmm) and 
E(F5 ) denotes the set {E 'r (x) : x dom(Fs)}. 
This is proved by induction on the structure of H. This is proved by induction 
on the structure of H: we just look at one case. Let A denote F5 ,p1 :J1 ,. . . ,Pmm, 
so that A F- H: J, and assume H is of the form VI(Ax:t.0)(Ax:t.q). Using the 
generation lemma and renaming variables if necessary, A, x: t H E  q : true(0) and 
J is true(V(Ax:t.0)) by the uniqueness of 67-1ong normal forms. By the induction 
hypothesis, and using the permutation lemma to obtain A, x : t in the right form, 
it follows that 
• . ''s,z:em)} H 	(true(0)) 
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where Y is {4() : y E dom(Fs, x : t)}, and so we have a derivation of the 
corresponding sequent 	 's ,z:t(m)} ==>y 'yrs ,Z:t ' 	(0) true. Using the 
VI-rule of first-order logic, we infer 
	
{ S,z:L' ) ' 	. 	g ,z:m)} 	Y/{x'} Vx'.'/rs ,L  (0) true, '  





5.1.3 More examples 
5.1.7 EXAMPLE [Higher-order logic] The representation of higher-order logic in 
ELF+ gives an example of an adequate encoding which requires extra constants 
to express the syntax of the logic in the type theory. There are many ways of 
presenting higher-order logic (see for example [Chu40], [And7l], [Sch77], [Tak75]). 
We encode the version given in [HHP89], which follows Church in using the simply 
typed A-calculus [Mit9l] to form the syntax of the logics with the simple types 
being treated as syntactic classes (often called the domains). The syntax and basic 
judgements are defined using the signature notation introduced in chapter 3: 
C = {i° ,o° ,='.2 } 
CI =C 
='L 	LLL 	OOO a E = {OL, succ , + , } U U 
r
= 
 a a , 	U a 
Ua {app' 	A= ) } af3 aj3 
J = {true° } 
To illustrate the representation, we consider the following fragment of the natural 
deduction system for higher-order logic: 
VI 	
1' X, za btrue 
1' 	V(A, 0x.) true 
VE 	
1' 	V g,.(e)true 
I' 	appa ,o(e)(e')true 
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F 	(e =, e') true 
LAM 	
r 	(A,x.e 	)t ,7x.e') true 
EQ 	
' 	 X qStrue ' 4'X (c 	b)true 
"X 'çbtrue 
F 	(app,.,.(Ae)(x) =T e[e'/x]) true 
77 	 F = 	(A qrx.(app yr (e)(x)) 	e)true 	 x V fv(e) 
The representation of the domains has already been discussed in example 4.2.3. 
They are specified in ELF by the following declarations in the signature EHoI, 
adapted from the specification of higher-order logic in ELF [AHM89]: 
dom : Type 
dom 
o : dorn 
= : dom - dom -* dom 
obj : dom -* Sort 
The remaining part of the specification is similar to the ELF representation of 
first-order logic. The expressions are specified by a set of constants, one for each 
expression symbol of higher-order logic: 
o : obj(t) 
succ : obj(t=tL) 
+ : 
obj(000) 
= : us: dom.obj(s=s=?o) 
V : Hs: dom.obj((s=o)=o) 
A : Hs: dom.Ht: dom.(obj(s) -* obj(t)) -* obj(s.t) 
app : ils: doni.Ht: dom.obj(s=.t) -* obj(s) -+ obj(t) 
Notice that the representation of the quantifier and equality, both indexed by 
the domains, makes use of the dependent terms in an essential way, just as in the 
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ELF representation of higher-order logic. The abstraction operator of higher-order 
logic is specified by the constant A to avoid confusion with the A-abstraction of 
the type theory, and the constant = is used as an infix operator. In contrast to 
Church's formulation [Chu40], both the domain and range term of an abstraction 
are explicitly attached to the representation of A-abstractions and applications. 
This does not, however, introduce any complications when showing that we have an 
adequate representation since the domain and range terms are uniquely determined 
for each term expression of function type. 
Using the same approach as in the encoding of first-order logic, we declare a 
constant to form the truth judgements of the logic: 
true : obj(o) -+ Judge 
The inference rules are specified using techniques similar to those for first-order 
logic. As a notational expedient, we make use of the following 'externalisation' of 
the equality constant: 
As: dom.Ax: obj(s), Ày: obj(s).app30(app330 =S  x)(y) 
which inhabits 
Hs: dom.obj(s) -* obj(s) -* obj(o) 
and which we write in infix form. Again we have one constant for each rule (we 
write arguments to applications as subscripts to enhance readability): 
VI : Hs: dom.[IF: obj(so).(Hx: obj(s).true(app30 F x)) - true(app3 ,, 0,0 V. F) 
VE : Hs: dom.IIF: obj(s=o).11x: obj(s).true(app(80)  V. F) -* true(app3 F x) 
eq 	: Hq5:obj(o).H:obj(o).true(q5) -* true(q5 , ii') -+ true(i/.) 
1_am : Hs, t:dom.11f, g:obj(s)—obj(t).(Hx:obj(s).true(f x 	g x)) 
true(A 3 , Ax: obj(s).fx 	A 3 , Ax: obj(s).gx) 
/3 	: lls, t: dom.Hf: obj(s)—obj(t).Hx: obj(s). 
true(app3 (A 3 , (Ax:obj(s).fx)) x 	Ix) 
77 	[Is, t: dam .11f: obj(s=t).true(A3 (Ax: obj(s).app 3 Ix) (st) I) 
5.1.8 THEOREM The signature EHOL provides an adequate encoding of higher-
order logic in ELF. 
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Proof The mapping 77 	S - sort is given, for each domain o, by 
= obj(j3(cr)), where ,8: S - dom is defined by 
8(o)=o 
f3(0r = c/) = 
The link between the term expressions and inhabitants of sorts is given, for each 













=(fl(o. )) 	 oES 
, T E S 
app(/3(o))(,3(r))(Cx (e°))(Cx(d°)) 	o, E S 
and f° : Var° -* VarSOTt is a bijection for each o E S. The connection between the 
judgements of the logic and inhabitants of Judge is given, for each finite sequence 
of variables X by S : J(X) -* judg4" , where 6 () = true( x (q)). From these 
mappings we obtain an encoding. 
The function ij: S - class is a bijection since /3 : S - dom is. To show 
that (ij, , 6) provides an adequate encoding, we define functions 	: sort,677 -* 
T(Xr s ) and 6r, : judg4 -* J(Xrs ). Let gC : VarS0t Varc denote the inverse 
functions of fC  for each syntactic class c. Then, for a context of sorts IF S in /377-long 
normal form, we define by induction on the structure of terms inhabiting sorts rs 
in this context as follows: 
E (x 	= 	g11l(obi(A))(x) 	x : obj(A) E [' rs' 
e' (0) = 0 
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 succ) = succ rs 
= + rs 
= rs 
rs 	= 	(A) 
rs 
	
(A(A)(B)(Ax:obj(A).e)) 	= 	A_1 (A) (glll(obJ(A))(x))E 	b()(e) rs , Z 0 A  
e (app(A)(B)(e)(f)) 	= e (e)e' (f). rs 	 i's 	rs 
I 	 / 	 / The function 8r : 3udge 5 —* J(Xrs ) is given by Srs(true(q5)) = Er (çb)true. Itis 
routine to show that E'rx  and 	are inverse to 	and ä, for each finite sequencerx 
of variables X and that the completion condition in definition 5.1.4 is satisfied. E 
5.1.9 EXAMPLE [Hubert-style S4] The encoding of Hubert-style S 4 (example 3.2.16) 
is an example where an extra constant is used to represent the consequence re-





This rule cannot be represented directly by the standard method of declaring a 
constant nec inhabiting llc:o.true(q5) -* true(D) since such a constant would 
force the inhabitation of true(Dq5) in any context entailing true(q). The solu-
tion due to Avron [AHM89] centres on a logic, denoted by £new , with the same 
syntax as 54 , judgements of the form qtrue and çbvalid and the proof system in 
table 5.1. The consequence relation of Lne.  (denoted by H 7 ) restricted to the 
truth judgements is the same as the consequence relation, H ° , of Hubert-style 
S4 . 
5.1.10 THEOREM Let 01 ,. . . , , 0 be formulae of Hilbert-style 54 and X a finite 
set of logic variables (in this case denoting formulae). Then 
{ c'i true,. .. , On  true} F-°g ( true if and only if {q5 	qS true,. . . , , true} r-new true 
Proof See [Avr86]. 
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A 1 	(c D (' D q)) valid 
A 2 	((q53(1'DO))3(3) 3(qO))valid 
A3 	( 	j 4) valid 
A 4 	(D(0 3 ) 3 (EJq5 3 Db))valid 
A 5 	(EIO 3 flDq) valid 








') true çbtrue 
btrue 
Table 5.1: The new logic £new . 
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In Avron's approach, Hubert-style 54 is represented in ELF by encoding £new  
and then, in the accompanying adequacy theorem, limiting the correspondence to 
those ELF terms representing the truth judgements. An important advantage of 
ELF is that the specification of Hubert-style S 4 is different from the specification 
of £new. The difference occurs in the universes in which the terms corresponding 
to çttrue and çbvalid inhabit. We declare the constants true : o - Judge and 
valid: o -+ Type which indicate that the terms of the form true(q5) correspond to 
the basic judgements of Hubert-style S 4 and the terms of the form valid(cb) are 
extra terms given by the encoding. (In the representation of £new , the constants 
true and valid both inhabit o -* Judge.) The full specification of Hilbert-style 
84 , denoted by EM0d, is as follows: 
o 	: Sort 
o—+o--*o 
D 	: 0-40 
true : o -+ Judge 
valid : o - Type 
C 	: 11q5:o.valid(çb) - true(çb) 
Al : Hqb:o.valid(q D (0 j 0)) 
A2 	: llçb,b,O:o.valid((çb D ( DO)) -* (( D 
A3 : flq:o.valid(Eçb D q) 
A4 	: llq5, 'çb:o.valid(D(çb D ) D (00 D I0)) 
A5 	: llq:o.valid(Dq D DD) 
MPv : Hq, ib:o.valid(çb) - valid(çb D 0) - valid(b) 
Nec 	: llçb:o.valid(q) - valid(Dçt) 
MPT : flq5, 'çb:o.true(q) - true(çb D 0) - true('ib) 
5.1.11 THEOREM The signature EM0d provides an adequate representation of 
Hubert-style 54 in ELF. 
Proof The correspondence between the syntax and judgements of Hilbert-style 
S4 and terms in (ELF, EM 0d) is easy. We have q : S -* sort given by 
ii(form) = 0 
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and, for X a finite sequence of logic variables (denoting formulae in this case), the 
maps 	: T(X) ­4 texr4 and 5 : J(X) - judg4 are defined inductively by 
x(c5) = 	', 	 çbEX 
= 
WOO = D(x()) 
for bijection () 	
Log : Var —* Var Sort and 
8x(0 true) = true(x(q)) 
We must show, for sequences of variables X = (x', . .. , x) and of judgements 
(0 true,... , On  true), that 
	
{ ci true,. 	m true} 1 {x 1 ,. . . , X} true implies 
x,Pi : 6 (4 true),... ,Pm Sx(cbmtrue) H EMod _: Sx(cbtrue), 
for distinct variables Pi, 	,Pm in VarJndge  where — : 8(çbtrue) denotes the in- 
habitation of Ox(cb true). This fact follows from theorem 5.1.10, together with 
a correspondence between £new and (ELF+, EMd) which is given by 77 and, for 
each finite sequence of variables X, by and VX : Jnew(X) —* 7, where Jnew (X) 
denotes the set of basic judgements in Ln,.  with free variables in X. The function 
VX is defined by 
vx(cb true) = 6x(q5  true) 
vx(qvalid) = valid( x (cb) 
and, for sequences of variables X = (x1,. .. , x,) and judgements (J1 ,. . . , 1m ) in 
£new, satisfies 
', new {J1 ,... mJ 	j implies F,q1 : vx(Ji),. .. ,q : VX(Jm) EMod _: vx(J), 
where q1 ,. . . , q are distinct variables from Var Type u Var J1zde  and, as usual, 
_: vx(J) denotes the inhabitation of vx(J). It is easy to show that (, e, 6) is an 
adequate encoding. 	 0 
5.1.12 EXAMPLE [Ai-calculus] The A1-calculus [Bar84] is an example of a logic 
which has been represented in ELF [AHM89], but whose adapted signature for 
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ELF+ does not give an adequate encoding. In this calculus the A-abstraction is 
restricted to 
E A1 and x E fv(M) implies Ax.M E A1 , 
where A1 denotes the set of term expressions. It has already been noted that the 
general principle for encoding logics in ELF is to avoid declaring a term whose 
00%c 
objects L variables; the variables of the encoded logic are identified with the 
sort variables. The difficulty therefore in encoding the A 1-calculus is to identify 
which expressions have x as a free variable whilst still having the sort variables 
stand for logic variables. The method is inspired by the denotational semantics of 
the calculus and involves adding an extra constant I: o which limits the applica-
tion of the constant representing the A-abstraction. The signature specifying the 
A1-calculus, denoted by E, is: 
exp : Sort 
I. 	: exp 
Hx:exp --- expJx(±)=J—*exp 
app : exp -* exp -+ exp 
= 	: exp -p exp - Judge 
E0 : llx:exp.x = x 
El 	Hx,y:exp.x=y—.y=x 
E2 : Hx,y,z:exp.(x=y—*y=z—*x=z) 
E3 	H 	I : x, y, x , y 
I  :exp.x = y - x
I 
= yI -* (app(x, x') = app(y, y')) 
Hx:exp.app(x, I) = I 
llx:exp.app(..L, x) = I 
-'-A : I = A1 (Ax:exp.I,E0(I)) 
,31 	Hx:exp -* exp.Hy:exp.Htx(I) = 4app(A 1(x,t),y) = xy 
Remark The signature E, provides an example which makes use of the rule 
(Judge, Sort, Type) of the type theory to form the term in which the constant 
A1 resides even though, in A1 , the syntax does not depend on proofs. It is not 
clear whether this rule, plus (Judge, Type, Type), should in fact be included. This 
example does not clarify this point since this signature does not give an adequate 
encoding, as our next theorem states. 
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5.1.13 THEOREM The signature E 1 does not provide an adequate encoding of 
the A1-calculus in ELF. 
Proof We suppose (7), e, 6) is such an adequate encoding and show that this re- 
suits in a contradiction. 	Since (ij, , 6) is adequate, there is a function 
sort 3' -* T(0) such that E' > 0E0 = idT(o) and EO o
>1= 
id3 I3 fl. We show 
that all possible choices of E >(i) give a contradiction. If E ( > (. L) is a variable, x 
say, then e0 (x) = 1 which does not satisfy the definition of E0 . If e(-L) is MN for 
M, N E A1 , then I = e0 (MN) = 6(Mx)[N/x] for x fv(M) by compositionality 
of e and so e0 (Mx) = I. Also, using the same argument for y V fv(M), we have 
60 (My) = I, which contradicts the injectivity of E. A similar argument applies 
when e' > (..L) is a A-abstraction. D 
Remark It is conceivable that there is an encoding from the A 1-calculus to 
(ELF, E1 ) which sends Ax.M E A1 to .X.1 (Ax:exp.M')(p) for ELF term M' rep-
resenting M and p some chosen inhabitant of term (Ax:exp.M')(I) = I. Adding 
an extra constant I to the calculus is unlikely to provide an adequate encoding 
since the construction of ELF+  terms using constant depends on infinitely many 
terms inhabiting x(I) = I for x : exp -* exp. 
Remark An alternative approach to representing the A 1-calculus is to transfer 
the restriction of the A-abstraction to the rules for the equality judgement; that is, 
to declare A in (exp -* exp) -* exp and use a constant dir in (exp - exp) -* Type, 
with the intuition that dir(Ax : exp.e) is inhabited if x occurs free in e, to restrict 
the inhabitation of the equality judgement. Further research on'the representation 
of side-conditions, exploiting the universe Type, is required. 
5.2 Representation of proofs 
Adequate encodings characterise representations of intuitionistic consequence re-
lations in ELF+.  These encodings can be strengthened to give a stronger corre-
spondence which also links derivations in a logic with terms inhabiting judgements 
in the representing type theory: we call such encodings complete. A complete en-
coding is natural when this stronger correspondence also yields an equivalence. A 
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natural encoding captures the intuition that, for example, the representation of 
first-order logic is more direct than the representation of Hubert-style S 4 , and gives 
some measure of the fact that the proof system can be mimicked by its represen-
tation in ELF. The full statements of the adequacy theorems for ELF [HHP89] 
are thus generalised. Following the approach in [HHP89], the syntax of a logic 
must be extended to give an explicit account of derivations, and the proof system 
adapted accordingly. It is not clear how to do this in general. For the moment, 
we illustrate the putative method by example. In particular, we adapt first-order 
logic to give anLof  proofs and show that EFol  provides a natural encoding of first-
order logic in ELF. We also point out that the signature EM 0d gives an adequate 
encoding of Hilbert-style S 4 which is not natural. 
5.2.1 Proof expressions 
In this section, the syntax of first-order logic is extended to include a class of proof 
expressions, adapted from the definition in [HHP89], in order to give an explicit 
account of derivations in the consequence relation of first-order logic. The idea is 
that the derivation of, for example, (4 j b) true, using the D I-rule in the last line, 
is denoted by the proof expression I(q)()((p)q) where q is a proof of 0 true 
depending on the proof variable p which denotes a proof of 0 true. The discharge 
of assumption 0 corresponds to binding the proof variable p. The conclusion 
(q D V)) true gives enough information to infer the formulae 0 and , although 
this is not so in general as the E-ru1e illustrates. Thus the proof expressions 
themselves must carry information regarding the formulae used. Following the 
approach advocated in chapter 3, these expressions are generated from a set of 
proof symbols, denoted by pf,  which have a similar behaviour to the expression 
and judgement symbols and which are accompanied by arities, where the set of 
arities of first-order logic is adapted to incorporate the class of proof expressions. 
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The proof symbols for first-order logic are as follows: 
D 
D 	
1, p1, pf)-*pf 
t-pf)--pf 
VE(t, t, pf)-+pf 
t,pf)-*pf 
f, p1, (t,  pf) - pf) -- pf 
There is a proof symbol for each rule of first-order logic, given in example 3.2.14, 
whose arity indicates the schematic variables used in the rule, the proofs assumed 
and the required binding of logic and proof variables. The proof expressions are 
defined using a countably infinite set of proof variables, distinct from the logic 
and schematic variables and denoted by Var00l,  in a similar way to the logic 
expressions; for exarip1e, the proof expression VI((x)q)((x)p) is formed from the 
(t-f t-+pf)--pf proof symbol V 	' 	, the term variable x, the formula q  and the proof 
expression p. The notions of substitution and a-conversion are similar to those in 
definitions 3.1.11 and 3.1.13. Rules are adapted to sets of (n + 1)-tuples of proof 
sequents of the form I' p : J, where XLa set of variables of the logic, F is 
a set of proof assumptions of the form {p 1 :J1 ,. . . ,pm :Jm }, with J1 ,. . J, basic 
judgements with free variables in X and Pi,••• ,pm proof variables, J is a basic 
judgement with free variables in X, and p is a proof expression with free variables 
in X and free proof variables in {Pi, 
Not all proof expressions denote valid derivations of a logic, just as not all 
preterms of a PTS are well-formed. The proof system of first-order logic (exam-
ple 3.2.14) is adapted to incorporate these proof expressions and identify the ones 
which are valid; see table 5.2. 
A complete encoding maps valid proof expressions to terms inhabiting judge-
ments. We assume that the definitions of derivations and consequence relation 
with proofs are obvious adaptations of definitions 3.2.7 and 3.2.11 respectively. 
Notice that the consequence relation with proofs for first-order logic satisfies the 
following: 
weakening F 	p: J and F c A implies A F- p: J; 
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F,p: çbtrue ?X  q: btrue 
P 	I(çb, b, (p)q) : ( 0 D &) true 
F = p: ( 	') true F =x  q: çbtrue 
F =xD  E(çb,'ib,p,q) btrue 
vi 
	 F 	p: o true 
F 	x  \fI((x)cb, (x)p) : 'vlx.çb true 
VE 
	 F x p : Vx.çb true 
F ='x  \IE((x)cb,t,p) : cb[t/x]true 
31 
	 F = p: cb[t/x] true 
F 	E((x)q5true,t,p) : 3x.otrue 
EIE 
	P 	q: 2x.çbtrue F,p: çbtrue =x,b true 
=x E((x)çb,i/),q,(x,p)r) : i/Jtrue 
Table 5.2: Proof system of first-order logic with proof expressions. 
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substitution of variables r F-  p : J implies F[/] Hx,{ ufV() p[t/] : J[i/], 
where ifr is {p 1 :J1 ,.. ,pm :Jm } then F[/} is {Pi : J1 [/],. . . ,p : m{t7}} 
and fv(i) = U 1  fv(t) for i = (t1 ,. . . , t,); 
substitution of proof variables r 	H: J2 and ,p1 :J1 ,.. ,Pmm 	E : K 
implies I', A H, E[ll/] : K[ll/] (renaming variables to avoid conflicting 
proof variables if necessary). 
5.2.2 Natural encodings 
We are now in a position to give a stronger correspondence between first-order 
logic and the representing type theory (ELF,EFOl), by linking the valid proof 
expressions with ELF terms inhabiting judgements. The definition of encoding 
is extended to that of a complete encoding which gives a sound interpretation of the 
consequence relation with proofs in the entailment relation; a complete encoding 
is natural when it provides an exact link between the consequence relations with 
proofs and the corresponding part of the ELF+  entailment relation. These concepts 
are defined at the general level for an arbitrary logic with proof expressions since, 
although we do not have a general method for constructing proof expressions, we 
are able to characterise their behaviour. 
A logic with proof expressions consists of syntax extended to incorporate a class 
of proof expressions constructed from a countably infinite set of proof variables. 
These proof expressions have the usual notions of substitution and a-conversion 
applied to both logic and proof variables. The consequence relation with proofs is 
defined as a relation of the form A F-s. p: j where X is a set of variables of the logic, 
= {p:j 1 ,. . . , p:j} is a set of proof assumptions, with each ji for i E {1, . . . n} 
a basic judgement with free variables in X and the Pi, . , Pm distinct proof vari-
ables, j is a basic judgement with free variables in X and p is a proof expression 
with free variables in X and free proof variables in {Pi, . .. , Pm}. The proof expres-
sion p is said to be valid. As in the definition of the standard consequence relation 
(definition 3.2.11), we impose certain conditions on the consequence relation with 
proofs to ensure its compatibility with the entailment relation of ELF. An intu-
itionistic consequence relation with proofs satisfies the weakening condition and is 
113 
Adequate and Natural Encodings 
closed under substitution of variables and proof variables (properties listed above 
for first-order logic). 
Notation Let EL og  be the specification of a logic with proofs in ELF. We 
distinguish the following sets of ELF terms: 
proofr = {p: for some j E judge, r H 	p : j} 
proof = {p:p E proofr and p is in /3i-long normal form w.r.t. (E L0g ; F)}. 
We also use SLOG  to denote the set of proof expressions in the logic with subset 
PLOG(X, i.) containing those proof expressions with free variables in X and free 
proof variables in L, for finite sequences of variables X and proof assumptions 
L. Let VPLOG(X, ) denote the subset PLOG(X, z) consisting of valid proof 
expressions. We omit the subscript when the logic is apparent. 
COM)At oc 
5.2.1 DEFINITIoN Let LOG be an arbitrary logicencoded in ELF by EL og . A 
complete encoding of LOG in (ELF, EL O9 ) is a quadruple (ii, , 8, x) such that 
(ii, , 8) is an encoding and, for each finite sequence of variables X = (x',. . . , x) 
and of proof assumptions A = (pi :j1 ,. . . , Pm :j), and some given standard bijec-
tion -h: VarT00f , i,rJude the function : P(X,) - T satisfies: 
Xx;(P) = h(p) for p declared in ; 
for basic judgement j of the logic and proof expression p, 
Log 	. 	 ELF+ 
{pi:3,. . , pm:2m} H{1}  p : implies Ux, I 	EL06 Xx ;i(P) : 8xCi), 
where context rX  is (X(Xi) : 	. . , ç(x) : ii(cr)) and precontext [ 
is (Xx;(pi) : 8(j1),.. .Xx;(Pm) : 
the Xx;  is compositional; that is, for proof expressions [I E P(Y, ®) and 
E 1 ,. . . , E. e P(X, z) and term expressions t 1 ,. . . , t E T(X), we have 
Xx; 1 [1 , 	]) = Xy ;o(ll)[x(t), Xx ;i(E)/y(X), xy;o(P)1. 
Notation Let (j, , 6, x)  be a complete encoding and let X = (x',. . . , x) be 
a finite sequence of variables and A = (p1 :j1 ,.. . ,pj) a finite sequence of proof 
assumptions. We let I, rA denote the context 
(X(Xi) : ij(o),. . . 	: h1(CTn ),Xx ;i (Pi) : 6 (j1),. . , Xi(Pm) : 6(jm )) 
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in ,3i-long normal form where, by definition, IP X is a context of sorts and I 
is a precontext of judgements. In (ELF+, EL) the valid proof expressions are 
represented by terms inhabiting judgements; the proof expressions as a whole are 
not represented. We therefore restrict X X;zj to the valid proof expressions: the 
function Xx ;i : VP(X, z) —* proof is the function extensionally equal to 
Xx; ,a restricted to the domain VP(X, A.). 
5.2.2 PRoPosITIoN Let ('ii, , 6, x) be a complete encoding and let X, Y be finite 
sequences of variables of the logic and A., 0 be finite sequences of proof assump-
tions. If p is in P(X, A.) and P(Y, 0) then Xx ; (P) = XY ;o(P). 
Proof By the compositional condition given in part 3. 	 El 
5.2.3 DEFINITIoN A complete encoding (ii, , 6, x) is natural if 
(ii, , 6) is an adequate encoding; 
for finite sequences of variables X and proof assumptions A., the function 
Xx ;  : VP(X, Li) —* proof r  is a bijection; 
the interpretation is complete: that is, for sequences X = (x',. . . , x") and 
(p1:j1,. . . , p:j) of logic variables and proof assumptions respectively, 
Xx;ii(P) : 8(j) implies {p1 :j1 ,. ,pm:jm} F Lo9 EL09 	 {,...,z} P : J. 
5.2.4 THEOREM The signature EF0I provides a natural encoding of first-order 
logic in ELF. 
Proof In the proof of theorem 5.1.3, we provide a triple ('ij, , 6) which is an 
adequate encoding of first-order logic in ELF+.  We extend it to a natural encoding 
by defining, for each sequence of variables X and proof assumptions A., the function 
Xx4 : P(X, A.) —p T, as follows: 
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Xx ; (P) = P" 
	
pE/ 
Xx ; a(D I(cb)(b)((p)q)) = I(yx(c5))('yx (b))(.\p":6x(cb  true).Xx; (p)) 
Xx ;z(D E(çb)(b)(p)(q)) = E('y ())(7x ())(Xx ;i (P))(Xx; (q)) 
X x;i (11((X))((X)P) = VI(Ax':t.7 x ,(cb))(Ax':t.x x ,(p)) 
= 	 (t))(X; (p)) 
xx ;jx(1((x)cb)(t)(p)) = 	 (t))(Xx;z (p)) 
= 
E\x':t.7x,, ()) ('1(0))( 	(p)) (Ax':LAr":6 x ,(/, true) •Xx, ; ,r (q)) 
where bijection ()' : V ar 09 	VarSont and the functions 	F(X) -* o, 
for each sequence of variables X, are defined in the proof of theorem 5.1.3 and 
(.)" : Var' °° ' Var" is a bijecton. The functions XX;A  satisfy the conditions 
required to make (ii, , 5, x) a natural encoding. The details are left for the reader. 
0 
5.2.5 EXAMPLE [Higher-order logic] By proceeding analogously to the first-order 
case, one can give a language of proof expressions for higher-order logic and a 
formal system for deriving valid proof expressions to provide a complete encoding 
of higher-order logic in ELF which is natural. 
5.2.6 THEOREM The signature Eff 01 provides a natural encoding of higher-order 
logic in ELF. 
Proof Extend the adequate encoding given in the proof of theorem 5.1.8. 	0 
5.2.7 EXAMPLE [Hubert-style S 4] It seems likely that the adequate encoding of 
Hilbert-style S4 in ELF, given in theorem 5.1.11, is not natural. The intuition 
behind this claim is illustrated by comparing the standard proof system for Hilbert-
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for theorems 
( 	
st') true and qtrue in S4 can be linked with two derivations in 
' new : 




(q5 	) valid 0 valid 
valid 
'çbtrue 
We believe our definition of a natural encoding will permit this intuition to be 
made rigorous. 
Remark Our approach for reasoning about representations of derivations, based 
on the analysis in [HHP89], is clumsy. An alternative approach is to study the rep-
resentations of 'higher-order' consequence relations, constructed from Martin-Löf's 
hyp othetico- general judgements [Mar85]. A slight variation of ELF, where rule 
(s, Judge, Type) is replaced by (s, Judge, Judge) for each s in {Sort, Type, Judge}, 
would allow for a characterisation of the representations of these consequence re-
lations in ELF. 
Remark One interesting problem regarding naturality is to compare the rep-
resentations of Hilbert-style propositional logic, specified by >Hjl (a fragment of 
EM Od), and natural deduction-style propositional logic, specified by EN at (a frag-
ment of Epoi). It is intuitively clear that EN at provides a less natural representation 
of Hilbert-style propositional logic than the normal signature EH&  It is not so 
obvious that the analysis of naturality given in this section can distinguish this 
difference. This is because there is a correspondence between the proofs of the 
two propositional logics. The rules for the Hilbert-style logic are derived rules 
in the natural deduction presentation. The deduction theorem shows that the 
D I-rule in the natural deduction system is not derivable in Hubert-style proposi-
tional logic. Instead, Schönfinkel's abstraction algorithm [HS88] provides a map-
ping from derivations in the natural deduction propositional logic to the derivations 
in the Hilbert-style presentation. Using the higher-order consequence relation pro-
posed above, we should be able to show that EHz is a more direct representation 
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of Hilbert-style propositional logic tham ENat: 	H 	is an instance 
of the I-rule, whereas = 	H' 	does not hold, since we know that the 
deduction theorem is not derivable. 
118 
Chapter 6 
Encodings Expressed as Indexed Functors 
We have emphasised the similarity in structure between the logics of interest and 
their representing type theories, due to the fact that the behaviour of the variables 
and the consequence relation of the logic is determined by the properties of the 
ELF+ entailment relation. Encodings preserve this common structure. This mo-
tivates an algebraic presentation of the logics and their representing type theories 
as strict indexed categories [PS78] (or split fibrations [Ben%5]) so that encodings 
become indexed functors between them: that is, structure preserving maps rather 
than functions satisfying a list of syntactic conditions. More specifically, a logic 
with an intuitionistic consequence relation provides a (strict) indexed category, 
whose base gives the term expressions and whose fibres are defined by the con-
sequence relation. This approach uses ideas from the area of categorical logic 
(initiated by Lawvere [Law70]), but generalised to a wide class of logics. Using 
ELF ve are also able to view the representing type theory as a (strict) indexed 
category with the sorts providing the base category and the judgements the fibres. 
Adequate encodings then correspond to certain indexed isomorphisms. By adapt-
ing both indexed categories to incorporate the extra information regarding the 
proofs and inhabitants of judgements, natural encodings also yield isomorphisms 
between indexed categories. 
The results in chapters 2 and 3 allow a smooth transition frdm the syntactic 
definitions of the previous chapter to the algebraic presentations given here. 
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6.1 Indexing of categories 
The usual categorical structures for presenting logics and dependent type theories 
(see the section, 'Related research', in the introduction) employ a categorical no-
tion of indexing. In order to understand the indexing of categories, it is instructive 
to look at the indexing of sets, which can be described in two ways. The first is 
as a set of indexed categories, {X} 1 , also written as X : I - Set where Set 
denotes the class of all sets. The second is as a map f : Y -* I where I is again 
the indexing set; the indexed sets are then given by the fibres f'({i}). The cat-
egorical counterpart of the first approach is given by indexed categories [PS78], 
and that of the second by fibrations [Benc5]. There are obvious translations be-
tween the two approaches for sets (the analogous categorical concept is called the 
'Grothendieck construction'). It is sometimes preferable, for technical reasons, to 
use the fibration approach since, extending the set analogy, the map f is defined 
in set-theoretical terms whereas the map X is not; its range is the class of all sets. 
We choose the indexed category approach since, for our purposes, it is more natu-
ral to present a logic by first considering the syntax, which provides the indexing, 
and then the consequence relation. We concentrate on the definitions necessary for 
this chapter; an introduction to category theory is given by MacLane [Mac88J and 
a clear exposition of fibrations and (strict) indexed categories is found in [BW90] 
and [Jac9l]. 
6.1.1 DEFINITIoN Let C be a category. A strict indexed category is a functor 
F : C' - Cat where Cat is the category of small categories. The category C is 
the base category and, for c E obj(C), the fibre over c is the category F(c). 
Remark A more general notion of indexed category as a pseudo-functor F: C°1' -* 
Cat requires isomorphisms F(idc ) and F('u o v) F(u) o F(v) with certain 
coherent conditions (see Pare and Schumacher [PS78]). For our purposes, the 
indexed categories are always strict and so, in future, whenever we refer to indexed 
categories we assume that they are strict. 
6.1.2 DEFINITIoN Let F : A°1' -* Cat and C : B °1' -* Cat be indexed cate- 
gories. An indexed functor from F to G is a pair (crba8e) o) consisting of a functor 
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ciba8 e : A -* B (called the base functor) and a natural transformation ci : F 
G o oOP 
Certain properties of functors and natural transformations lead to conditions 
on indexed functors which are used in the analysis of encodings. An isomorphism 
F : C - B of categories is a functor F from C to B which is a bijection on objects 
and arrows. An equivalent definition is that there exists a functor G : B —* C 
such that F o G = idB and G o F = idc . Afunctor F: C -* B is faithful (or an 
embedding) when, to every pair c, c' E obj(C) and to every pair f1 , 12 : c -* c' of 
morphisms of C, the equalities Ff1 = Fl2 : Fc -* Fc' imply f1 = 12. We will also 
require some properties of natural transformations. Given functors F, C: A —* B, 
a natural isomorphism a : F -* G is a natural transformation in which every 
component aa , for a E obj(A), is an isomorphism. The inverses of the aa are the 
components of a natural isomorphism a 1 : G - F, which we call the inverse 
natural transformation for a. We write F G when such a natural isomorphism 
exists. A faithful natural transformation 0 : F -* G for F and G as above has 
faithful functors for its components. 
6.1.3 DEFINITIoN A faithful indexed functor is an indexed functor with a faithful 
base functor and a faithful natural transformation. 
6.1.4 DEFINITIoN An indexed isornorphism is an indexed functor whose base func- 
tor is an isomorphism and whose natural transformation is a natural isomorphism. 
6.2 Logics as indexed categories 
We provide a methodology for presenting logics with intuitionistic consequence 
relations as indexed categories, where the term expressions provide the base cate-
gory and the consequence relation the fibres. The common structure is determined 
by the properties of the ELF entailment relation which dictates the behaviour 
of the variables and consequence relations of the logics under consideration. This 
approach is based on the algebraic characterisation of particular logics and their 
models (initiated by Lawvere [Law70J), but generalised to a wide class of logics. 
It concentrates on the abstract view of logics as consequence relations (due to 
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Tarski [Tar56]) and provides the rudiments of an algebraic framework for such 
logics. 
For a logic with an intuitionistic consequence relation, the base category is 
determined by the term expressions. 
6.2.1 PROPOSITION Let LOG denote an arbitrary logic with an intuitionistic con-
sequence relation. Then the following defines a category: 
objects 	finite sequences of distinct logic variables; 
morphisms finite tuples of term expressions (t 1 ,. . . , t) : X -* Y(= (yi,•.. , 
such that, for each i E {1,.. . , n}, the tj and y2 inhabit the same 
syntactic class; 
composition if(t 1 ,...,t) : X -* Y = (yi,•. .,y) and(s 1 ,. ..,S m ) : Y -+ Zthen 
(Si,...,Sm ) 0(t 1 ,...,t) is (i[/Y] .... Sm[t/}) : X -* 
identity 	(x 1 ,. . . , x,) : X -+ X = (x1 ,.. . , 
Proof Use proposition 3.1.14 and the substitution results (proposition 3.1.15) to 
show that A is a category. 	 D 
6.2.2 DEFINITION Let LOG denote a logic with an intuitionistic consequence re-
lation. The category defined in proposition 6.2.1 is the term category for LOG. 
Remark An analysis of the structure induced by the expression symbols is not 
given as this structure is not present in the type theory (typically we represent 
these symbols by constants in the signature). This analysis should be possible 
using the information provided by the accompanying arities (section 3.1). 
Remark We have chosen to define the objects of the base category as sequences of 
variables to give an easy correspondence with the contexts of sorts. An alternative 
is to use sets of variables and either define an equivalence on the context of sorts 
using the permutation lemma or work with some standard enumeration of logic 
variables to determine the corresponding context. Both approaches introduce extra 
complication when studying encodings as indexed functors. For the same reason, 
we also present the assumptions as finite sequences of judgements. 
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6.2.3 PRoPosITIoN Let LOG denote a logic with an intuitionistic consequence 
relation. Then the following defines an indexed category £ : A ° - Cat. The 
base category A is the term category for LOG and, for each X = (xv ,. . . , x) in 
obj(A), the fibre £(X) is: 
objects 	finite sequences of judgements with free variables in X; 
morphisms (j1,. . , jm) - ( k r ,. . . , k,) whenever {j i , . . . ,jm} FLOG 	k2 for 
ie{l,...,p}. 
For each morphism (t 1 ,.. . , t) : Y -* X = (x 1 ,. . . , x,,) in A, the functor 
£((t 1 ,. . . 	: X - Y) = ()* : £(X) -+ £(Y) is as follows: 
()*((1 	
. ,j,,,,)) = (ii[/],. . 
()*((j1j)...* (k 1) .... k))= (ji[/],...,jm[/]) 
Proof The fibre £(X), for each X E obj(A), is a preorder since the logic has 
a consequence relation which is closed under cut (definition 3.2.12). By propo-
sition 3.1.14, we know that (t 1 ,. . . , t)" is well-defined. It is a functor from the 
consequence relation preserving substitution (definition 3.2.13) and the substi-
tution results (proposition 3.1.15). The functor £ : A °" - Cat is therefore 
well-defined. It preserves identity and composition using the substitution results 
(proposition 3.1.15). D 
Remark Notice that the proof of this proposition requires that the consequence 
relation preserves substitution (proposition 3.2.13) and satisfies the following cut 
condition: 
if {j1,...,j} 	k2 for i E {1, ... ,m} and {k i ,..., ICm } [-x  1 then 
The weakening property for intuitionistic consequence relations and the fact that 
these relations are defined on sets is not fundamental to our presentation of logics 
as indexed categories. We concentrate on these logics since they must have this 
property to be encodable in ELF. 
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6.2.4 DEFINITIoN Let LOG be a logic with an intuitionistic consequence rela-
tion. The indexed category defined in proposition 6.2.3 is the indexed category 
determined by LOG. 
Remark The standard motivation for presenting logics categorically is to ex-
plain the structure of particular logics: that is, to give a categorical account of 
the behaviour of the connectives and quantifiers. It is well-known, for example, 
that the universal quantification of intuitionistic first-order logic is right adjoint 
to substitution. This analysis concerns the specific properties of logics and, al-
though interesting, is not of fundamental concern to us. Of more relevance is 
an explanation of the general stucture common to all logics; the consequence re-
lation, defined from sets of assumptions and logic variables, corresponds to the 
base category and fibres having products; Martin-Löf's hypothetical and general 
judgements give cartesian closed categories for the fibres in which right adjoints 
to substitution exist. 
6.3 ELF+  as an indexed category 
We do not take the standard categorical approach to representing type theories. 
Our presentation is motivated by the use of the type theory as a framework for 
representing logics. It has already been emphasised that not all of the entailment 
relation of the representing type theory corresponds to the consequence relation of 
the underlying logic and, therefore, the whole theory is not presented as an indexed 
category. Instead, we take advantage of the separation of ELF+  terms into sorts, 
types and judgements to provide an indexed category whose base category is given 
by the inhabitants of sorts and whose fibres are given by the judgements. We con-
centrate on ELF+  terms in 37-long normal form since the definitions of adequate 
and natural encodings are given with respect to these forms. An alternative is to 
present the categorical structure up to 377-equivalence. 
The base category of the indexed category determined by (ELF, EL 09 ) is 
defined using the inhabitants of sorts. 
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6.3.1 PRoPOSITION Let (ELF, EL og ) be the type theory representing a logic. 
The following defines a category B: 
objects 	contexts of sorts in /3ij-long normal form; 
morphisms r —f 	= (x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x:A) are finite tuples (t 1 ,. . . , t) of 
ELF+ terms, such that P5 E LOG  t : A[t1,.. . , t_ 1 /x 1 , . . . , ;_1] for 
i E {1, . . . , n} and each t 1 is in 377-long normal form with respect 
to (EL O9 ; Ps); 
composition for morphisms (t 1 ,... ,t) : IPS - A s = (x1 :A 1 ,. .. ,x:A,) and 
(s 1 ,. . . ,S m ): As - ®, their composite (Si,.. . S) 0 (t 1 ,. . . , t) is 
(s1[/j,. . .,Sm[t/1) : - 
identity 	(x1)... , x,) : AS - A s = (x1 :A 1 ,. . . , x:A). 
Proof To determine that composition is well-defined, we must show that 
P HEti  :A[ti, . . . , t_ 1 /x 1 ,. . . , ;_], i { 1,. . . , n}, and x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , E- E a 
implies F ELog  a[/] where a is an ELF assertion. By the thinning lemma 
(lemma 2.3.6) and renaming variables if necessary, F, x 1 :A 1 ,.. . , x:A HELog  a and 
so, by the generalised substitution lemma (lemma 2.3.5) and, observing that sub-
stitution of sorts preserves /3j-long normal forms, the result follows. Using the 
start lemma (lemma 2.3.3), the identity is well-defined. The definition of simulta-
neous substitution, together with the accompanying results (proposition 3.1.15), 
give the identity and associative laws. D 
6.3.2 DEFINITIoN Let (ELF, SLog)  be the type theory representing a logic. The 
indexed category defined in proposition 6.3.1 is the sort category of (ELF, EL 09 ) 
Remark We have given no account of context extension: that is, given a context 
F and an entailment F F- A: 't for universe u containing variables, the extension 
is F, x : A. This analysis is not essential for our purposes and is omitted since, 
although there has been much research in this area (see [Jac9l] and the references 
therein), there is no definitive account of context extension. It is also beyond 
the scope of this thesis to give a full explanation of the structure arising from 
H-abstraction. 
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Using the sort category we define the indexed category determined by 
(ELF EL) which presents the subtheory corresponding to the encoded logic. 
6.3.3 PRoPOSITIoN Let (ELF, EL og ) be the type theory representing an arbi-
trary logic. Then the following defines an indexed category e: B°1' — Cat. The 
base category is the sort category of (ELF, ELog),  and, for each rs e obj(B), the 
fibre E([' s ) is the preorder category given by: 
objects 	finite sequences of judgements J1 ,. . . , J with J e judg4' for 
iE{l,...,n}; 
morphisms (J1 ,. . . , Jn) " (K1 ,... , Km ) whenever 
F5 ,p1 :J1 ,... ,p:J F-,
Log 
: K, for j e {1,. . .,m}, where — : K2 
denotes the inhabitation of judgement K,. 
For each morphism (t 1 ,. . . , t,) : As - Ps = (x1 :A 1 ,. .. , x,:A,) in B, the functor 
E: ((t1 ,. . . , t)° : P5 —f As)= ()* : S(P 5 ) —+ E() is given by 
= (J1 [/],.. .,Jm [t/]); 
Proof The fibres are seen to be preorders using the start lemma (lemma 2.3.3), 
the generalised substitution lemma (lemma 2.3.5) and the substitution results 
(lemma 3.1.15). For each morphism (t 1 ,. . . ,t,,) : As — F, ()* provides a well-
defined functor using the generalised substitution lemma and the start lemma. 
Finally, S is a functor, again by the generalised substitution lemma. D 
6.3.4 DEFINITIoN Let (ELF+, EL 09 ) denote the type theory representing an ar-
bitrary logic. The indexed category determined by (ELF, EL O9) is the indexed 
category defined in proposition 6.3.3. 
Remark Since adequate encodings focus on representing the consequence rela-
tions of logics, the fibres of the indexed category determined by the representing 
type theory are preorders: that is, we concentrate on inhabitation of judgements 
rather than the terms inhabiting judgements. To study complete encodings, these 
indexed categories must be adapted to incorporate the extra information given by 
the inhabiting terms (definition 6.5.4). 
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6.4 Adequate encodings give indexed isomorphisms 
We are now in a position to show that the syntactic definitions given in chapter 5 
correspond to simple categorical concepts; more specifically, encodings give rise 
to indexed functors such that adequate encodings correspond to indexed isomor-
phisms. 
Notation Let (77, , 6) be an encoding of a logic in ELF with standard bijections 
1C : Var' —* VarSot. Recall that when X = (x,. . . , x) is a finite sequence of 
variables of the logic we let rx denote (f° '( x 1 ) : 77 (0 1 ),. . ., f° (x) : 
- Also, if (ii, , 8) is an adequate encoding and gc 	Sort : Var 	—* Var c  is the inverse of 
fC  then, for F5 = (x 1 :A 1 ,.. . , x,:A) a context of sorts in 67-1ong normal form, 
we let Xrs  denote (g 11) (x 1 )
1 (A ' ) ,. g'(A..)(X),r'(A)) where 77-4 is the 
inverse of ij: S —p sort. 
6.4.1 THEOREM Let (i', , 8) be an encoding of a logic LOG with an intuitionistic 
consequence relation in ELF+,  and let the indexed categories determined by LOG 
and (ELF, EL 0g  ) be £ : A °" — p .  Cat and S B°" — Cat respectively. We can - 	 . 
define a faithful indexed functorL  denoted by (ebase , e) : £ — 5, consisting of base 
functor ebase A —* B and natural transformation e : £ —+ 5 o ebase , where 
eba8e((x1,. . . )x:)) = ( X(Xi) : i(oj),.. . 	: 77(o)) for X = (x 1 ,. . . , x); 
ebase ((ti,. . . ,t) : X —+ Y) = (e(t1),. .. ,(t)) : eba3e(X) —* eba3e(Y), 
and, for each X E obj(A), 
ex((Ji ,. . . , J)) = (8(J1), . . . , 
ex((Ji ,. . . , J) 	(K 1 , . . . , Km)) = (6x (1),. . . , 8(J,)) * (6x(K1),.. . , 
Proof ebase is well-defined since the encoding maps distinct logic variables to 
distinct sort variables and term expressions to inhabitants of sorts satisfying the 
properties stated in condition 2 of definition 5.1.4. Composition is preserved since 
eX is compositional for each X = (x', .. . , x) and the identity is obviously 
preserved. For each X E obj(A), we have a well-defined functor ex since the 
encoding gives a sound interpretation of the consequence relation in the entailment 
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relation and the identity and composition are obviously preserved because £(X) 
and 5 o e&a, e (X) are preorders. These functors give a natural transformation 
e : £ -* S since the functions 6x : J(X) - judgeP? are compositional. It is rx 
faithful Lsince ij and, for each X E obj(A), ex and 6X are injective functions. 	0 
6.4.2 DEFINITIoN Let (, , 6) be an encoding of an arbitrary logic LOG in ELF. 
The indexed functor determined by (ij, , 6) is the indexed functor defined in the-
orem 6.4.1. 
The converse of theorem 6.4.1 does not hold; that is, not all indexed functors 
give rise to encodings. For example, there is no guarantee that an indexed func-
tor preserves the ordering, or even the length, of tuples. We believe that a more 
detailed analysis of the structure of these indexed categories (in particular, the 
categorical interpretation of sequences and contexts) will yield a two-way corre-
spondence. We are able to deduce, however, that the indexed functor determined 
by an encoding is an indexed isomorphism if and only if the encoding is adequate. 
This strong correspondence is feasible since we are dealing with a particular in-
dexed functor, given by the encoding, which preserves the ordering and length of 
tuples. The preservation of structure gives rise to the following lemma, used to 
link adequacy with isomorphisms. 
6.4.3 LEMMA Let (ii, , 6) be an encoding of LOG in ELF by EL 09 such that 
the indexed categories determined by LOG and (ELF, E 09 ) are £ : A °2' - Cat 
and S : B ° -+ Cat respectively. Let the indexed isomorphism (ebase) e) £ -+ S 
be determined by the encoding and let (fba3e, f) : 5 - £ be the inverse indexed 
functor for (ebase)  e). 
1. Given 
S .__J\ 
f6 a8e ((1) t )  J) PS - L5) = (iT,t
/  , V) : f&ase(") " fbae('S) 
__J Uf 
fbase ((X,t,Y) : 	- 	= (x ,t ,y) : fbase(1'$) " fbae(s), 
where (ii, t, u) and (, t,  ) denote two arbitrary morphisms in B containing 
ELF+ term t, we have 
(a) the lengths of rs and fba3e(F5)  and of As and fba3e(S)  are the same; 
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the lengths of i and ü' and of U and 'O are the same; 
t' = t". 
2. For each I'g E obj(B), given 
frs (U,Jj)) = _I 	! __J fr5((,J,))=p,J ,q'?, 
where (3, J,  ) and  (, J, ) denote two arbitrary objects of E(F 5 ) containing 
J E judg4', we have: 
the lengths of 3 and  3' and of I and r are the same; 
J' = J". 
Proof By the definition of (eba8e , e) we know that the functor eba,e and, for 
all X e obj(A), the functors ex preserve order and length of sequences and tu-
pies. This yields parts la, lb and 2a. Parts lc and 2b follow from the equalities 
ebase  0 fbase = idB and efb (rs) ° Irs = idg(rs ), for each rs E obj(B), and the 
injectivity of i and , 6x, for each X E obj(A). D 
We are now in a position to show that adequate encodings correspond to in-
dexed isomorphisms. 
6.4.4 THEOREM Let (ij, , 6) be an encoding of an logic LOG with an intuitionistic 
consequence relation in ELF+  and let (eba8e) e) : L -* S be the indexed functor 
determined by (ii, , 6), where £ : -* Cat and 5: B °" -* Cat. Then (j, , 6) is 
adequate if and only if (ebase , e) is an indexed isomorphism. 
Proof Since (ij, , 6) is an adequate encoding, we know that there are functions 
texj4' _* T(X rs ) and 6. : judg4' _* J(Xrs ), for each context of sorts 
IFS in 37-long normal form, which are inverse to exr  and 6Xrs  We use these 
functors to provide an indexed functor (Ibase, I) : S -p £ which is the inverse 
indexed functor of (ebase , e). 
The base functor fba8e  is given as follows: 
fbase ((X141, . . , x:A, 1)) = ((x r'(A1) 	' i) 	,.. ,rs (xn 
where F 5 is (x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , 
fbase((t1,,tm ) : rs - 	s) = ( 3 (t1 ),... ,(tm)) : fbase (1S) 	fbase( 1 S), 
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and, for each context of sorts F5 in /3ij-long normal form, the natural transforma-
tion f : 	£ ° fbase is defined, for each F5 E obj(B), by 
frs ((Ji,... ,Jm)) = 
frs((Ji,•••,Jm) 	(K 1 ,. ..,K)) = (6 (Ji),..•, 6 (Jm))rs 
(K)).' 6rs 
That (fbaae,  f) provides an indexed functor from E to £ follows from the conditions 
satisfied by i[', , and 6', s for F5 E obj(B). In particular, we have that fba3e  pre-
serves compositionality and that irs'  for each rs E obj(B), forms the components 
of a natural transformation since 	and 6 preserve substitution (see proposi- 
tion 5.1.5): that is, given s E sort, j E judge, where L = (x 1 :A 1 ,. .. , x,:A) 




The indexed functor (fba8e, f) is inverse to (e&a5e , e) since, for each X E obj(A), 
the functions i[, 	and 	are inverse to m ex and  6  respectively.rX 
We now show that whenever ( 6ba8C) e) is an indexed isomorphism then (ii, , 6) 
is an adequate encoding. This relies on lemma 6.4.3. Let (fba8e, f) : F -+ £ be 
the inverse indexed functor of (ebase , e). Define i/ : sort - S and, for each 
rs e obj(Fs), . : texj4 - T and 6, : judg4 - J as follows: 
. 'q'(A) = cr for each A E sort, where f&ase ((X : A)) = 
• 	(t) = t' for each t sort, where fba3e((X1, . . . ) x,, )  t) : Fs -i F, x : A) = 
(Yi, 	, y, t') : fba8e(FS) -* f 8 (F, x : A); 
• 
	
1 	 . 	/ 	 . 	.1 61 
rs ( l) = j j for each e .judge '1 , where fr 5 ((J)) = (3 ) 
The function j' is well-defined by lemma 6.4.3, the injectivity of ij and the equality 
ebase o fba8e = idB . It is the inverse of ij since fbase  is the inverse functor of eba8e . For 
77 +each Fs E obj(B), the function: texp - T is well-defined by lemma 6.4.3 
and the fact that the objects are contexts in 077-long normal form. The equality 
eba8e  ° fbase = idB implies, for each F5 E obj(B), that t) C T(X rs ) where, 
if F5 is (x 1 :A 1 ,. . . , x:A), then Xrs is (,(xiy(A1),.. . ,, (x n)'"); we write 
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texp —* T(Xr s ). For each X E obj(A), the function 	: texppr —+ 
T(X) is inverse to : T(X) — texp since fba3e  is inverse to ebase . We use 
a similar argument, this time appealing to the fact that functor frx  : e(r) —i 
£(fbase(FX)) is inverse to functor ex : £(X) —+ S(eb ase (X)), for all X e obj(A), to 
show that the function : judg4" —* J(X) is inverse to : J(X) — judg4. 
Finally, the result 
rs,pi:ji,. . . 	EELF+ -. j : Judge implies EL 09  
16( i),. ,6(j)} xrs 	5W' rs 
where if F. is (x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x,:A,) then Xr s  is ( 	( x1 ) 17 '(Al), . . . , 	(x)'''), fol- 
lows from lemma 6.4.3 and the fact that (fba3e, f) is an indexed functor. 	0 
6.5 Natural encodings give indexed isomorphisms 
The categorical presentation of adequate encodings does not require an explicit 
account of the derivations of a logic or the terms inhabiting ELF judgements. 
We now include this information regarding proofs in order to express complete en-
codings as indexed functors, with naturality again corresponding to isomorphism. 
The definition of the complete indexed category for LOG, which includes the 
proof information, has the term category of LOG for its base. Its fibres are defined 
using the proof expressions rather than just the consequence relation. 
6.5.1 PRoposiTioN Let LOG be an arbitrary logic with an intuitionistic conse-
quence relation with proofs. An indexed category, denoted by £ : A °" — Cat, 
has the term category for LOG (definition 6.2.2) as its base category and, for each 
X E obj(A), the fibre £(X) consisting of: 
objects 	finite sequences of proof assumptions (p 1 :j1 ,. . . , 
morphisms finite tuples of proof expressions 
(H 1 ,... ,11m ) : (p1 :j1 ,.. .,p:j) —p (q:k,. . . 
composition for (H 1 ,... ,llm ) : (p1 :j1) .. . ,p:j,) —* (q1 :k 1 ,. . ., qm :km ) and for 
. . . , E,.) : (q1 :k 1 .... , q:k) —+ (si:l, . . . ) s:l), the composition 
(Ei,...,Er)O(Hi, .... Hm ) is 
(J1[ll/],. .. ,E7 [ii/]) : (p1 :j1 ,. . ., p:j) —' (s 1 :11 ,. . . 
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identity 	(pi,. . . ,p) : (p1 :j1 ,. . ,p:j) —4  (p1 :j1 ,. .. ,p:j). 
For each morphism (t 1 ,.. . ) t,) : X —* Y = (Yi,. . . , y,) in A, the functor 
- £((t 1 ,... ,t) op  Y —* X) = (t)*  : 	—* Lp(X) is given by 
	
()*((p1:j1  . ,pm:jm)) = 	: j1[/],.. . ,p 	im[/]); 
' H,.) : (p1 :j1 ,. 	,pm :jm ) —+ (q1 :k,. . ,q,.:k,.)) = 
(r)((p1 :j1 ,. . ,pm :jm )) —  
Proof The proof follows from the substitution results (proposition 3.1.15) and the 
consequence relation being closed under substitution of logic and proof variables, 
as specified in section 5.2.2. 	 D 
6.5.2 DEFINITIoN Let LOG be an arbitrary logic with an intuitionistic conse-
quence relation with proof. The complete indexed category for LOG is that defined 
in proposition 6.5.1. 
The inhabitants of the ELF judgements are incorporated into the indexed cate-
gory determined by (ELF ) EL og ) in a similar fashion. 
6.5.3 PROPosITIoN Let (ELF, EL og ) be the type theory representing an arbi-
trary logic. We may define an indexed category, denoted by S: B' —* Cat, with 
the sort category for (ELF, SLog)  (definition 6.3.2) as its base category and, for 
each F5 E obj(B), the fibre 6(F 5 ) consisting of 
objects 	precontexts F j , where ri is (p1 :J1 ,. . . 	such that 
J2 E judge for i E {1,. . . , n} and F5 ,p1 :J1 ,. . . , p:J is a context; 
morphisms finite tuples of ELF terms 
Fj —* A i = (q1 :K1 ,... ,qm :Km ) such that 
ELOG  
composition for (fly,. . . , Hm ) : Fj —p 1 j and (E r ,. . , E1 ) 	z 	— ® j, the 
composition is (E 1 [ll/},. . . , E[ll/]) : F —+ 
identity 	(pi,.. . ,p) : F —* 	= (p1 :J1 ,. . . , p,:J,,). 
For morphism (t 1 ,. . . , t,) : rs As = (y 1 :A 1 ,. . . , y:A,) in B, the functor 
= 
( 	: e(5) —+ S,(F.) is given by 
()*41:J1 
... 
,pm :Jm )) = (p 	J1[1/]1.  ,Pm : 
()* 
: ((ll,.. .,H 1 ) : F 	—+ ij) = (H 1 [/],... ,H 1 [/]) 	F[/] —* 
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Proof The proof that the e(F) are categories follows the same reasoning as in 
the proof of proposition 6.3.1. For each morphism (t 1 ,. . . , the ()* provides a 
well-defined functor using the generalised substitution lemma (lemma 2.3.5) and 
the start lemma (lemma 2.3.3). Finally, Ep is a functor, again from the generalised 
substitution lemma. u 
6.5.4 DEFINITION Let (ELF+, EL) represent an arbitrary logic. The complete 
indexed category for(ELF, EL Og) is that defined by in proposition 6.5.3. 
6.5.5 THEOREM Let (ij, , 6, x) be a complete encoding of a logic with an intuition-
istic consequence relation with proof represented in ELF+,  and let the complete 
indexed categories be £ A ° - Cat and S B° - Cat respectively. A faithful 
indexed functor from L p to EpLcan  be defined, with the base functor eba3e  : A -+ B, 
defined in theorem 6.4.1, and natural transformation ce : Cp - Ep o eba,, defined, 
for each X E obj(A), by 
cex ((p1 :j1 ,. . . , pm :jm )) = (Xx ;i(Pi) : 6(j1 ),. . . , Xx ; (Pm) : 6x(irn)); 
cex((Hi, . . . , H 1 ) (p1 :j1 , . . . , pm:jm) 	, (q1 :1 1 , . . . , q1 :k 1 )) 
= (Xx ;i(r1 i),. . . , X,(H1)) : ce x ((p1 :ji ,. . . ,pm :jm )) 	ce((q 1 :k1 ,.. . , q1 :k1 )), 
where A is (p1 :j1 ,. . . , pm :j n ). 
Proof We have a natural transformation ce : Cp - 	o ebase  by the compo- 
sitionality of 5, and Xx;'  for X e obj(A) and 	obj(Cp(X)). It provides a 
faithful indexed functorLslnce ij and, for each X E obj(A) and L E obj(I. p (X)), 
the functions 	, Sx and Xx;A are all injective. 	 U 
Remark Just as in the encoding case, we believe that, with more analysis of the 
structure of these indexed categories, the converse may be proved. This analysis 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6.5.6 DEFINITIoN Let (ii, , 51 x)  be a complete encoding of a logic with an intu-
itionistic consequence relation with proofs in ELF+.  The indexed functor deter-
mined by (j, , 5, x) is that defined in theorem 6.5.5. 
Remark By definition we know that a complete encoding is an encoding with 
an extra correspondence satisfying certain conditions. This is reflected in the 
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categorical treatment by defining the indexed functors (idA, F6 ) : Cp  — 12 and 
(idB , F6 ) : Sp —* S, where F 6 and F6 are natural transformations whose compo-
nents are the obvious forgetful functors losing the information regarding the proof 
expressions and the inhabitants of judgernents respectively, to obtain the equality 
(ebase)  e) o (idA , F6 ) = (idB) F6 ) o (ebase ) ce); 
that is, eba3e oidA = idB 0 ebase  and, for each X E obj(A), ex oF6 = F6 X 	e(X) 0 cex. 
6.5.7 THEOREM Let (ii, , 6, x) be an encoding of a logic with an intuitionistic 
consequence relation with proof in ELF+,  and indexed functor (ebase , e) : 	— 
be the indexed functor determined by (ii, , 6, x), where £ p : A °" —* Cat and 
B °' —p Cat. Then (i', , 6, x) is natural if and only if (eba3e , ce) is an indexed 
isomorphism. 
Proof Adapt lemma 6.4.3 for (fba3e,  cf) : Sp —p £p, the inverse indexed functor 
of (ebaBe , ce) : Cp —+ £. The proof is similar to that of theorem 6.4.4. 	0 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
In this thesis we have introduced and explored the new framework ELF+.  An im-
portant achievement is that, with this framework, we are now able to characterise 
what it means to represent a logic. More specifically, we have concentrated on 
characterising two consequence relations defined using the proof system of a logic: 
the usual consequence relation associated with natural deduction systems and a 
consequence relation with explicit reference to proofs. In this concluding chapter, 
we summarise some important directions for future work arising from this thesis. 
Several specific areas for further research have been identified in earlier chap-
ters, and include: 
proof search and general tactics for representations in ELF+  (page 98); 
. weaker notions of encoding (page 98); 
• the comparison between ELF and Martin-Löf's type theory with the judge-
ments A set, Aprop and Atrue (example 4.2.2); 
• the representation of side-conditions using the universe Type (page 109); 
• an algorithm for constructing 37-1ong normal forms (section 4.2.4); 
• an alternative method for incorporating signatures in PTSs (section 2.2). 
In the following sections, we briefly discuss some wider issues, regarding repre-
sentations of logics in frameworks. 
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Consequence relations from derivations 
In our analysis of representations, we have focused on two types of consequence 
relation given by the proof system of a logic. Since our ultimate aim is to mimic 
the proof system of a logic using its representation in the framework, the in-
vestigation of the most appropriate consequence relation, which provides enough 
information to reconstruct the derivations, is an important area to explore. One 
possibility is to use a higher-order consequence relation, based on the basic and 
higher-order judgements of Martin-Löf [Mar85] (see chapter 3), to retain informa-
tion regarding the dependency of proofs and the binding of variables in derivations. 
Using a slight adaptation of ELF, where the rule (s, Judge, Type) is replaced by 
(s, Judge, Judge) for each s E {Sort, Type, Judge}, a general description of the 
ELF terms corresponding to the basic and higher-order judgements is possible. 
We believe that this general description will allow the characterisation of represen-
tations of higher-order consequence relations in ELF+,  and thus provide an easy 
analysis of the representation of the structure of derivations. 
An alternative approach is to have a more direct representation of the rules as 
closed terms (with no free variables) in Judge; that is, rules are specific 
H-abstractions in Judge rather than terms inhabiting judgements. For example, 
the VI-rule of first-order logic would be identified with the ELF judgement 
HqS, 'b:o.(true(q5) - true(b)) - true(q D ). 
This is a very different concept of representation and so is inevitably more specu-
lative than the one discussed above. 
All the notions of consequence relation considered so far are defined with re-
spect to sets of assumptions and indexed by sets of variables, since the restriction 
to sets is required if the consequence relation is to be represented by the ELF+ 
entailment relation. Viewing derivations of natural deduction systems as trees, 
it makes more sense to consider multisets of assumptions (advocated in [Avr9l]): 
that is, collections of judgements where the ordering is not important but the 
number of occurrences is. This leads us to the concept of a 'linear' consequence 
relation defined using multisets of assumptions and indexed by sets of variables. 
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Work in progress on a linear ELF [MPP92], transferring ideas from Girard's lin-
ear logic [Gir87] to type theory, should be relevant here. These ideas should be 
compatible with the higher-order consequence relations discussed above. 
Schematic consequence relations 
When using logics, one usually works with derivations and the consequence relation 
at the schematic level. The study of schematic consequence relations arising from 
proof systems, an area also proposed by Aczel [Acz9l], is therefore important; this 
study would yield a deeper understanding of the informal method of representation 
in ELF+,  which relies on the schematic presentation of rules. It may even be 
possible to provide a methodology for representing logics of a certain standard 
form, rather than just an informal method which one must then show to be correct. 
This standard form would not constitute a framework since logics would not be 
presented using a finite amount of information, but it would give a transitory stage 
from which representations in ELF+  should be easy to obtain. 
If we wish to investigate the schematic nature of logics, an alternative ap-
proach to frameworks may be more appropriate, where the standard variables and 
schematic variables of the logics are treated separately. This separation of vari-
ables is motivated by the observation that, at the schematic level, substitution is 
a common notion, whereas a common behaviour of variables of the logic is not so 
obvious: for example, the variables of first-order logic, Hoare logic [Apt8l] and the 
it-calculus [MPW89] have very different behaviours (see section 3.1). With this 
approach to frameworks, we would aim, for instance, to capture a-conversion at 
the logic level and substitution at the schematic level. 
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Algebraic frameworks 
Our work on the algebraic formulation of logics and their representations in ELF+ 
provides a link between syntactic and algebraic notions of frameworks. In chap-
ter 6, we present logics and their representing type theories as (strict) indexed 
categories where the amount of information within these indexed categories de-
pends on the particular consequence relation under investigation. We have shown 
that, for both types of consequence relation discussed in this thesis, encodings 
determine indexed functors such that "correct'encodings give rise to indexed iso-
morphisms. We conjecture that further analysis of the general structure of these 
indexed categories, and in particular of the categorical interpretation of sequences 
and contexts (a major research area at the moment), will give an exact correspon-
dence between encodings and indexed functors and, hence, a precise link between 
the syntactic and algebraic presentations. These ideas should also apply to the 
notion of a higher-order consequence relation discussed above, with the higher-
order structure amounting to the fibres being cartesian closed categories with 
right adjoints to substitution. Our ideas thus form the beginnings of an algebraic 
framework for representing logics. 
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The Type Theory ELF 
The original presentation of ELF [HHP89] is given in this appendix. In chapter 2, 
we present an equivalent type theory which is notationally more concise and easier 
to understand. 
A countably infinite set of variables is given and two countably infinite sets 
of constants, disjoint from each other and from the variables: one for object-level 
constants, the other for family-level constants. The metavariables x, y, and z 
range over the variables, c and d range over the object-level constants, and a and b 
over the family-level constants. The abstract syntax of the terms of ELF is given 
by the following grammar: 
Kinds 	K ::= Type I flx:A.K 
Families 	A ::= a Hx:A.B I Ax:A.B I AM 
Objects M ::= c x I Ax:A.M I MN 
The abstract syntax for signatures and contexts is given by the grammar: 
Signatures 	E ::= () 	, a:K I E, c:A 
Contexts 	F ::= () F,x:A 
The ELF type theory is a formal system for deriving assertions of one of the 
following forms (the intended meaning is in brackets): 
E sig (E is a valid signature) 
F (F is a valid context in E) 
FF- E K (KisakindinFandE) 
FI- E A:K (AhaskindKinFand>J) 
F}-EM:A (MhastypeAinFandE) 
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sig I-E K a'dom(E) 
(B-KIND-SIC) 	
E, a:K sig 












1E F  
F HE Type 
F,x:A HE K 
(B-PI-KIND) 
F HE Hx:A.K 
Table A.1: The LF Type System 
We write F F- a for an arbitrary assertion of one of the forms F HE K, F 'E  A: K, 
or F HE M : A. The rules for deriving the formation assertions of the ELF type 
theory are given in Tables A.1 and A.2. 
The inference rules of the ELF type theory make use of a definitional equality, 
consisting of the following three forms of assertion: 
F HE K K' 	(K and K' are definitionally equal kinds in F and E) 
r 	A A' (A and A' are definitionally equal families in F and E) 
F HE M M' 	(M and M' are definitionally equal objects in F and E) 
The first two of these relations are used directly (rules B-CONV-FAM and B-CONy-
OBJ); the third is used to define the others. 
The definitional equality relation considered is /3-conversion of the entities at 
all levels. Thus we define the definitional equality relation, , between entities of 
all three levels to be the symmetric and transitive closure of the parallel nested 
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I-S F c:KE>J 
F Fr, C: K 
F,x:A 1E  B : Type 
F F-r, Hx:A.B : Type 
F,x:AF-B:K 
F 1E  \x:A.B : Hx:A.K 
FI-E A:llx:B.K FI- E M:B 
F 'E  AM : [M/x]K 
FI-E A:K FI-D K' FI-E K=K' 
F HE A : K' 
F-DF c:AEE 
F HE  c : A 
HE F x:AEF 
F HE x : A 
F,x:AF-E M : B 
F HE Ax:A.M : Hx:A.B 
FI-E M:Hx:A.B FH E N:A 
F HE MN : [N/x]B 
FHE M:A FHA':Type FH E AA' 




Table A.2: The LF Type System (continued) 
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(Ax:A.M)N - [N'/x]M' 
B—*B' 	N—*N' 
(R-BETA-FAM) 
(Ax:A.B)N -* [N'/x]B' 
M—*M' N—*N' 
(R-APP-OBJ) 
MN -* M'N' 
A—*A' 	M—*M' 
(R-APP-FAM) 







A — A' B — B' 
(R-PI-FAM) 
Hx:A.B - [lx:A'.B' 
A—*A' 	K—*K' 
(R-PI-KIND) 
Hx:A.K -* Hx:A'.K' 
Table A.3: Parallel Reduction 
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reduction relation, -*, defined by the rules of Table A.3. The transitive closure of 
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